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Abstract. 
In West Africa, where most countries attained independence in 1960 or around that Economic 
co-operation and integration have been pursued at different levels with degree 
This addresses Nigeria's policy in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 
between 1979-1997. It is an investigation of the forces that have been driving the integration efforts in 
West Africa. The study focuses on the period between 1979-1997. The analysis proceeds through three 
Onl'lse,Y- Firstly the Alhaji Shehu Shagari Era 1979-1983; secondly, the General. Muhammadu Buhari 
era 1983-1984;finally the General Ibrahim BabangidaiErnest ShonekanlGeneral Sani Abacha eras 
1984-1998. The policy posture of Nigeria as a regional powerbroker is the focal pOint of analysis in 
relation to Protocols ECOWAS Treaty. Three policy courses pursued by 
been the subject of examination in this study: the expulsion of illegal immigrants most 
of whom were citizens ofECOWASmember states in 1983 and 1985, the land border closure of 1984-
1985, and Nigeria's role in ECOMOG. These policies are analysed in tandem with the Protocol on the 
movement of goods, persons and services, the 1979 Non-AggreSSion Pact, the 1981 Mutual 
Assistance Protocol and the Protocol dealing with landlocked and Island member states. Other sub-
regional forces like the linguistic barriers between the Anglophone, Francophone and Lusophone 
speaking states, the involvement of external powers like France, Britain and the United States of 
America and the regional rivalry between Cote d'Ivoire, 
are also interrogated 
Ghana, Burkina Faso and Nigeria 
The study concludes that regional is the most viable alternative for the socia-economic 
development and political stability of countries in the subregion. However, because of the in 
the level of economic development, the issue offree movement of persons should be handled with 
political tact in order to avoid a repetition of the 1983 and 1985 Nigerian expulsions. 
Such moves may not be a contravention of the Protocol in question but will dampen the of 
'oneness' that is a sine qua non for the success of the Community. Moreover the implementation of 
such a sensitive Protocol as the 1979 Non-AggreSSion Pact and the 1981 Mutual Dejence Agreement 
needs a clear mandate to reduce the controversy that arises over the interpretation of such Protocols. 
This will reduce the tensions and as is manifosted over Nigeria role in 
ECOMOG. Finally, the study concludes that Nigeria has a very role to play in ECOWAS. 
The realisation of the dreams of the founders of the Community is dependent on a consistent 
course by Nigeria in the affairs 
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DEFINITION OF TERMS. 
ACRONYMS: 
ACP: 
APPER: 
AG: 
AFRC: 
CARICOM: 
CEAO: 
CAF: 
CEM: 
ECOWAS: 
ECOMOG: 
ECA: 
FTA: 
GNP: 
GDP: 
ILO: 
IMF: 
ING: 
Caribbean and Pacific "-'v •• uu~ 
African Priority ~ .. n.n .. '" 
Association of 
Action Group. 
East 
for Economic Recovery. 
Countries. 
Armed Forces Council. 
Banque Centrale Etats Afrique de L'Ouest. 
Caribbean Community. 
Communaute Jj,CIDnC)ID1ql de 
Community 
Council of Ministers ofExtemal Affairs. 
for Economic H'.LU-U':W"'~ 
Common External Tariff. 
Democracy. 
Economic Community of West States. 
ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group 
European Economic Community. 
African Community. 
Nations Commission for Africa. 
East Development 
Trade Area. 
Food and Organisation. 
National Product. 
Gross Development Product 
ua •.• v....,w Labour Organisation. 
Fund. 
..... u""u,~ National Government. 
Latin American Trade Area. 
Developed Countries. 
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M.R.U: 
NAM: 
N.P.C: 
NAFTA: 
N.C.N.C: 
NIEO: 
O.A.U: 
OCAM: 
OAS: 
PTA: 
RUF: 
SAP: 
SDP: 
IJLWO: 
UN.O: 
UNICEF: 
UNESCO: 
UNCTAD: 
WAUA: 
WACH: 
WABA: 
Plan of Action 
Mano River 
Non-Aligned Movement. 
Northern Peoples 
North American Trade 
National Council of Nigeria and Cameroon. 
New International Economic Order. 
Fo"<ll...,"'UVAL of African Unity. 
Afro-Mauritian Common Organisation. 
Organisation of Petroleum Countries. 
Organisation of American States. 
Eastern and Southern African iJr,p-f'prpntll'1 
Revolutionary United 
Trade 
Southern African Development Co-ordinating COltlteI'enc;e 
Southern African Development Community. 
.... 0 ..... ('·., Fund. 
hCIOnC)flnc, SIClelltttic and Cultural 
United Nations Commission on and Development 
Central Customs and Economic 
African Unit of Account. 
West ClearingHouse. 
West African Bankers Association. 
World Organisation. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION. 
The balkanisation of the continent into arbitrary nation·states elicits from 
Africa understandable impulse to restructure the region into a more 
coherent and economic and The African sense of oneness and 
solidarity also sparks off natural sentiments for increased socio.economic co-operation. 
At the economic the nwnerous obstacles to development that individual 
African countries confront as a result of limited and fragmented economic space have 
provided an rationale and the African resolve to pursue and 
achieve the of self- ECA 1989. 
a historical product the 18th and century, European scramble, 
partition and the subsequent incorporation of Africa into the world system through 
.. . . 
colonial at a conjuncture. balkanisation of the 
COJltm,ent into no cultural and 
inevitably created a survival and economic viability for Africa. Independent 
African states were exposed to the international political system and were left to fend 
themselves a characterised by socio-economic imbalances between the 
western European countries and newly independent states. Following 
departure the colonial powers, balkanised 'independent' African states were 
awakened to a hostile international politico-economic system, which, most cases, 
proved to be too advanced for the comprehension of the unprepared 'successors' of 
erstwhile colonial masters. The current developmental foreign policy dilemma 
states is so intricately linked to their peripheral status the global division of 
labour as of raw materials to industrialised world (Dauda, 1986: 1-3). 
With the questions challenges COIlfi{:mtltng the new African leadership, a collective 
approach was deemed inevitable if they are to surmount 
first two post colonial April 1958 June 1960, African 
adopted 'regionalism' as a vehicle for the eccmOlmIC ""uu,tr'<lI'1"Itc! lTnoc)se:Q 
by smallness fragmentation of the~r national 
of OAU in 1963 regionalism was enshrined in OAU ........ "rt.>r to ",U",VWA 
regional co-operation at sub-regional level eventually to these blocs into 
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COiltmental whole 1997: 159). 
With several countries achieving independence in the 1960s, the continent was 
characterised by and optimism formal independence and the 
aSSlumlPucm that and technology, 
economic and political development would not create any oroiOle.ms. However, 
turned out to an era of disillusionment, anxiety, and re-evaluation 
l1' ... u"\nr'l"",(1 developmental models as well as policy priorities. 
1980s on the hand as Shaw (1986) has put it; is to be a "", • .,au,.., 
rprlPuIPt1 experimentation, not least forms IJV"U"',,' economy a 
redefinition of policy goals (Dauda, 1986: 159-161). establishment 
European Coal and Community and later the Rome establishing the 
European Economic Community (EEC), was seen as a precedent worth emulating. 
success the third world countries to 
integration schemes own. 145) The to this is to 
investigate the by states of African and their to 
address the socio-economic challenges form of regional integration and to 
examine Nigeria's policy of regional engagements in efforts. 
With a geographical of about a population to 
170 million people, West Africa is to be an region. It a 
wide range of -eommercial crops, including tropical oils (the world's largest supply) 
groundnuts, and "'V.I. ... "' ..... The region also produces over 60 cent of world's 
cocoa. Other 11Tllnnl'1'!Hlt income produce includes plantations, 
and fishing. West Africa is endowed with energy resources such as nV(lrO-eU~CII[1Clrv 
(Ghana and coal, and petroleum (Nigeria). mineral resources include 
high quality iron bauxite, copper, tin, columbite, diamonds, gold and maganese. 
Nonetheless, region has unprecedented cases of starvation and human 
tragedies the severe which Sahel 
(Gambari, 1989). Fresh questions are therefore How can this potentially 
wealthy cope with or indeed avoid future socio-economic dislocations and the 
sufferings caused by natural disasters? can poorer states in West Africa share in 
the their neighbours? will the countries of the 
2 
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region continue to on handouts from donor COlllntne:s, whose assistance 
tends to come in bits pieces and times of often too (Gambari, 
16-18). In an attempt to address these questions various West African 
decided though not without controversy, to attempt their resources for the 
development of the sub-region. for co-operation can be up the 
words of Adedeji (often referred to as the ofECOWAS) when he 
"Economic co-operation among African states is a sine qua non for the achievement of 
national SClClO-eC()no:nuc goals and not an extra to be given after the prClCeSS of 
development is well advanced". ( in Asante, :85) 
desire economic co-operation was also the LVU'UUJU15 
fathers ECOW AS, the of state, Yakubu Gowon who 
stated in West Africa is evident' 
(Gambari, . 14). It would according to him playa 'fundamental' role the 
development the countries of the and in welfare the peoples of 
West ECOWAS was finally established Lagos on the May with the 
initialling ECOW AS treaty the annexed to treaty were ratified 
November 1976, allowing the community to commence its functions. The n.1I"'Uu.',-" 
members were, ...... "", .... .., Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Liberia, 
Mali, Mauritania, Nigeria, Senegal, Leone, and Volta 
(Campbell, 1978:7). 
by virtue its population estimated at over 111.3 million (in Report, 
1997) diversity resources, the of education the 
of its people, is a dominant power Africa. was one of 
the seventeen countries that independent in the year, has 
known as the annus mirabilis. independence she joined the commonwealth and 
the United Nations. Aluko, (1981) argued that, logic of events and the colonial 
1<>0"'''''''' have both largely foreordained foreign policy options. Thus during 
two years of independence Nigeria maintained relations with the 
Commonwealth in general and Britain particular. During the 1960s 
played a relatively hesitant and minimal role in international affairs, not only 
V'VI.,au..)'V she was new to the international "",,,l' ........ but also because WaS relatively 
weak almost sense. But the 1970s has assumed a more 
3 
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vigorous in world affairs, largely as a result of the great political and economic 
changes that have taken place in country, coupled with oil boom which started 
in the early 1970s (Aluko, 1981: 1-3). Nigeria has also a series of 
upheavals unprecedented in African 
line with developments, Nigeria has been playing a significant role in West 
Africa, in the rest of Africa and the larger international system. has become 
what ( cited in Aluko, 1981), has aptly called 'a regIonal power' black 
Africa. While it is true that she is heavily dependent on the powers, especially the 
Western countries for her trade, investments and technology, has been able to use 
her internal market opportunities and investments especially the oil 
industry, to influence their conduct on issues. Nigeria's role in 
(ECOWAS) has led to questions how and why has a nr".Q-t& .... focus 
of attention on the sub-region? this postUre nUU"A'" to suit interests or 
can it be described as altruistic? What are economic, political 
implications ofECOWAS to Nigeria? What are the probable lines of her foreign policy 
ECOMOG's controversial In and Sierra Leone? 
For analytical purposes (Aluko, 1981), has conceptualised Nigerian foreign policy as 
three concentric The innermost circle consists of Nigeria's policy towards her 
neighbours West Africa; the inner one is policy towards the rest of Africa; and the 
outer is policy towards the larger international community. This has been the 
guiding frame by which Nigeria has conducted her foreign relations with the world. 
The concern in study is the implication of Nigeria's policy in the innermost circle 
that ................. " her "' ..... ' .. v •• " with neighbours in West (ECOWAS). 
econOimc pOlltlCaJ re,ascms, the Nigerian past and .,. ... &.,,&>,'u 
considers policy towards, and relations with neighbours as of utmost priority, 
to establish Chad Commission and Niger River 
Commission in 1964 and of our study, ECOWAS (Aluko, 1981: 1-3) 
brings us to the definition of the question. 
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM. 
This study .... "'" ....... , ...... ., with ECOWAS and the conduct of Nigeria's foreign policy in 
the community. posture in the community is very outstanding the need 
to her policy as the power broker', in one of Africa's 
4 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
integration schemes. The inauguration of ECOWAS in May 1975, must be r""c.<lIr"""t1 
both as an integral of the wider revolt of the poor nations the 
inherent in the present international economic system, and as a consequence of their 
desire to harness their domestic resources for the welfare of their people, to secure full 
control of their economies and political destiny, and redress the intolerable imbalance 
prevailing between the export and the sectors of their economies. It is only 
through the collective efforts the states and co-ordination of the 
. national policies on a broad front that they can hope to transcend the major constraints 
on their and profound inequality the present pattern of 
production, distribution and consumption of the international wealth. (Akinyemi, 1978 
:69) 
Nigeria has provided the bulk of financial resources to ECOW AS; nonetheless, her 
policy in the community has been a changing one. the enthusiastic promotion of 
the ideas ofECOWAS in the 1970s, Nigeria under Generals Murtala-Obasanjo regimes 
began to asserted the primacy of national interest within the country. The civilian 
government, which succeeded General Obasanjo's administration in 1979, was also far 
less enthusiastic about regional economic and financial commitments. Although 
President Alhaji Shehu Shagari continued the practice of the predecessor regime, 
(Gambari, 1991), whereby Nigeria supplied oil on soft loan to a number of West 
African countries such as Ivory Coast, Senegal, Togo and Ghana, the administration 
did only what was necessary for ECOWAS--no new initiatives were taken. Major-
General Muhammadu Buhari who overthrew the Shagari administration was also not 
very committed to the community as was manifested by his prolonged closure of the 
country's land borders and the expUlsion of millions of ECOWAS citizens who were 
tagged 'illegal aliens'. Although Nigeria's policy the community has significantly 
improved during the General Babangida-Abacha however it is that, the 
unsteadiness of the country's policy thecommunity not helped to create a 
regional integration (Gambari, 1991). 
In spite of Nigeria's role and being a prominent member of 
ECOWAS, the of success in many of the community's aims (primarily to improve 
on development of the sub-region), coupled with the r""01nn 
unstable nature often mamtc~st~ld in frequent coup counter coups, the out break 
wars and Leone, in the Nigeria's fluctuating 
5 
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policy in the community has generated a lot of , ... 1",<> .. ",,,1" and debate. Ibrahim Gambari, 
has contributed to by what to as, " ... a new national 
debate and reassessment of our country's involvement in ECOW AS, which may lead 
to the building of a true national consensus behind the community on net gains 
to us as well as concern for regional solidarity. Such an out come in a leading member 
state ... catt only to benefit of the community." (Gambari, 1991: 48) 
after two decades since Lagos establishing ECOW AS, 
instability in region has to economic stagnation deterioration has 
<>l"n.''''T,",''''''' affected people of the and has led to a drastic In torc::um 
investment. The crisis Liberia and Sierra Leone has diverted the attention of the 
community from that of , ...... , .... ,...". on the socio-economic of the region 
. to keeping, with bearing the bulk of the burden of ECOMOG in terms 
un,,",,,,,,,, and manpower. 
Research Question: 
This some fundamental questions such 
and resources led 
Can the country effectively adapt 
towards 
national 
how Nigeria its immense 
African economic integration? 
and to the 
imperatives of the leadership of regional integration without arousing the suspicion of 
West African states as to the genuiness of its intentions as a big and potentially 
powerful neighbour? (Olukoshi et al, 1994: 1-2). to the above the research 
question therefore 
To what extent has Nigeria's foreign policy contributed in shaping the 
integration efforts in West Africa? 
no attempt has made at defining policy in work. This 
is about policy it must be clear at point that it is not about the 
policy science of policy. However for the purpose of study we are guided 
by Henry Bienen's (1980) definition which state that; the essence offoreign policy is to 
understand the interaction between general interests, the goals that are derived from 
those ahd the policies that are designed to further the goals and interests on 
the one hand and the specifics within regions (BieneR, 1980) and countries that allow 
or constrains maximisation of goals on the other hand. States to maximise their 
positions in a world in there are many short run and long run conflicts between 
6 
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and interests and hetwefm global re~~onal concerns u:nenen. 1980: 32). 
analytical purposes it is important to preview Nigeria's political development prior 
to establishment ofECOWAS in 1975. post independent Bima war 
policy into will help to the contours 
historicisation peculiarly difficult 
of Nigeria policy development and its transitional process can 
comprehensively explained. Similarly, it is important particularly in the context 
that dominant peculiar to her foreign policy can be made clear. 
historical a ....... ' ...... "" in this ""u.,,~~, ..... is a perspective most inclined to 1'\r",,~p1r1T 
with earlier transformation cognitive context (Kerlinger, 1986: 
Therefore the historical approach in this C".h~lntE·r is meant to put Nigeria's evolving 
m West African sub-region in proper perspective. 
"" .... ".H"""'" of Political Development (1914-1960). 
One of the architects of Nigerian independence Chief Obafemi Awolowo described the 
country as: 
" ... a mere gcclgra,pbical e:q:,ressi011 .. word .L u",""ua is a distinctive "'vv ...... a,u.v .. to 
distinguish those who live in, within !'1I}!';t<ua from those who do not" (cited in On'vei~:kwe, 
1978:48). 
Most interpretations of modem 
the 'conglomerate ~n"1"'1'" 
is anything but homogeneous, Such terms as 
'the geCJgr'apJllC;al <''''''nr'''"''''''n .... 
horizontal mCISallC , 'the 
"'''''''T'P" ... nT conceptual att1empts 
to come to terms this lack (Gra£, 1988:7). H."''tn ... ,," we tum to 
process of political developments LUv ........ ,U will be 
features. 
the country's """""V!"'."", .... 
NHY"""'" IS a climatic and diversity distinct physical reglOn,s. 
Facing the Atlantic through Gulf of Guinea and a position, 
such as proximity to Suez or command a much-travelled Nigeria been far 
from the of world communications. A wrapper of inhospitable natural 
barriers this isolation: Sahara and the malaria-laden coastal swamps 
7 
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(Ostheimer, 1973: 1). Far North of Nigeria contains some sandy, sparsely covered areas 
Saharan ecology, but most of the North is savannah (grassy plateau with scanty 
forest) which extends south nearly to the Niger and covered Rivers. It is inhabited by a 
predominantly Islamized agricultural people, the who have intermingled with 
the more traditionally group, There are also various Christian 
minorities and in this region. the South is a transitional ecology known as 
the middle belt. people, dispersed into smaller, distinct ethnic units, have been 
busy deterring encroachment from the groups to the North and South. The third 
major ecological 1"4>0 ......... 
density and rainforest 
known as the Guinea Forest, is an area of population 
on v .... uu .. ", ,",v,",vu._ and 
palms products. This rainforest zone extends nearly to the coast where a swampy 
mangrove area, from 10 to 50 miles wide, intervenes. It is predominantly 
inhabited by.the Yorubas in the West and the Ibos in the with of other 
minoriy ethnic groups in the (Ostheimer, 1973:3). 
story of British policy toward Nigeria covers a short period in annals of 
world history. The acquisition of territory began about the middle the previous 
century and was not completed until 1914. very name the country was 
su£!:£!es,teO by Lady Lugard only in 1897; moreover, area which she the name 
did not have a unified administration until 1914; and that constituted a mere personal 
union under as a sort of "" ..... ,"''''' .. ,,, ... over two large areas of 
native go'vernmlen1ts. On June 5, 1 Britain proclaimed a protectorate 
coast between Lagos and Rio del Rey, the banks the to 
with from of .... """ ... '" northward Ibi (Hamilton, 
1962). 
the its political independence 1960 Nigeria had nearly 120 years of 
different contacts with and ..... ,,""...,..,."' .. ,,+< global political economy. 
times, by different ag_enC:1es and through tiif'.;.,. ... ,"' ... t instruments the North, the and 
the West were acquired, administered and from an almost entirely 
subsistence to a predominantly monetised economy, towards ""v~" .... t'" 
region specialised in production of one agricultural product-the North with 
ground nuts, with palm products and the West with cocoa (Shaw and Aluko, 
1984:194) 
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In of the 1914 amalgamation which created Nigeria, and of colonial 
economic and fiscal policies aimed at maintaining unity in order to 
further British economic interests, and of other attempts to create 'Nigerians' out of 
the different ethnic groups, Nigeria emerged at independence as a federation of North, 
East and West regions, each being a veritable nation-state. It is significant in this 
context that the East and West became in 1957, a status acquired by the 
North 1959 and Nigeria itself only a later (Shaw Aluko, 1984: 194). 
On October 1, 1960 Nigerian 1-<&>/1&>,..·"1" ... ,,, .. received full epe:nOIIDce. and 
whole country lJec:arrle entirely and free from external political control. 
Nigeria's colonial had been short and remarkably free from violence. 
Resistance was: it began on the day the British amved and continued to the date 
they left. Once the colony was 'pacified' most protests were non-violent, unheroic; 
there was neither a Mau-Mau uprising nor a Gandhi. compared with the Gold 
(Ghana), whose colonial was similar, the fight freedom was 
When it was over, Chief Awolowo regretted that: "our struggle for 
independence have produced no martyr - no hero who is held in reverence and 
affection by the majority of people" (Awolowo, 1960:299). It was in the context 
this complex social and economic system that the Nigerian State had to conduct 
politics, particularly policy pursuits. 
Foreign Policy in the First Republic 1960 -1966 
"We in 
for !>u .... ,I.lll,!,; to this 
every country in Africa as an equal big or small and we have reasons 
In other continents these countries are not evenly divided in size 
or in population and this does not make the big countries wish to dominate the 
small ones. If we want peace in Africa, it is most important that we should regard the big 
and small countries to their present boundaries as 
and let live in Africa". Sir Abubakar Tafawa 
equal to ourselves ... Live 
January 1961. 
The 
that it 
historical fact into a world system states is 
politically, through imperial conquest (and its ancestral forerunners 
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such as the Atlantic slave trade). Young (1985) has noted that the enduring OOlltlCal 
fact this IS incorporation as a subsidiary 
part of western economic institutions and relationships euphemistically 
called Capitalism. The structural flaws of the Afiican system - its fragmentation, 
lack of cultural logic (political decay among other things from) .. .inherently 
problematic state-civil society ties-derive from fundamental historical 
In the the vulnerabilities of states .;t<;llJLCI. ..... in the externally 
/ 
imposed structure of and production, which made them vulnerable to 
fluctuations of the international market for produce (Crawford 1985). 
Post Nigeria had to conduct foreign against backdrop socio-
economic imbalance created by colonial encounter. It is popular among political 
scientists to talk the disparity foreign policy making in new as 
opposed to established states. One can easily draw an analogy between planning in the 
domestic and the international arenas. Planners policy know 
than their American counterparts about conditions to which they may have to 
respond, just as domestic development planners find themselves constrained by 
inadequate knowledge of their own economy's performance. (Ostheimer, 1973: 161) 
The of I'.lu ... ",r." is that it is a federation that come to 
colour important policy, Ulhpth,p.r in the dOlne~;tlc tpnrlun or foreign (Phillips, 
1964). The essence 
unitary hence the 
is the lack of sufficient national consensus to create a 
in many minds that it is a "second best" form 
government. However, the fact a federation emerges at all is that some 
common values are held by leaders from various regions and Nigerian know 
than came to accept a system although with reluctance in some 
The for was a federation of three regions and a 
territory. Such decentralisation governing difficult even after decades of 
experience as the history other states have demonstrated. But Nigeria adds to this 
~U~lrPTn another feature - that in which one region is remaining ones 
combined in both geography population. (Phillips, 1964: 
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Independence came to Nigeria at a most critical 
The federal took at the moment 
history 
the focus of African 
interest was from colonial relationships to the relations of independent 
states to other and to the rest world. As most populous state, 
was to assume a on which not only 
the future but ultimately the peace 
expectation meant that the Nigerian leadership had to 
assume its rightful place in world politics. 
world (Dauda, 1 
a delicate line order to 
At m<1c~pel[l<1ence emno-re210naJ .... ·"'ri .. "'" PtTlP1""O"p/1 to the political vacuum 
arising from colonial These were the 
Northern (N.P.C.) supported by the Hausa-Fulani, the Western Action 
Group (A. G), mainly supported the Yoruba and the National Council of 
Nigeria and in the east by the Tho. party 
contested for power by and to ethnic SeI1ltmlents ...... 'Q,UUCL 
1986). Although the N.P.C. and the eventually won the elections formed 
of the first government post colonial through a tTI~'rn~ 
convenience, national and foreign policy issues, were f"lpr ..... Pl'llPn and interpreted by the 
opposition from a narrow and _ .. ,.,._ .• ~ vantage 
rather than broader category of national interest. no small measure militated 
against the as well as pursuit policy goals first 
republic. (Dauda, 1986: 132-133). 
According to fo.l,...I1,u,,,,·,,'7 (1964), ·",rnnn,,,, perhaps the psychological 
basis of early foreign policy. Deeply distrustful suspicious any new 
form of post colonial subjection, also envied and wished to emulate western 
achievement. Anxious not to associated with capitalism, imperialism, class-
structured many advocated a distinct approach to the economics politics, 
that is an that did not into either extremes- or 
Socialism. the weight 
elite who found it difficult to 
totally at odds with the west 
western influence was heavy on Nigerian 
lhQ,:"'.ntIP to political economic theories were 
1964). 
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From the onset, Nigeria's foreign policy decisions were by necessity compromises 
between ties with Britain and other western countries prompted by the need for 
procuring aid and the desire to establish a Nigerian identity. Mention must be made of 
the fact that, during the terminal colonial period, were naturally 
preoccupied with problems of and comparatively was 
expended on foreign policy. However leadership of the political parties were 
decidedly pro-west by virtue of their educational backgrounds, ideology and political 
contacts. 'generous' outlook toward Nigerian independence offered little 
encouragement to advocates of a vigorous break away from British influence-except 
probably to opposition to the Anglo-Nigerian pact. Most of the significant political 
elite's commonwealth membership continued relations with 
""' .... T" ...... (Schwarz, 1968: 119). 
The controversy over the Anglo-Nigerian Defence pact 1960-1962 reveals 
salience of ethno-regionalism in t ..... t""'""'m policy perceptions the Nigerian leaders. 
opposition and 
emanated basically from the 
.. "" ....... ". the tonner colonial power 
especially """"">LA the Action Group sut)Dorters 
Most importantly, the was perceived by most its as a clever 
design to enhance the pro-military capacity of the pro-British northern Hausa-Fulani 
oligarchy to dominate the federation indefinitely. Although the treaty was eventually 
abrogated in the public debate further polarised ethnic rivalry in 
Nigeria's body politic. (Gambari, 1980: At this juncture it to be pointed out 
that, opposition to pact should not have clouded the 
relative unity foreign policy in the republic, at least when compared to the 
disastrous divisions over internal politics and policies as the 1960-1962 
population census. All history conscious Nigerians whether Moslem or Christian, or 
whether Hausa-Fulani, Tho or Y oruba, (Dauda, 1986) shared deep feelings race 
consciousness, which produced a unanimity of opinion on many foreign policy issues. 
Whatever differences between the parties, it did not stop the new Nigerian 
leadership from subscribing to the popular Afro-Asian concept of 'non-alignment'. 
Nigerians interpreted non-alignment as a pragmatic policy that would allow decisions 
to be made on the merits of while maintaining flexibility. As the federal 
Prime Minister Balewa explained to United Nations: 
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" ... We shall not blindly follow the lead of anyone, so as is possible policy choice 
on each occasion will be selected with a proper objectivity in Nigeria's national 
interest. We consider it wrong for the federal government to ass()ciate as a matter of routine 
with any of the power blocs." (In Daud.a, 1986: 130) 
The Tafawa-Balewa regime's foreign policy started on a cautious note as has been 
indicated in Prime Minister's remarks about Nigeria's non-aligned position. For all 
his Pro-western bias, Prime Minister Tafawa-Balewa was a nationalist who be(~arrle 
increasingly concerned with the maintenance of a correct posture for on the 
African stage. government took a on the apartheid go'vernment South 
extJlressed his about the white minority go'vernment of South 
Portugal for their continued political repression of blacks. Moreover, the 
government of the Republic declined associate status of the European common 
Market in the spirit of African solidarity, in spite of the obvious economic advantages 
such a co-operation would have offered for sale of Nigerian commodities. When in 
December 1960, despite vehement protest about the first twp nuclear the French 
exploded their third atomic bomb in the Sahara; policy took a sudden lurch. 
Although the protest had come all over Africa, Nigeria alone diplomatic 
relations with France, maintaining that the explosion had shown 'utter disregard for 
Africans and constituted a grave insult to the government and peoples of this country.' 
The French ambassador to Nigeria and his staffwere ordered out of the country within 
fourty eight hours and an embargo was placed on French shipping and air traffic. It 
was not until 196(5 that General Gaulle was prevailed upon to reopen Embassy 
in After Ian Smith's Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) over 
Southern Rhodesia, the foreign ministers of the Organisation of African Unity 
(O.A.U), including Nigeria, resolved to break off diplomatic relations with Britain for 
its failure to check Smith. this time, Nigeria was not among the countries 
that fulfilled the resolution (Schwarz, 1966). / 
Regardless of its initial hesitations, Nigeria did not fail in its basic obligations as 
Africa's most populous state. In 1961, when African governments split into the radical 
Casablanca group inspired principally by K wame ]'lkrumah of Ghana, and the moderate 
Monrovia group, Nigeria by virtue of not only its but also because of some patient 
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diplomacy, feU a leadership position of the latter. A conference held in Lagos in 
January 1962 made serious efforts that almost succeeded the two 
However about the last minute the Casablanca group ue(:Iue:u not to it is 
important to note that, that produced the of charter of the OAU 
1968: 122) 
Nigeria's position on questions like .r ..... 1'" ...... ..., the racial union of South Africa was 
already clear, but on others, such as powers as well as other 
states eagerly the of views the 
policy principles enunciated by Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa his at the Ul'l 
October 1960, were shortly translated into action when a Nigerian delegate the 
head the Congo Conciliation Commission. federal government preferred 
super powers to stay off the Congo crisis and allow Africans to settle own 
problems without the interference of any external power (Tillman and 1962). 
Nigerian were clearly prepared to accept full share 
responsibility for settlement of Africa's problems within framework decisions 
taken by the United Nations. With penetration of the cold war into Africa by way 
the Congo crisis, the Nigerian government's support for west came under 
increasing attack from East, African countries and from segments 
public opinion within Nigeria. Some of the neighbouring independent West African 
states also brought to bear for an declaration support for 
apparent victory of Colonel Gamal Abdul at Casablanca 
conference was an indication of efforts being made by to block Israeli 
for technical aid to the African countries. Because of the strength of Islam 
and cultural relationships of the Nigerian Northern 
with Egypt, policy were peculiarly vulnerable to Egyptian 
opposition to the with A,J.,,, .... ,,., 
question also brought ethno··re!9.mtlls1m f"n .. ·.,.'Clrn policy perceptions to the front The 
south always of northern tendencies were to put on 
the federal establishment of diplomatic with the state of 
this was because the south that of links between Nigeria 
Arab would be to the advantage of the north. order to respond to southern 
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pressure the government allowed Israel to establish an embassy Lagos, it 
refused to open an embassy in Israel as a of appeasing the north. On 
important question of Pan-Africanism, Balewa took a clear and stand 
that was almost directly opposed to the CQI1CelPtl<)n of Pan-Africanism held by Kwame 
(Tillman Cole, 1962). 
The Nigerian leader appeared to share Houphouet-Boigny's vision an African union 
out of closer economic and cultural relations between the member states. He 
emphasised that is determined to encourage, as far as possible, the 
development of co-operation at these levels. A major policy aim of his government is 
to secure agreement on a plan for improvement of and 
transport facilities, of resources for higher education scientific n'''''''''<llrpn 
and an expansion of travel. Tafawa Balewa no doubt as to his views on this 
Issue; 
" I must say that I do not think myself that ideas of political union are practicable in the 
immediate future. I do not rule out the possibility of eventu l union but for the it is 
unrealistic to expect countries to give up the sovereignty which they have so recently 
acqum~ and I am sure that it is wrong to that union could of itself 
countries the it will follow as the natural consequences of co-
operation in other fields." (Quoted in Tillman and Cole, 1962: 117). 
a major policy statement Sir Tafawa Balewaemphasised to Nigeria's neighbours 
that despite its and population, has no expansionist intentions. Although 
African boundaries were artificial creations of the European powers, nevertheless 
Prime Minister emphasised the fact that inherited boundaries should be respected 
and, in the interest peace, must remain the recognised boundaries until such time as 
the peoples concerned decided of their own will to merge to one unit (Tillman and 
Cole, 1962: 116-122). 
of above-mentioned position, it would be impossible to overstress the 
emotional approbation to articulate Nigerian opinion over terms such as 
and unity'. Pan-Africanism like virtue, was lauded everywhere. It 
was not difficult to understand the nature the appeal for African unity. As an 
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eminent front bencher of the Nigerian People's Party (NPC), Mallam Mutari, put 
'whether we like it or not 'blackism' is our answer (Phillips, 1962). We shall to 
stand and fall together.' Coupled with the racial identity of tropical is the 
common history of all Africans as subjects of European colonialism. Before 
independence, all Africans to with one voice. The common political 
pnp·mu was colonialism, common internal were undeveloped economies 
and the absence of national integration; the common psychological enemy was the 
debasement caused by the above and the common 
was therefore natural that after independence 
was absolute independence. It 
A:filcans, including 
should continue to think in terms common African development-in 
words regional integration (Phillips, 1962). 
Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa "' ..... v ... 'y this view of economic co-operation when he 
obeserved that; 
" As regards the principles which must underlie any realistic political co-operation 
between the countries of I am glad to tell you that the declared of the 
federal government received universal support, adding tOOLthe object of the Liberian 
conference was not 1'IM>"'<>M to settle differences between the nations who attended but to 
try to create the atmosphere for international co.-operation in political, cultural and 
scientific matters" (cited in Phillips, 1964: 117). 
was probably the Monrovia conference than any other ~vent, which first brought 
Tafawa Balewa to international attention. The resolutions adopted at the conference 
and later the OAU bear unmistakable imprint of the Nigerian leader (Phillips, 
decision to join the in 1961 federal government of Nigeria to 
an even Pan-African was explained by the then Federal 
LO:mn:USS1Loner for Chief Okotie-Eboh who stressed that, the conference held in 
..!...<Up,v"" Nigeria at that the importance to the closest possible 
economic with other African states particularly, initially, with the other 
West African states. to him will undoubtedly lead to the establishment 
of at a African common market comparable concept to the present 
k.1101"\1'1."," .... common (Phillips, 1 118). 
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following month in a radio report on a conference held in Addis Ababa, the 
federal Prime Minister Sir Balewa pointed out that one of which dwelt 
on was the need for '\ .. an African common market based on certain groupings--a-
North African grouping, which will include Sudan; a West African grouping which win 
extend the river Congo: an 
.ru. •. '''''''''' grouping which will include all Central African 
countries". He that co-ordination among such groups would create "a successful 
African common market which should increase the inter-state trade in the continent. 
While his plan was not adopted, he added that the conference did welcome a plan to 
establish an African Development Bank and agreed to appoint a preparatory economic 
committee 'to study in collaboration with government and in consultation with the 
Economic Commission for Africa, -the various African economic problems and to 
submit their findings to member states' (Phillips, 1964: 118). 
It would appear therefore, that Nigerian economic policy has now shifted from Europe 
to Africa, and that moves will- be made to attempt to improve inter-African trade, 
although the difficulty of such a move for primary producers seem formidable indeed. 
However, because of the sub-regions heavy reliance on foreign aid and investment and 
its trade patterns, their trade with non-African states cannot be automatically delinked 
(Schwarz, 1964). 
The last major policy act of the Balewa regJme was to organise the 
Commonwealth Prime Minister's conference on Rhodesia, held in (the first ever 
to be held outside London) at Balewa's initiative. This was held in January 1966, just 
as the First Republic was beginning to make an impact abroad, it was brought to an 
end in a bloody military coup (Schwarz, 1962). 
census in 1962 overlapped with a major political crisis. census usually has 
political overtone and in case, the census was laden with political dynamite. 
Emotions reached a climax in February 1964 (Schwarz, 1964). For years Southern 
Nigeria had harboured a deep suspicion that the North's population was much smaller 
than it had claimed in the 1952-1953 census. These earlier population figures had 
proven of great significance. Northern dominance of Federal House of 
Representatives was based on them. first result of the 1 census showed a 
radically decreased proportion of population living in the Northern region. 
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After 1962 census had been rejected by Northern leaders, were vast 
of ethnic groups back to "home" Entire "new villages" were 
discovered especially in Iboland, and the census politicised. Federal 
Government forestalled by the 1962 census and revising the 
subsequent outcry led to a completely new census in late 1 
results published 1964, showing a majority retained by Northerners, was rejected 
by the leader the National Congress of Nigerian Citizens, Michael Okpara, who 
later became one of key players in Biafran secession (Schwarz, 1964). 
N.P.C. had achieved apparent success in gaining control of 
central and regional government of the federation, events had destroyed the hopes of 
Nigerians that independence would bring democracy and development. Some of 
these frustrations surfaced in the strike 1964. The cohesion of the labour 
movement coupled with support from outside the labour movement succeeded in 
paralysing Nigeria during early June 1964. More importantly attention had been 
focused on the corruption, of development and ineffectiveness Nigeria's 
independent In of this political the stepped 
into political scene overthrowing of 
(Schwarz, 1964: 158) The Prime Sir Tafawa Balewa, Premier of the 
North, Sir Ahmadu Bello, the Commissioner of Finance and a lot of other government 
officials - civilians and military were murdered by coup plotters (Schwarz, 1964). 
This heralded the first military take over post-independent 
The Military Era and The Civil War: 1966 - 1970 
With 
been significant 
the "Ar.~I't1n of Major-General Ironsi, down regional offices 
abroad and stopped regions sending eCCmOltnlC rrnSSlOns overseas. military 
government's ovc;,)rZlealcDus.ne:ss context led to promulgation of Decree 
which would have made a unitary state. The consequences of this tiAf'rAA given 
regions' tenuous nature the incipient transition to T",n."nu 
supremacy, were the ......... ,fTT'r1 • .".." 1966, the military coup of July and the 
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subsequent civil war. General lronsi's only foreign policy initiative was to appeal to 
foreign investors to continue to invest in Nigeria was futile (Shaw and Aluko, 1984: 
201). 
Less than twelve months before the Biafran seceSSllon, Ironsi, summoned his 
days of consultation in ambassadors from diplomatic postings in Africa 
..L.IUI"V,,". The decision to begin with an assessment of the federal government's interests 
in Africa, was explained by General Ironsi; 
"In the whole relations, the attaches the mealtest ..... ..,"'...t~".,,..,, 
to our foreign policy. We are aware that because of our population and potentials, the 
majority of opinion in the civilised world up to us to responsible leadership in 
and we realise that we shall to a very extent by of success 
or failure with which we face up to the challenge which this expectation throws on us. We 
are convinced that whether in political, economic, or cultural sphere, our destiny lies in our 
role in the of Africa" (Stremlau, 1977: 1-2) 
Seven weeks later Gen. lronsi was assassinated, a victim of Nigeria's second military 
coup in seven months and country slipped to brink of anarchy. Aspirations 
leadership in Africa had to be abandoned as the formulation and execution of foreign 
policy became impossible under domestic chaos. • ..., .. , .. " .. of 
war would not detain us here, although a brief "",V"·'U·C" 
causes of the 
event will be 
made. After the first coup in 1966 Lieutenant-Colonel Odumegu Ojukwu was 
appointed military governor of the eastern (Calvocoressi, 1991). The July coup 
headed by Colonel Gowon was not recognised by Colonel Ojukwu, the pogroms 
against Ibos before and after the July coup, made Ojukwu to conclude that the 
salvation of the Ibo could only be secured by secession from Nigeria. Dissuaded from 
this step at a conference in January in Aburi, Ghana, he nevertheless proclaimed, 
in May 1967, the independent state Biafra. Attempts at mediation by the OAU (at 
Kinshasa in 1967, Algiers in 1968, and Addis Ababa in 1969) aU failed. The federal 
army, expanded from 10,000 to over 200,000 men and women, gradually prevailed in 
spite the toughness the Biafran resistance. While Britain and the Union 
supplied arms to the Nigerian Federal government, France supplied Biafra and two of 
her closest allies Ivory Coast and Gabon recognised the Secessionist State Biafra. 
(Calvocoressi, 1 : 511) 
It was not until late 1967, well into civil that the federal government 
General Gowon succeeded in establIshmg a policy framework for the conduct of 
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international relations, and emerged as the central focus of Nigeria's civil war 
The basic strategy, which prevailed until the end of conflict in January 
1970, was defensive, aimed at limiting Biafran penetration of international system. 
Nigeria the would be giant of Africa, ironically found itself tied to a foreign policy that 
depended in large measure on the willingness of other African governments to ma,mtain 
a solid front of diplomatic support as a means discouraging that would 
.... "'"rr!ll" independence (Stremlau, 1977: 
The Civil War Diplomacy -1967-1970 
The war marks a turning point in relations with the world. It saw the 
erosion of the overwhelming western influence, in "''''''", ..... ,".po, ..... a considerable increase 
in Soviet By 1968, the volume of Nigeria's with the placed her 
fourth among African countries, behind United Arab Republic, Algeria and Morocco. 
conclusion of the civil war, the valuable military aid received Soviet Union 
had replaced by new Nigeria'S recognition communist IS a 
further indication of the new spirit of m external relations (Ostheimer, 
1973). 
With its heavily western orientation, Nigeria's economy was in all likelihood to retain 
significant trade with Britain and America. There was no doubt, however, that 
Nigerian leaders felt betrayed in their darkest hour by the west, and have tried 
1970 to identifY and develop new sources of aid and trade. Japanese for example, 
extended a loan worth $24 million and were the largest exporter of goods to Nigeria, 
Britain, the United States and West Germany. During the civil war, British 
government material support of federal government was constant albeit materially 
insufficient from the point of view (Ostheimer, 1973). 
During 1968 and 1969 many British, A1'n""rtl" and other outsiders fully expected that 
the conflict will end in negotiations and a virtually independent Biafran State. France 
with her close African ally- Ivory Coast, one the four African states- (others being 
Gabon, and Tanzania) to recognise Biafra was clearly counting on this 
development and Biafra. The de Gaulle and his 
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foreign affairs on Africa, Jacques Foccart, seemed to view Nigeria in terms of 
the nineteenth century, when England presented the greatest challenge to France. 
While France had clearly chosen to sacrifice relations with government, 
Britain appeared as an ally who could not be trusted. attitude toward 
and her Commonwealth affiliation was clearly expressed in a 1971 editorial in New 
Nigerian newspaper report which states that; 
"For those member countries that are not inhabited by people of British descent, the 
commonwealth is no more than an junk bordered almost invisible 
silken threads from which it will take much more than the normal political courage and will 
power in the breasts of the mentally emasculated and suitably educatioually conditioned 
mind of ex-colonial man to escape... it is only to leave the 
commonwealth that we can to recreate the pOlmC:ill elan with which to move forward 
under our new steam".(Osthmeir, 1973 : 161-173) 
The civil war made Nigerian policy makers suspicious of Britain's sincerity and this 
widened the between Anglo-Nigerian relations, which had hitherto been cordial. 
onset of the conflict, it was to the belligerents that since as the 
f-nN"npr colonial power, enjoyed a amount diplomatic, political, and 
economic influence the post-colonial state, its stance in the unfolding 
mt,efIllattonal politics of the crisis would influence the course the war. sides, 
therefore were quick to diplomatic possibilities of 6""""'6 
recogruttcm and with it, benefits of arms supplies, technical relief, 
as well as probability of political support by the commonwealth nations (Ostheimer, 
1973). Britain on other hand was anxious to limit the scale and 
more crucial, to safeguard its own commercial and political interests. These two 
considerations led to Britain's vacillation and diplomatic ambivalence at the 
stages of the war. However, once situation became clearer, with the federal troops 
regaining physical control the oil producing and the Union "''''';<''''1''> 
its full weight behind the federal the only sensible option left for to 
safeguard Nigerian was to support the Gowon (Osthmeir, 
1973), 
in spite of the diplomatic and token military support, Britain's role, in the 
perception of Nigerian policy makers, was from total and sometimes duplicity was 
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' .. 
suspected, as a top federal go'"entllnent official explained that, l-oI ... j,." .... supplied the bulk 
of Nigeria's ground we,aocms. and spite of all the emphatic ministerial denials in 
House of commons, supplied more arms than the British people realised, nevertheless 
the strident, and sometimes worthless, parliamentary debates, the hostIle mass ... ..,' ...... 
wavering attitude of some key cabinet and the to supply the 
. Nigerian Air force with aircraft and all helped to inflict serious damage to the 
goodwill that Britain enjoyed in Nigeria (Ogunbadejo, 1996: 15) 
1968 unfolded, the Gowon government began to realise that 
support, like Britain was not to be unequivocally became a 
political in the hands politicians. Richard Nixon did not fail to see the 
political potential of the Biafran issue. Nixon gave what was probably his most 
eloquent campaign speech on the importance Biafran which he viewed as ' 
thwarted by the federal government of Nigeria to pursue total and 
unconditional victory.' his of the Johnson government's hesitancy, 
pointed out that; , genocide is is taking place now- is the 
grimreaper. This is not the time to stand on ceremony, or to go through the diplomatic 
. 
niceties. destruction of an entire people is an immoral objective in the most moral 
of wars. It can never be it can never be condoned.' (Osthmeir, 1973: 161· 
173). 
The refusal by Knlr~l1n and the United States to sell heavy weapons to the 
government, which it needed, for an effective prosecution the war, was seen as a 
:betrayal by an 'ally in hour of need'. Biafran war had the of decreasing 
the cordial relations ....... ·n"''',.... Nigeria and her former western allies- Britain and the 
USA; thus tilting policy towards eastern bloc and particularly the African 
continent. Until 1967, Nigeria almost relied exclusively on west for 
and economic requirements. But in August she entered into an econormc, 
cultural and military aid agreement with the USSR (Aluko, 1981). The 
airforce was henceforth supplied almost wholly with military radar 
other equipment. Soviet and Egyptian experts were put in charge of training 
Nigerian pilots for the MiG In June 1970, an agreement was ""l"."""'" providing 
USSR geological and mineral investigations into coal, and other raw 
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material resources with ultimate of an iron and steel 
complex in the country. Between 1968 and 1970, (Aluko, 1 1), Nigeria entered into 
new economic cultural with the following 
countries: Romania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Hungary, and Bulgaria. 
Trade with Europe was being vigorously encouraged than before. For 
1964 only 2.4 cent was with but rose to 
4.6 in 1968 (Aluko, 1981). This was largely to mSl11IDclem military support, 
which the received from its Western partners, in 
prosecution of the civil war. 
In spite of all this, however, Nigeria's trade, cultural 
firmly with west. In 1968 about 75 cent of country's trade was with 
Western Europe, North and Japan. Of about 32.1 per cent was with the 
countries which took 36.5 cent of Nigeria's total export 1968, making 
the largest single market her exports. Although Nigerian leaders wanted to 
reduce the dominance of the west in were at the same time 
"' ..... " .. '" _U'J~""" to know that such a principle must not be in any economically 
self-defeating manner. short, what the war to Nigeria's foreign policy 
posture according to Chief Anthony Enahoro, " to reinforce the policy 
of non-alignment" (Aluko, 1981: 124) 
USSR-Nigerian diplomatic rapprochement beginning during 
excellent illustration the now preponderance of 
civil war provides an 
agrnatlc considerations 
over whereby national .... n ....... ,. ... " .... " and rhetoric come .,"'''"'u ...... rather than the 
other way round. USSR-Nigerian alliance the conflict is a that in 
national survival, the doctrine of non-alignment, more often a 
back seat. Indeed the short .. :}ived Gowon-Brezhnev of convenience' 
conceived within the political framework of post colonial war of survival is 
symptomatic of policy convergence between post-colonial states and external 
powers. the final analysis, both and the Soviet Union gained from the post 
Kruschevian approach to soviet diplomacy. On one hand, Nigeria emerged as a 
united political entity following the defeat of Biafta, while the USSR, on the other 
hand, cultivated a relationship not only earned her a multi-million dollar contract 
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for Nigeria's Iron and Industry, but also a diplomatic ally whose support was to 
(at least within the OAD) USSR-Cuban Angolan victory 
(Dauda, 1986: 142). 
Nigeria: Post Biafra Impact On African Policy. 
The dominant fact about Nigeria on 12 January 1970, when the civil war guns ceased 
firing, was the emergence of a potentially stronger united federation. The authority of 
the central government in Lagos, was and continued to accepted without question by 
aU the constituent units of the federation (Aluko, 1981), each of which has now 
become too small and too weak to threaten or defy it. The effect of this has been to 
bring the direction of foreign policy firmly under federal control. No 
longer can regional make important pronouncements on policy and 
country the reputation with 'too many . The war 'to 
Nigeria one' more than the independence, wielded together the 
diverse ethnic groups who have come to accept the view that their destiny and hopes 
can be fulfilled only in a stable, and united Nigeria (Aluko, 1981). Alike (1981) alluded 
that: 
Economically, Nigeria has become potentially the richest African country. In of 
the damage and the disruption of the war the economy showed a remarkable resilience 
that even surprised the Nigerian leadership. war was financed at a cost of 
million pounds without resorting to borrowing. (West Africa, 
March 1970) Agriculture expanded so that more food was produced for the 
popUlation and part of this was exported to other West African countries Ghana. 
In becoming one the first ten oil-producing countries in the world, her economic 
prospects seem good. Although economy is still mainly based on agriculture, some 
light manufacturing industries developed so rapidly during the war that she ~an now 
depend on home production for goods such as textiles, shoes, matches, cigarettes, 
beer, and other things. International confidence in the economy, which was shaken as a 
result of the war, was restored. Since the end the war, there has been a steady flow 
of public and private investment in the country. However, this did not radically change 
but strengthened country's African policy as enunciated by the Tafawa-
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Balewa regime. The principles of this policy are five in number: 
• The sovereign equality of all African states. 
• Respect for the independence, C!{nlP .. ,p.-Jo"'nhT and territorial integrity of all African 
states. 
• Non-interference in the internal affairs of other African countries. 
• commitment to functional co-operation as a means of promoting African unity 
• the total eradication of racialism and colonialism from Africa (Aluko, 1981 : 125) 
post-civil war reassessment of Nigeria's foreign policy concluded that Africa must 
be the "centre piece" diplomacy. of war also 
made it for Nigeria to pay more attention to the West African neighbours. 
Of the four African countries which recognised the secession region of 'Biafra', one 
was in West Africa (Ivory Coast). After the civil war found that its wealth 
based on the export crude oil, (Gambari, 1991), began to it a more 
positive interest in the developmental needs of the West Africa sub-region. The 
country's leadership had vision of a more evenly developed West Africa, which 
Nigeria would not be resentment - provoking of prosperity and a sub-regional 
-eC004JmIC desert'. again should West African countries be staging for 
"r<.1VU< .... powers attempt to destabilise or dismember Since Frarice was 
a power that used considerable on the smaller francophone countries for 
T'l111rnn"lP"l during the war, co-operation between the states in the .. "" ... "" .... 
might that Even independence in 1960's, the 
states in West Africa retained a of interlocking networks· 
relationships, such as OCAM, and Counseil de 1 'Eutente - all of which were 
heavily subsidised by (Gambari, 1991: 18-19) 
Before the civil maintained a <good neighbour' policy in West 
rel:atl<>ns with her immediate neighbours were based on the same principles as those 
with 
freedom 
countries. The civil war brought the fact and 
the country depended on the security, stability and freedom of her 
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neighbours. Instead of treating as other African the 
government now took a interest in the internal development in of them to 
ensure that hostile forces did not destroy relations. If for hostile 
surrounded Nigeria would probably lost the war. If Niamey, 
Lamy, Yaounde, Lome and Cotonou been used as staging posts by the 
runrung instead Libreville, Sao and Abidjan, the on Nigeria 
would have more serious. Nobody understands this more than the 
IPlUlpT(;: This is why could not forgive Zinsou, President 
for allowing Cotonou to by International Committee of the Red Cross 
early in ostensibly for sending relief supplies to and for breaking the 
and his explanation L"' ... , ......... blockade. President Zinsou's visit to in the 
that arms and military equipment were not hidden in the relief supplies shipped 
Cotonou were not to the The Nigerian rrl"""""1"1 ... rn,,," ... 1-
was happy at his overthrow was said to have been manipulated into working 
agamst Nigeria by what many called 'international do-gooders' 
(Aluko, ). 
However regardless of the betrayal felt by the ..l"I'" ..... ," leadership by countries as, 
that supported Biafra focused energies on bringing the countries 
of the sub-region together. civil war had the of creating a idea 
........ ' .. "' •• '" with neighbours, that of creating sub-regional economic units 
linguistic divide in (Aluko, 1991). It was firmly 
'. ' .. ~ 
that will cut across 
believed Lagos that it was the enormous tlIUllflClai difficulties 
government made 
Red Cross to break 
"1""""Ii',,,,,,,,,,, remain financially dependent on 1-< ... """""" they could 
against The committed herself to the 
~omotion of economic development neighbours in order to reduce their 
.. ~endence ,on of the' t'egional powers. resolved that it will henceforth 
~icipate 'in joint industrial and agricultural ventures with any her neighbours, as 
well as in ordinary trade 
involve financial or other 
and economic co-operation, even if 
on her part.(Aluko, 1981: 127) 
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part of to reduce dependence on foreign powers and to help the 
states in the Nigeria made it her first diplomatic priority in 1970's 
the creation of an economic co-operation within Africa. for prospect 
co-operation in the immediate areas of the valley and Delta states in 
that area refused to support French involvement Biafra or backed the Lagos 
government outright. For Niger a country which gambled by supporting Gown's 
government in spite of her close ties with the choice seemed to have paid off. 
President Harmani Diori, for example on a visit to France 1968 criticised French 
policy towards Nigeria and acknowledged the traditional and cultural ties 
between At the conclusion of war Nigeria rewarded Niger by 
treceZlTlg a trade zone them. A landlocked country, could now send 
exports through Nigeria to the Nigeria was to support 
development even at 
agricultural exports, 
cost of the competitive position one of her own main 
over problems 
infrastructural development and trade is certainly necessary if Nigeria is to 
dependence on the developed countries. (Osthmeir, 1973: 1 
the of war, and as a way of promoting the atmosphere of regional co-
operation, General Gowon visited almost all the countries in the sub-re!i!ion. 
leadership was concerned with her consciousness by promoting 
such concepts as 'negritude' and 'African personality'. A major evidence of this 
awakening was the establishment of the Fanon Research Centre, in Enugu, 
charged with a 'total commitment to the mental emancipation of Black men all 
over from neo-colonial mentality' (Gambari, 1991). 
As a starting point the agreement between and Nigeria signed in July 1966 
was never ratified nor implemented and eventually it lapsed. Although it presumed to 
provide substantial economic benefit both parties the agreement was heavily 
criticised the politically conscious and articulate segment of national elite 
some of these critics argued that, instead of making separate agreements, Africa should 
ne,zotllate with as a block. Others preferred the development of trade and 
economic co-operation among the West African countries as a step towards 
establishment of a regional economic community. After the conflict was over, Nigeria 
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was able to fe-examine the strategies to association with the the 
country's options were strengthened by the tremendous economic recovery which she 
and the huge increase in both oil output especially through her 
membership of OPEC. key Nigeria's future dealings with the EEC was 
the country's efforts to co-ordinate African state approach to the EEC General 
Gown told his host during a state visit of Britain in the early 1970's, "it is better for a 
united Africa to to a united Europe"(Gambari, 1991). 
The Nigerian effort resulted in a joint African negotiation with the which 
culminated in an agreement between the European Community and 
AfricanlCaribbeanlPacific states in in 1975, which known as 
convention. the of the convention pro-regionalist argued 
that the countries of West Mrica were able to sign an to promote trade 
with the it ought to be possible for them to conclude an agreement for the same 
goal within the region. argument spurred and Togo - the two countries 
that played the most active part in the establishment of EC.O.W.AS. - to set up an 
eCCIl1011l1C union between them. purpose of the Nigerian-Togolese union was to 
show that a small, and relatively poor country can III an economically 
relationship with a large and rich country and to dispel the assumed 
impenetrable linguistic barrier (Gambari, 1991: 20-21) 
The signing of the Lome convention by AC.P. countries was a triumph for Nigerian 
diplomacy. The federal government used this victory as ,a launching pad for the 
establishment of an economic union in sub-region. Nigeria's diplomatic role 
between 1972 and 1974 was therefore centred on the establishment of such a union 
that would reduce the influence of France in the francophone states. France was 
a power that used its considerable influence on the smaller francophone countries for 
negative purposes during the civil the federal government saw the formation of 
EC.O.W.AS. as a or reducing that influence. The greater the distance between 
France and these countries the more likely that the francophone West Mrican countries 
would begin to EC.O.W.AS as an alternative source of funds, ideas 
economic and trade relations. The capacity of EC.O.W.AS. to 
uu." ...... , .• ""... that had been built over years needs to be 
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I 
went on the diplomatic offensive between 1972 1974 (Aluko, 1 1). As 
a step in this direction Dahomey was successfully persuaded to abolish transit tax 
on all goods going from Togo to 1973 a number of other West African 
states signed of agreements to trade with Nigeria. restrained 
and shrewd diplomacy the Gowon government was greeted with such enthusiasm 
and confidence by neighbouring states that Harmani Diori, the then president of 
and chairman of C.E.AO. said in June 1973 that any economic arrangement in 
Africa that excluded Nigeria will be unrealistic (West Africa, 11 June 1 Another 
trump card was played by the Gowon government in July 1974 when the decision was 
made to crude oil at concessionary prices to African countries that had their 
This was welcome by many African countries especially Ivory Coast and 
Senegal, whose support was crucial to the formation of a pan~West African economic 
community. These diplomatic moves coupled with successful with 
in February 1975 directly paved the way for the formation ofE.C.O.W.AS. 
Olu Sanu, the Nigerian ambassador to the who presided over AC.P. 
negotiation with the E.E.c. during 1973 to 1975 said categorically that without 
Lome convention it would have very difficult if not impossible to about 
E.C.O.W.AS. (Sanu, 1978). treaty establishing the community was finally signed 
by West African states in Lagos, on the 28th May 1 
By the end of the first decade and a half of the country's independence, Nigeria was 
showing clear signs of a arrlUJ1,nO political stability and wealth at home and influence 
abroad, at least in the West African sub-region and the African continent. Two major 
. elements potential power have responsible for this: population and 
resources. With end of country's civil war and a successful policy of reconciliation, 
Nigeria as one people constitutes the concentration African people in one 
country. As a member of OPEC, Nigeria through its oil production quotas has earned 
unparalleled wealth, especially in much valued foreign exchange. nUl''''',."" these major 
strengths have also served as sources of weakness. nati<)Oal unity question has 
eluded resolution, largely because of the intense competition for a share of the growing 
wealth among segments of the national elite. To paraphrase a scholar, it is often easy 
for things to fall since the centre can not often hold. The management of the 
petroleum resources has been so inept and often corrupt that the country's oil 'boom' 
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almost become econonnc and social doom' (Gambari, 1989:4). 
From the above analysis one would draw a direct link domestic politics and 
foreign policy in Nigeria. The domestic political arrangement and the manner of 
conducting political business invariably affect' the conduct of external relations. 
the history of foreign policy been to some extent related to a search for 
national consensus behind the major outlines of country's externally projectable 
goals and objectives. absence of a unity of purpose abroad has 
10 contlict those who represent what one may call the radical on 
the one hand and those who reflect a conservative weight on the other (Gambari, 
1 According to Gambari, from this enduring contlict come policy 
positions, which are often tentative and uneasy compromises. Alternatively, successive 
independence governments have often adopted the loud rhetoric of radical 
elements 10 country, while quietly pursuing essentially policies abroad. 
The logic of this asymmetry between radical rhetoric and essentially conservative 
external policies can be found in the country's economic structure and external 
economic relations. Other than the and resources put into building a wider 
sub-regional market for manufactures, which culminated in the establishment of 
no serious efforts have been made to change direction and pattern of 
Nigeria's economic relations. The pattern of production, consumption, and export 
country's ever to the west. Moreover, as the situation 
deteriorates, attempts to find solutions are anchored on the expectations of western 
aid, investment, or the prescriptions of international financial institutions like the W orId 
Bank and the IMF which are dominated by the west. The net result is what Douglas 
Anglin, correctly identifies as the policy political nonalignment and economic 
alignment (Anglin, 1964: 2). 
in spite of the limited room that a dependent economy like Nigeria has to 
manoeuvre 10 external realm, the country was able to move from a low-keyed, 
hesitant and apologetic policy to a more activist, positive and intluential role the 
1970s. A number of factors were responsible for this, first the Gowon regime 
succeeded in redressing balance power in favour of the central 
government in relation to the regions and states. centralised and hierarchical 
nature of military connnand structure and the military government's decision to 
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divide into twelve, nineteen, states and the swelling of the financial 
purse helped to end regional challenges to a federally controlled foreign policy. 
Second, the civil war was fought and won by the authorities, but the bitter taste 
left on the government's tongue by the recognition of secessionist 'Biafra' by some 
African states required a'post-civil war reassessment of Nigeria's foreign policy with a 
for Nigeria'S West African sister countries. Third, and perhaps most prominent, 
was the increasing wealth from oil revenues and membership, which 
strengthened Nigeria's capability to pursue a new, and policy toward 
Africa and world in the 1970s (Garnbari, 1991). In a bid to shake off the accusation 
of policy, helped to lead the collective African 
approach to negotiations with the EEC. Caribbean and countries joined 
African states negotiations, which led to the of the Convention, 
trading Pan-African membership for abandonment of association and reverse 
Along with Togo, Nigeria provided the diplomatic impetus and financial 
backing which made possible the creation of the region-wide Economic Community of 
West African States (ECOWAS) (Gambari, 1989: 5-8). followed the path of 
Nigeria's policy development to the establishment of ECOWAS, the ensuing 
chapters will on attempts at integration in the and Nigeria's policy 
and its impact on such efforts. 
PURPOSE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY. 
With the together of European Community into a unit - the the 
ever growing strength of North American Trade Area (NAFT A) and the 
Association of South Asian Nations (ASEAN), African integration schemes like 
ECOWAS in West Africa and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
in Southern Africa, a thorough soul searching needs to be done regions want to 
be heard in the international politico-economic system. sub-Saharan Africa, the post 
independence era has been characterised by experiments at different levels for socio,.. 
economic development. Such experiments have ranged from individual national 
economic policies, to joint attempts at formulating policies for the harnessing 
their resources for the common good. The failure of most post-colonial economies 
has a lot of interest and debate among politicians and economists, in their 
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",tTi"ri" to establish the cause of such failures and to establish fonnidable sustainable 
development policies. Such debates have left political and economic theorists, with a 
of consensus on the cause of economic failure but one area consensus is the 
fact that African states are too small and too weak to compete on their own. The 
balkanisation of the continent into minuscule states and their peripheral position as 
producers of primary materials has awakened policy planners in these to the 
reality that 'regionalism' is the only answer to these challenges, hence the formation of 
in 1975. ECOWAS was established as a measure to address the challenges 
the postcolonial states- with its primary nl">,,,,,,,1",,,,,, ofsocio-
economic development in the sub region. However, spite of the original of 
founders of the community, controversy and lack of success in most of ECOW AS' 
and policy In community has arouse a lot of interest and debate. 
The purpose of this study is therefore to do the following; 
PURPOSE. 
to InVeSIllgalce 
investigate the need from which 
dreams founders have 
of ntP'OT~ltl to West African 
arose and moreover whether 
not achieved or abandoned. 
.. Secondly, to identifY and examine the significant role of regional powers In 
integration schemes. Here emphasis be laid on the role of Nigeria as a regional 
power in the operations of the community. This will bring illuminate how 
policy has been conducted (whether it has been consistent) and its e1t~~cts on the 
community. 
.. Thirdly, to assess role conflict resolution as part of policy in the 
community with special to the Liberian and wars. Here 
emphasis will be on the establishment of ECOMOG and effects on inter-
state in the 
• Finally, this study will examine the role of relatively stronger member states such 
as Senegal, Ghana, Ivory Coast, in the operations community. 
The significance of this study is to a broad perspective of efforts by countries in 
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the West African sub region to come together and moreover; 
SIGNIFICANCE 
• It will provide the basis for West Africa endowed with a lot of human and natural 
resources to realise its dream of economic co-operation and integration. 
• It will to highlight the weaknesses and failures of ECOW AS and will make 
an attempt to propose a path forward. 
• It will greatly ... llll ......... '... the ""H"",, of with renewed vigour in the 
community to carve a better path to socio-economic development. 
• study will also serve as a .. ",t;"''''::>1nl'''' point for the ECOW AS sub region on the 
virtues and of a dominant power in integration efforts. 
• The study will also attempt to provide alternatives to the single power factor (the 
case in ECOW AS) integration sctLerrLes. 
• Finally it will serve as a reference point to other regional organisations like SADC 
on the effect of a dominant regional power in co-operation schemes. 
METHODOLOGY. 
This study was conducted the qualitative research method. The qualitative data, 
for this study has collected by of literature, content analysis, extracts 
documents, etc. (Corey, 1985:62). Qualitative data occur in a variety of 
forms: Data can the of notes, interviews, transcripts, documents, 
pictures other representations (Atkinson and Coffey, 1996:4). According 
to Strauss (1987), there is no single way of approaching these materials as qualitative 
have quite different investigatory styles, let alone different talents and gifts, 
so that a standardisation of methods ... would only constrain and even stifle researchers 
Primary data has been collected by a reView of policy documents, 
nn,,,,,, .. nrn,,,, ... t statements, ECOWAS protocols, bi-Iateral and multi-lateral agreements, 
and Nigerian Presidential address on foreign policy. Historians have always urged 
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researchers to rely more on primary sources. Kerlinger defines a primary source as 
" ... the original depository an historical datum, like the original record kept an 
important occasion, an eye witness description of an event, a photograph, minutes 
organisational meetings, and so (Kerlinger, 1973: 
Secondary data includes the review related literature, monographs, 
newspapers etc. Babbie (1979) a secondary source as a 
secondary analysis which " ... refers to the analysis of data collected by another 
researcher for same purpose other than topic of current study \"-""'''' "', ..... 
1979: Mills and Huberman view qualitative analysis as concerned with data 
appear in words rather than numbers (1994: 21 ). 
In .... ""'.u.5 with qualitative materials, analysts make problems, grounding them in 
the everyday realities and meanings of social worlds and political actors, rather than 
problems from makers, general theorists, or others (Atkinson and Coffey, 
1996). Atkinson and (1996), stresses that qualitative data analysis 
methodological knowledge intellectual competence. is not about adhering 
to any approach or set techniques; it is artfu~ flexible and 
Whatever research strategy is being followed, problems, rPQ~'l'Ir[' 
design, data collection methods and analytic approaches should all imply one another. 
most of qualitative research, they should not even be thought at 
the process. What is conventionally to as analysis 
is a pervasive activity throughout the of the project (Atkinson and >.../VJLL .... V 
1996). 
the events to be examined study occurred between and 1997, i~ is 
logical that the procedures should comply with a sound historical approach 
(Kuye, 1989:62). is defined as " ... the critical investigation of 
developments, of the the of of 
the validity sources of information on the and the of the 
evidence"(Kerlinger, 1973: 70 1). 
Since this research is one based on a case study using historical approach, it is 
pertinent that three vital steps within the historical ..... ',..,..n methodology are 
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considered. include a definition of the problem 
theoretical model, the provision of internal and 
use of appropriate and relevant primary and secondary sources 
1989: 
of an acceptable 
study, and the 
infonnation (Kuye, 
Historical case studies use several approaches in the collection of data. The ,.."'''''''''.-''' 
uses the methodology for the data. Crude understanding of 
triangulation often imply that data from different sources or derived from different 
methods, can be in some way in order to produce a fully rounded, more 
authentic, portrayal of the socio-political world. Such a view would imply that the 
different data types, or rht'I-",..,pnt analytic allow one to approximate with 
fidelity a valid representation of subject under study (Atkinson 
and Coffey, 1996:4-14). 
LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY. 
Kuye (1989) suggests that, every research is constrained by varying factors, ranging 
from logistical to financial constraints, which tends to inhibit the gathering of research 
In light above, the limitations for this research arise from following; 
• This study COvers the period 1979-1997. That time frame is chosen 
because policy within the Community during that period has been highly 
influenced the frequent change government both in Nigeria and other member 
states, which to a great extent helped to shape policy course. Moreover, 
the changing economic fortunes Nigeria during this period are also important for 
this study. 
reluctance of government officials to divulge and the 
..,tu" • .."u,""" of linguistic barriers the sub-region also as a l1mltatlon to 
study. 
• The desire on the part of member states to protect their sovereignty territorial 
integrity, which is retleclted in the ".,.I'=>l't'I'I.1P nature of policy documents. 
• The eXlstelnce of bureaucratic red tape which is characteristic of most countries 
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the sub-region and the selective application of rules and policy also served as a 
limitation 
• Finally, limitation of financial resources and other logistics also served as a 
constraint to this study. 
In spite of these constraints and limitations, they are however not a to the 
presentation a credible academically study Nigeria's policy dynamics 
within ECOWAS. The has made full use of authentic primary, secondary 
and tertiary data in the completion of this study. 
examined the process of the development of Nigeria's foreign policy since 
independence in the introductory chapter, chapter two will discuss the theoretical 
ff",,,,,,,",,u/,,,rlr and for this study. Chapter two will attempt to the 
rationale the formation of ECOW AS consonance with theories of integration, 
putting Nigeria's role into perspective. Moreover, policy making models will be 
discussed in order to shed more light on the policy making process in Nigeria. 
Chapter three will on an overvIew policy between 1979-1997. 
period is into two Shagari-Buhari eras- 1979-1984 and the 
Babangida-Shonekan-Abacha eras- 1984-1997. In this section, Nigeria's policy 
torwards ECOW AS with regards to specific specific policies pursued by the different 
regimes is presented. 
Ch.iPtl:lf four will focus on the analysis of the research findings. The analysis in this 
chapter will focus on the specific policies pursued Nigeria and their implications for 
ECOWAS. Specific attention is given to the Nigerian expulsion orders of 1983 and 
1985 with reference to the ECOWAS Protocol on the free movement of the 
Nigerian land border closure 1984-1985 and Nigeria's pivotal role in ECOMOG's 
involvement in Liberia and Sierra Leone between 1990-1997 will be the subject of 
analysis. implications of these policies for regional integration and co-operation 
within the TT"!'Ilmp,["'nlrlr ofECOWAS will be examined. 
Chapter will be a conclusion of the study, summary and recommendations will be 
made for the future course of Nigeria's policy in ECOWAS. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW. 
Introduction. 
The major challenge facing the Afiican continent this last decade of the 20th century is 
how to reverse the trend economic decline which has afflicted the region since the 
1970s and to strengthen the capacity of the economies for participation as important 
and effective partners the global economy in the next One key element in 
reSPOlLlse to challenge is the promotion of regional economic integration, which 
has constituted a aspect of Afiican development strategy. merits as 
a desirable strategy for large number of Afiican states (like ECOW AS) have been well 
documented in various studies on Afiican development and reflected in virtually all 
recent internal and external action programmes or guidelines for Sub-Saharan Afiica. 
Of considerable significance is fact that the smallness of the economies in 
leads to perspective that: when combined into larger market behind a common 
it could easily become the nucleus or growth core for West 
integration. Among a growing number of scholars and policy makers, there is an 
increasing awareness that Nigerian-led economic integration offers the most viable 
path to the economic integration of West Afiica. then is how and under what 
conditions the process of pooling together the structurally weak and dependent 
economies of the West Afiican states into the realisation of a virile economic union is 
to be realised. (Asante, 1997:28). Thjs study will therefore focus on Nigeria's policy 
within this framework of integration in the West Afiican sub-region. But before 
examining policy within ECOW AS an attempt will be made to analyse the 
international of integration within the context of the formation of ECOW AS. 
Regional Co-operation in West Africa and The Traditional Theories of 
Integration. 
, African countries cannot continue to pursue economic policies and as if all 
want is a poor imitation of America, USSR. or time has come 
for us to think seriously about evolving a genuinely authentic strategy for development-a 
Stral[egy for development that is not oriented, that is not based on copying other 
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societies hook, line and and that does not lead to accnlturative modemisation ... thus 
economic co-operation among African states is a sine qua non for the achievement of 
national socio--economic goals, and not an to be to after the process of 
Oe\rel0,pment is well adVanced". Adebayo Adedeji, 1986. 
term become part of vocabulary of politicians and economists 
trying to carve out viable and sustainable economic policies. But before we get into the 
intricacies integration an attempt will be made to a broad a 
of The term integration in fact covers a wide variety 
possible Given the nature and these different 
schemes, it is important they are clearly distinguished at the out set. following 
classification of different of integration based on (Balassa, 1961; and 
Jovanovic, IS reference points: 
1. Preferential agreement: In this case customs duties on trade among member 
countries are reduced relative to those on with non-member countries. 
example of such arrangement in African context is the 
Free Trade Here member countries remove tariffs and quotas on trade 
between members in within FT A, retain control over their 
own restrictions on trade with non-member The and other res:tnc~tl(ms 
applying to external trade will vary from one country to another. For this reasons an 
will normally embrace rules of origin agreement. 
3. Customs Union: In case members not only abolish restrictions on internal trade 
in FTA) but also impose a common tariff on non-
member countries. of origin are then no longer required. 
Customs Union (SACU) is an example of such an arrangement in 
Southern 
African context. 
4. Market: This is a customs union, which has, additionally, movement 
of factors production. restrictions apply to movement of factors with 
non-member countries. In the context ECOW AS was intended to achieve a 
common though it fallen far of this objective. 
5. Economic Union: goes further than a common market that major economic 
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policies are (for example, fiscal, monetary, industrial) co-ordinated, and monetary 
union may be introduced. Examples of monetary union context (for 
example, the and the Rand zones), but these are in nature (because 
of the role played or South Africa). These arrangements, therefore, do not 
really qualifY as economic unions as defined here (Lyakurwa, 1997:162). 
the purpose of this study, this broad definition will serve as a in our analysis 
integration efforts in the West Economic integration between 
states has some claim to be regarded as one of leading aspirations of 
international economic policy in the mid-twentieth century, so much so that this era has 
been termed 'the age integration' (Harbeler, 1961: 1). In the developed world, the 
desire for integration is reflected in the formation of such as the European 
Community the Council for Mutual Economic 
(COMECON), and many others. similar interest is also found in Africa and is 
in a variety of arrangements like the ECOWAS and in plans for 
others. The need for regional economic integration in Africa is not a recent 
phenomenon. In fact, most African leaders appreciated this need soon after their 
countries had become independent sovereign states in the 1960s. Although, they 
did not always distinction between economic integration and political unity 
(indeed some, particularly leaders of the Casablanca group of countries held 
doctrinaire view that political unity and the formation of a united states of Africa must 
precede economic integration), and although very little has been achieved in either 
fields, yet following independence is likely to go down in African history as 
the of and political integration rather than the development decade. 
the view of President Nkrumah of regional blocs were incompatible with 
African unity: according to him they not only impeded achievement but would sap 
strength once it had been achieved (Harbeler, 1961: 1). 
Following independence most Afiican states had close especially in the economic 
field, with outside states than they had with each other, and powers thus 
pv~>r("l",prl considerable leverage within the continent. This applied especially to the 
former colonial powers since the 'mother country' was normally the new states 
principal trading partner, economic, financial and cultural links between for 
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instance and its fonner colonies (except Guinea, Conakry) were particularly close. To 
President Nkrumah of Ghana, the relationship smacked of neo-colonialism: he charged 
the metropolitan powers political independence, while still retaining 
eccmOlrntc control over their fledglings. believed that a united Africa, subject to a 
government, was the only effective way of ending the white minority minority 
rule in Africa (Tordoff, 1997: 260). However, the failure of most post independence 
African leaders to promote economic development and political stability has not 
credence to this view. Moreover the slow progress at integration has 
further brought the of a united under serious contention. 
further buttress the fact that regional integration is not a recent phenomenon sub-
Saharan Aijica, there are the cases of and the EAC both of which have existed 
smce 1910 aRd 1919 respectively. However, the majority of regional economic 
" .............. ..,,, were established in the 1970s. The motivations behind the establishment of 
regional integration schemes in SSA have been both political and economic. Most 
" ................ " were fonned as a of the disillusionment with political 
and economic systems, which were viewed as being urifavourable to developing 
countries. Some regional integration schemes such as the EAC and those in the CF A 
zone were fonned at the instigation of the colonisers, with a view to maintaining closer 
links. fonnation of most union also coincided with the era of export pessimism. 
This s~hool thought argued that the world trading was not favourable to 
developing countries as a result of declining commodity tenns of trade against LDCs 
export, export earnings instability, low trade elasticities and unfair protectionism 
against export to developed countries. These argUments were therefore used to 
justify import substitution industrialisation policy. Most of the regional integration 
groupings in SSA were fonned on the basis of import substitution strategy. J'he hope 
was that by widening the market, together with protection of important sectors, 
eC(mOmH~S of scale would ultimately lead to trade and promotion 
of However, has shown that import substitution 
industrialisation policy has not only failed in individual countries but also many 
regional groupings (Lyakurwa, 1997: 174-76). 
Attempts at integration in -the mdepc~ndlenc:;e era were not only dominated by 
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economic impetus but also there were political unions. Many attempts were made, both 
before and after the establishment of the in 1963, to form political 
unions. The successful cases can be counted on the one hand; the Ghana and 
British Togoland in 1 Italian and British Somaliland in 1960, .;ov ....... ...,. 
Jl .... ""jJ .... .lU"" of in 1961, and Tanganyika and Zanzibar in 1964. It is an 
that each case one or both of the states coming together were 
tonnerlv UN trusteeship territories and a significant fact that, (Tordoff, 1 with 
single exception of Tanganyika and Zanzibar, every successful union took place before 
the independence of one or more of the states concerned. Southern Cameroons, which 
Knlr<>.f'I had administered as part continued under UN trusteeship 
Nigeria's attainment independence in 1960, and pending the holding of a plebiscite 
in February 1961. If the 1981, confederal arrangement between and the 
Gambia had (it collapsed 1989), the case for Sene-gambia would have 
proved an exception on both counts since each state was at the time 
union and neither was ever under the UN tutelage (Tordoff, 1997). 
cases to achieve lasting politic~l union include the Mali federation- Ghana-
Guinea-Mali Union, and the EAC. Key in each case were institutional 
incompatibility and the perception of incumbent leaders that their political power base 
was being or would be eroded. short-lived federation between the former French 
West colonies pf Senegal and Soudan (now Mali) was particularly instructive 
this case (T ordoff, 1997). 
It is important to note that, those formed for economic purpose 
better than the regional political unions (Tordoff, 1997:264), though they, too, 
had a of the with limited objectives had 
a long survival record~ de the Union 
Douaniere et Economique l' Afrique (UDEAC), and the Organisation 
1"r1£'!!'1"'" et Mauritienne (OCAM), which became mainly a linguistic and 
cultural A groupmgs up in the post 
independent Oelt10Cl. sometime to collapse and resurface; included the Chad 
Basin River Development Organisation, the MRU, and the 
CEAO. were non-political that made 
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steady than spectacular oroere:5S (Tordoff, 264-66). 
Current UlUIA.W'5 and UO;;<I,.;'Ato;;< in many official African on the subject of regional 
is centred around Abuja Treaty 1991 and the Plan of Action 
(LPA) of 1980 (Lyakurwa, 161) called for formation an African 
common market by the was to be in with 
formation Trade followed by a common market and an economic union. 
The LPA divided Africa SSA into three sub--regions: West Africa, Africa and 
..LJ ....... ~ ........ and Southern Africa. of the sub-regions was to through 
integration an common market could be formed (Lyakurwa, 1997). In 
1991 OAU of state and government judged the made sub-
regional co-operation enough to justifY the signing of the to establish a Pan 
CLU .... "'". Economic Community Treaty establishing the provides 
for the existing sub-regional to serve as the building blocks for new 
community, and the five of the new institution will be devoted to the 
stre:ngt,herung of these sub-regional groupings like ECOW AS which is subject 
this study (Lyakurwa, 161). 
relation to the various forms of economic co-operation Africa, both actual and 
projected, questions are suggested some which included 
following; what is the source of economic benefits? How extensive are 
benefits likely to be? Can economic association without political unity maximise the 
integration? Under what circumstances is economic association likely to 
""',..,"'''" into some kind of political association? Is economic integration a stable forms 
of organisation, or does continuance seem likely to demand some political 
unity? (Robson, 21). questions make one thing clear, that is, integration 
can not looked at from a purely economic point of view leaving out the political 
dimension. of this the traditional theories of integration have 
used to explain integration arrangements in SSA is however a to 
evaluate the relevance ·of such positions to the efforts of countries in West 
Sub-region-ECOWAS. For purpose this study we will concentrate on two of 
these theories-Functionalism and Customs union theory. An attempt will made to 
theories to the rationale integration West Africa, culminated in 
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the establishment of ECOW AS in Lagos in May 
Traditional Theories of Integration. 
Functionalism, developed by David Mitrany and Earnest asserts nation-
state can not respond adequately to the technical, eccmO'DllIC. and social challenges of 
modern ''''''''''''TU functionalist approach to international co-operation is premised 
on the proposition that one can isolate non-political problems, such as social, technical 
and humanitarian matters, and then concentrate on solving them. In the words of David 
Mitrany (cited in Gambari, 1991) that: " the problem of our time is not how to 
keep the nations peacefully apart but how to bring them actively together" (Gambari, 
1991 : These can be achieved according to the functionalists by indirectly seeking 
out areas of mutual interests, which are common, where they are common, to the 
extent to which they are common. functionalist puts emphasis on a pragmatic 
approach to solving practical problems. Functionalists also seek an escape from the 
vertical divisions of world (nation-states) by a horizontal 
approach to common problems. They prefer a problemsolving approach and 
approvingly Lenin's pronouncement that what matters is 'not the governmept of men 
but the administration of things' (Gambari, 1991). They entertain the hope ·that co-
operation in economic and social fields may 'spillover' into the political fields. The 
habit of co-operation and the accumulated agenda of constructive work may well bring 
about federalism instalments or by pieces 1991. 2). The inter-
related nature technological and environmental serves as a strong basis 
the position of the functionalist. 
According to the functionalist, relationship between social, economic and 
technological change on the one hand, and political change on the has long been 
a major ~oncern of political theorists. Some argued that the political forms and 
practices are strictly determined the economic or technological 
sOC:letlles~ while others suggested that while we can not infer the political structure 
any society from 'non-political' features, latter do exert continuous 
pressure on leaders to reconsider and adapt the political system. Functionalists have 
based their arguments on a distinction between the political non-political of 
societies, and postulate an tension h"'+,,,'''' ..... the particularistic nature of the 
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f'nN",,"'r and the implications of the latter, in the modem era. Since the 
1930s, this position has been most forcefully and widely by the functionalists. 
As Mitrany in (pentland, 1973), observes, ' ... the number of problems which take on a 
world character is growing apace, partly because we have a better understanding of 
them ... but also because their technical peculiarities ... these new contacts which 
crowd upon us from all directions can be as much a source of conflict as of co-
operation ... '(pentland, 1973: 64-65). 
The functionalist further argue that, out of an increasing recognition the imperatives of 
technological and the global scale of problems of welfare must develop a 
network organisations perlbrming specific functional tasks transcending national 
boundaries. In Mitrany's words, 'the nature function tells the of 
jurisdiction and the needed for effective And the same 
reason, unlike rigid political functional can be adjusted, 
when the conditions of the functions are seen to have changed.'( Mitrany, 1966: 61). 
Beyond this however, it is difficult to what the end product 
the process of integration thus conceived might look However, the traditional 
functionalists best represented by Mitrany, sees the ultimate goal to be a complex, 
interwoven network of cross-national organisations performing all the traditional 
welfare functions of the modem nation-state at the same time rendering war 
impossible. In this community there is a perfect elasticity of structures: they develop, 
as in Lamark's Third law, according to felt need and die out with that need. The 
functionalist view the i tegrated system, as a web of organisations meeting all human 
needs and responding to technological change (Pentland, 1973). 
The functionalist further argue that perception of an increasing number of problems, 
needs and trends outstripping national capacities is bound to result in toward 
co-operation. One such problem is that The advent the nuclear age, 
in satellites and electronic surveillance, and new techniques of 
espionage, subversion and guerrilla warfare, have challenged the belief that the nation-
state can 
that with 
perform the basic function of protecting its citizens. It is further 
recognition of increased difficulties in purely national social welfare 
planning, in an when workers migrate across boundaries, calls for co-operation on 
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matters. in short, is a fact if acknowledged politically, 
would dissolve the nation-state system, organising the world not what divides it but 
by what unites it (Pentland, 1973). 
Another set of factors discussed by functionalists are those technological 
developments which, whether perceived or not, set in motion a process 
'planetisation'. and their creation of a global village; the 
revolution in data processing. new speed and the scale transport all media. 
(Armand and Dancour, 
It is the view of the functionalists that the between these changes and changes in 
the structure of the international political system can not be allowed to persist. The 
sociological, economic and technological bases of national sovereignty are 
eroding, and future global pattern daily more and more 
nec:ess,arv As problems a technical non-political) nature it is argued, they 
spawn whose sole purpose is to and whose limits of 
competence are by the nature of the problem itself As Mitrany says, 'the 
functional dimensions ... determines themselves. In a like manner the function 
determines its appropriate organs. It also reveals through practice the nature of action 
required under conditions and in that way the powers needed by the 
respective authority' (pentland, 1973: 77-79). Describing Roosvelt's New Deal as a 
model for this procedure, Mitrany (cited Pentland, that 
function was left to generate others gradually, the functional sub-division of 
organic cells; and in every case the appropriate authority was left to grow and develop 
out of actual performance'. 
view the nation-state as a structural fossil from an era of limited 
eccmOlffilC and social problems and rudimentary technology. theorists see the 
nation-state as the chief barrier to rational organisation for human welfare, because of 
the ascendancy of politics over the common interest. In both the political 
reality and the functionalist inadequacy of the nation-state, functionalist draws an 
explicit contrast between society-natural, beneficial and flexible, with widening 
of communal action- and the state, the former servant of society now turned on 
its own artificer (Mitrany, 1966: 62). Functionalist theory, then, sees the state in 
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international co-operation as the insect in a carnivorous plant. Attracted ever inward 
by the benefits it finds that behind it the avenues of retreat are progressively blocked. 
of self-determination, which drives the functionalist process of 
depends as we have seen not ..... ""'~"'h' on the objective trends but on 
collective attitude towards co-operation. The core of the argument is that creative 
association and co-operation in problem solving provides a learning situation which 
participants are gradually weaned away from their allegedly irrational nationalistic 
impulses toward a self-reinforcing ethos co-operation. their functional needs are 
met, people discover the source of their welfare and direct their and 
loyalties to the international than to states (pentland, 1973: 
86). 
A general response to the position of the functionalists is that, it over emphasised 
harmony and integration in modem It tended not to accommodate the idea of 
conflicting interests and the differential power of groups in conflict with others. The 
that different parts of the political are of everything 
producing unity, seems a distorted way of describing any society. The functionalist 
directed their attention mainly towards the factors in society, which maintain consensus 
and stability. position can be understood, given the areas of natural science, 
which they and their social anthropological precursors chose as analogous to social 
science. Smith (1996) has further argued that functionalists emphasise the importance 
for society of finding ways to new generations into current values and they 
look the contribution which political functions make to the maintenance of social 
equilibrium. Their central focus is on what holds societies together, what structures 
and values are functional to its survival. (Smith, 1996: 106). Smith further asserts that 
functionalists can be faulted for not being capable of explaining the very changes that 
were its raison because it concentrates on 
of the status quo. tendency to regard 
prerequisites of the maintenance 
that exists, including the 
characteristics of the political system, as functional and therefore desirable becomes 
normatively supportive the perpetuation existing social arrangements (Smith, 
1996: 106-107). Having explored the functionalist approach an attempt would noY' be 
made to look at integration attempts through projects of customs union. 
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Projects for customs unions other special tariff states 
independent of each other politically are today widespread, ~nd many persons look to 
them as at least a partial solution major economic and political problems in the 
... " ..... n.vu .... field. The United States has recent years given strong 
support to this idea ways, and the Committee of Co-operation 
established to collaborate with the United in the execution of the Marshall Plan 
aid to Europe, no doubt in response to interpretation of American wishes, has 
likewise its sympathy with this idea as relates to Europe. The customs union 
is only one of a number of possible of arrangement, which eliminate or reduce 
the tariff barriers two or more political units while maintaining tariff barriers 
against imports from outside regions. Its economic difference from reciprocal free 
trade unaccompanied by other criteria of customs union is slight, while, if the removal 
of internal trade barriers is incomplete, its and administrative differences from 
ordinary reciprocity agreements are also slight or questionable (Viner, 1950: 3). 
According to the customs union focus of integration, the principal objective of 
integration arrangements is to remove, such discriminations that may exist in 
trade and general economic relationships across national boundaries. significance 
of national borders lies in the introduction of 'discontinuities whether in trade, inflows 
of factors of production or in general economic policies'. These discontinuities 
according to the customs union theorists actually lead to effective discrimination in the 
economic sphere. Before Jacob Viner's major contribution to the customs union 
theory, the general view was that because a customs union brings about trade, 
they tend to increase world welfare. However, this free-trade world welfare focus has 
been criticised for neglecting issues concerning the mal-administration of world income 
and the privileged positions of the developed, capitalist economies in the international 
system (Viner, 1966). 
It is important to note that, the amount trade created or diverted, is not in itself an 
adequate representation of the or losses from a customs union, because it takes 
no account the the production costs of 
htl:ectlvelv the and derived from the commodities in 
establishment a customs union are by in costs resulting from the 
shift '"'u .... ""'''' from higher cost to lower cost sources within the union, the 
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loss relates to the extra costs of producing a commodity in the partner country instead 
of in the rest of the world. Thus, as in (Robson, 1968) notes, in order to 
ascertain whether the formation a union represents on balance, a net gain or it is 
necessary to consider not only the total volume of trade on which costs have been 
lowered and the total volume of trade on which costs have been increased, but also the 
extent to which costs have been raised or lowered on each unit of or diverted 
trade. this into account, the test whether on balance the 'production' 
.... u." .... ., of integration are positive or (Robson, 1968: 29) 
who that his is a static analysis, which ignores or UUll"UU"",., dynamic 
aspects of regional integration, further refine viner's theory. political 
considerations involved in integration schemes, they declare, are of such crucial 
importance that economic reasoning alone is inadequate as a tool understanding the 
process if integration. conventional integration theories tend to focus on economic 
ettc::cts and issues concerning integration. Their attention is focused at economic 
factors, which promote more efficient use of resources in customs union. Such use of 
resources is predicated on the movement of goods and factors of production, 
following the elimination of discriminatory policies among member states. 
Conventional integration theory largely concerns gains that may derived from 
changes in existing patterns of trade (Gambari, 1991). Such theory evolved with the 
developed countries of Europe in mind and therefore illuminated the problems of 
integration in Western Europe. It tended to make two basic assumptions; - that there is 
full employment and a given input of resources. - that domestic prices are supposed to 
reflect opportunity cost, tariffs apart, and hence there is no need to interfere with 
market allocation of resources (Gambari, 1991: 7). With this functionalism 
and customs union theory, we can now tum to the integration efforts in West Africa, 
which culminated to the formation the ECOWAS. But before we get into 
dynamics of the whole integration process in the sub-region, it would be pertinent 
one to explore the political economy of the sub-region. 
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The Political Economy of West Africa. 
West sub-region is the largest and biggest in Sub-Saharan Africa, with 16 
countries and a combined population of about 170 million and GDP of US$ 78 billion 
(Mansoor, 190/91: 423). The grouping contains Nigeria, Africa's nation as well 
as one its smallest, Cape Verde. It includes the Sahelian countries which depend 
heavily on some of the most industrialised economies in Sub-Saharan 
such as Cote d'Ivoire (16 per cent of from manufacturing), and Senegal 
(17 per cent of manufacturing). ECOWAS countries as a group had the best 
growth performance of all groupings from 1965 to 1980 but since have 
registered the worst performance GDP by 1.8 between 1980 
and 1986 (Mansoor, 1990/91: 427). West Africa's modem states fall into two clusters; 
One is the corridor of Francophone states stretching from the Atlantic Ocean in the 
west to Lake in the east. Known collectively as (meaning the 'coast' of 
Sahara in they are the Gambia-an Anglophone 
Mauritania, Mali, Faso, and Niger. All of them are ex-
colonies of sharing a common predicament in the of the encroaching 
Senegal is a spatial exception; being one of the region's more prosperous 
economies. To this group we should add the small ex-Portuguese colony of Cape 
Verde Island (Hart, 1982). 
The other group consists small coastal usually reaching back in a narrow strip 
through forest to a portion of the Sudanic savannah: Leone, Guinea, Guinea-
Bissau, Liberia, Coast, Ghana, Togo and Benin. Of these, the Coast and 
Ghana alone have the social 1" .... ~Q"'1r1M population resources to attc~ml)t a 
reasonably viable political economy. After Nigeria, they (along with 
Senegal), second tier of independent states behind by the the 
and 
The region is highly characterised by inequalities. Its colonial inheritance--of dualistic 
economies, authoritarian regimes and high levels of ethnic consciousness, is not an 
advantageous one. Nevertheless, despite its unfortunate and 
performance, West has emerged as an important actor in contemporary 
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arena of global politics. Ambiguities and contradictions in the past and present 
political economy of the sub-region; in addition it is a .,',n .... ' .... 
in a global system still dominated essentially by the interest and actions of 
region 
North. 
The discontinuities and dilemmas of 'economic' dependence and 'political' 
interdependence are revealed most poignantly in the very tenuous and vulnerable 
of 'independence' achieved by the countries in the (Shaw, 1985: 8). 
In the 1980s sub-region suffered precipitous fall per capita incomes from levels 
that were already low. Whereas capita incomes increased at a moderate rate of 1 
per cent in the 1960s, this declined to 0.2 cent in 1970s and 2.8 percent 
between 1980 and 1986 fell in the 1990s (Sandbrook, 1993:5). 
uneven rates and results of development- with interrelated political, economic, 
social and strategic components- have served to exacerbate inequalities and tensions 
both within and between states of the region as well as between continental goals 
and global actors The of West today is that after three decades of 
political independence, economic emancipation that was expected to follow closely 
on the heels of political independence (and to result from the economic transformation 
of the continent and thus bring about a significantly higher and progressively increasing 
standard ofliving for masses of the people) remains a mirage(Shaw, 1980). 
regions decline is not only limited to a single sector, it covers a wide range of 
issues. For example per capita income has stagnated or declined. Industrial output has 
fallen; deforestation and desertification have reduced the productive land area. RiSing 
food imports, declining terms of trade, and capital flight have produced a massive jump 
the external debt, which in 1990 was roughly equivalent to the GNP and 
required half of all earnings to (Sandbrook, 1993: 5). 
Although have been some structural changes in the economies, during the 
three decades, fact is that the West economy today is still basically 
underdeveloped: low capita a high proportion population engaged 
low level of productivity, a circumscribed and fractured 
industrial base, a high dependence on a vulnerably narrow spectrum of primary ",v",.nrl 
commodities, a transport sector geared largely to the export sector, a sharp bifurcation 
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between the traditional and the modem sectors, a high of illiteracy, low life 
expectancy, and a predominance of expatriate business enterprise banking, 
commerce, finance, industry management. Although these are some of the T"''''·'''''' 
that point to the underdevelopment, they suggest the magnitude of challenges 
that confront the West African (Shaw, 1982: 280). 
classical political economy of Mill and Marx was a fairly sufficient model of 
advanced capitalism, in which Marx emphasises the class antagonism of capital and 
labour; but neither paid much attention to political organisation (Mill 1990; Marx 
1959). The tendency to treat economic activity as it were autonomous from the 
sphere of government was thus shared by both strand of political economy, and it was 
undoubtedly fostered by the apparent success of the nineteenth century liberal state in 
promoting Britain's economic development. 
For the nations of West not even the appearance of a separation of state and 
economy is plausible. First, their dilemmas are more than those of the post-renaissance 
Europe or of Victorian England; and second the synthesis of politics and economics 
was made explicit by the government of the colonial period, and the successor states 
have even further towards combining the two public and in practice. Indeed the 
character of each of these states is the single most important variable in any attempt to 
understand the region's political economy. After their recent experience of 
decolonization, West Africa's peoples are now living in a balkanised clust~r ofEngiish, 
French and Portuguese speaking states. These are dwarfed by the growing might of the 
one black African powers that now stands at the threshold of national greatness-
Excluding which dominates the Eastern part of region (Hart, 
1982). 
of the of African continent, economic co-
operation is perhaps more relevant to than to any other developing of 
the world. the conventional indicators of economic and social well most African 
states fall significantly behind Latin American countries and all but a few of the poorest 
Asian countries (Many factors are responsible for Africa's poverty and 
underdevelopment. But certainly the small size of most African countries is one factor 
that inhibits rapid economic transformation (Renninger, 1982: 158). In this vein RS. 
51 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Morgenthau stated that: " the typical developing African nation has a sparse 
population, small internal markets, limited infrastructure, new and fragile borders, and 
economies vulnerable to fluctuating world prices" (Morgenthau, 1977). 
before it became rich as a result of oil, was along with the areas 
surrounding the and Volta River -one of the wealthiest, most densely 
populated countries. Its citizens out number other west Africans by five to three. Its 
Gross National Product accounts seven tenths of the regional totaL Yet it is not the 
most developed country in the region. When West Africa decolonised, Ghana and 
;:)erleg:al were both more advanced, however following their relative Ivory 
Coast now has a capita income of some $250 higher than Nigeria's, which ranks 
seventy-sixth out of countries in the world. It is the Sahelian states whose poverty 
is outstanding, though aU but two West African countries lie the bottom third of the 
international income Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger are among the poorest (Hart, 
1982). 
However, Claude Ake (1981) has argued that in spite of the oil boom of the 
Nigeria remained a dependent economy. The oil boom in Nigeria illustrates the 
tendency of disarticulation and dependence to be mutually supportive. Oil according to 
Ake (1981) greatly increased Nigeria's dependence, both technologically and 
financially, particularly in the technological field. Apart from technological dependence 
the oil industry had very few backward linkages and virtually all-forward linkages were 
external. The bulk of the demand for oil was external. All this meant that the oil 
industry was externally oriented. Since oil accounts for about 90% of export earnings, 
it has tended to influence the subsidiary sectors towards an ......... ' ..... U"'1 orientation, 
thereby exacerbating disarticulation ofthe Nigerian economy (Ake, 1981:136). 
The fifteen Gross National Product was and is still than a 
tenth of Britain's, a nation with similar numbers of people and only 4 per cent the 
land area. It is hard to visualise what an income of a dollar looks like, when every man, . 
woman, and child, in the U.S.A receives a dollar an hour around the clock. On this 
scale citizens of Mali spend a year what Americans spend in five days - a ratio of 
70: 1 (Adedeji, 1970:217). Primary production is the mainstay of the economy of the 
\ 
region. The average share of agriculture, including livestock, forestry, and fishing, in 
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total GDP is between per cent. point of view of agricultural 
production, West Africa can be divided into two main belts of production, stretching 
from east to west. The forest belt concentrates on growing crops primarily for exports, 
such as cocoa, rubber, bananas, and timber. On the other hand, the northern 
savannah belt, a tsetse fly specialises in livestock breeding and grain 
The volume of inter-country trade within West Africa is very low 
(Adedeji, 1970: 7). 
Thus the lack of progress on both national and regional levels has combined to keep 
the West African economy in its state of underdevelopment, with the structure of 
production remaining largely as it was in the colonial days. The region continues to 
devote our resources to produce for export rather than to produce for our own 
,""v.eu".,,,,,, needs because that is the 'inherited' economic order. In the meantime, West 
Africa depends on outside world to supply our requirements and, more often, than 
not, our basic needs (Adededji, 1982). It seems to have been forgotten that agricultural 
production for export, example, was nourished, and sustained by 
colonial powers because that was the of the manufacturing industries the 
metropolitan countries (Adedeji, 1982: 280-282). 
Thus, the West African economy is the most open and most exposed economy in 
the world, overly dependent on external trade and other external stimuli, foreign 
technology and foreign' ""v~,,,,,rt'I(!"" The very strategies of development the African 
governments have been pursuing since independence, have come from outside, derived 
as they were from theories economic development that were developed during 
colonial neo-colonial of production in Africa. Not unexpectedly 
theories of development and economic growth reinforced the economic dependence of 
the sub-region. They linked the rate and direction of internal socio-economic change 
with export markets and with the import of technology and capital goods, 
services, and modem consumer products (Shaw, 1982:283). 
The attempt to confront West Africa's development problems today naturally brings to 
the fore the question of how can we account for the historical process of its having 
become underdeveloped in the first place. It is no secret that the regional economy is 
abundantly geared toward foreign trade. Thus an United Nations Commission on 
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Trade and Development (UNCTAD), recent report points out that the intra-regional 
trade West Africa constituted than 3 per cent trade, compared with 20 per 
cent in Latin America, 64 per cent in and 7 per cent in Africa as a 
whole. It is hard to avoid striking superficial attitudes about this external orientation of 
the 'economie de traits' 1982: 25). 
It should be realised that the contemporary condition of the sub-region is one of crisis-
a of profound and poignant qualities ... brought about by; an of 
incorporation in the world and by subsequent nexus between 
the latter's centre and The cluster of shocks which swept through across 
the global political economy of the 1970s ... from the floating dollar and expensive 
energy to middle power emergence and super power confrontations ... has had massive 
impact on patterns of Africa's dependence and underdevelopment. The central 
idealistic myths of Pan-African nationalism and cohesion that all African states are 
essentially and equally free to develop ... have been replaced by a new realism of 
pessimism (Shaw, 1984): states are exponentially with only a minority likely 
to experience sustained growth. terms of political, psychology, diplomacy and 
security realpolitik poses a dramatic almost awesome, set problems for region. 
The contours of the are now quite clear ... West Africa (Africa), has been hardest 
hit of all regions in the 1970s ... so that, a century after the treaty of Berlin, the 
continent as a whole is now more marginal economically than ever: the region which 
already contributes least to global trade and product in terms of both primary products 
and manufactured goods. The urgent and emergent debate over alternative strategies 
poses challenges not only for West African interest but also for extra-African actors, if 
development should come to this region (Shaw, 1984:73-78). 
However f'..-p>g'i"U'" ofECOWAS does not seem to have led to trade diversion, since 
all but 2 percentage points of this is accounted for by greater trade with non-
ECOW AS Partners. It would appear that while ECOWAS has not generated much 
new trade, an important part of of many of its has been 
with other Sub-Saharan African countries, even though this is masked the overall 
numbers by the dominant position some of the economies that have little 
regional trade, specifically Nigeria and Ghana (Mansoor, 1990/91: 428). 
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The assumptions, prescriptions and projections of the following independence 
were no longer valid. Instead, 'developmentalist' ideology is being replaced by 
as the contemporary continental motif; the elusiveness of development and 
the unevenness growth have combined to force a reconsideration of strategy and 
scenario on Africa's statesmen and scholars. Adebayo Adedeji One the chief 
architects ofECOWAS summed it up thus; 
'Africa more than the other third world region, is ... faced with a development crisis of great 
portent...if past trends and if there are no fundamental in the mix of 
economic policies that the African govermnents have pursued during the last decade and a 
half and if the current efforts to fundamentally the international economic 
and relaltiOlls fail to yield concrete positive results, the African as a whole will be 
worse off compared with the rest ofthe world at the end ofthe century than it was in 1960.' 
t\ueueu. 1977:13-14). 
The projection of inequalities in the future has profound implications for both policy 
and politics; hence the debate' about the continent's development strategy. The 
alternative World Bank and OAU plans for Africa are based on the assumptions, 
expectations and projections; they also reflect distinctive class preferences. Agenda for 
Action favours bourgeois and NIC interests whereas the Lagos Plan of Action is based 
on more proletarian and peasant basic human need characteristics of the periphery. If 
become the continental plan then further inter and intra state inequalities 
would ensue. If however, the LP A is adopted such inequalities might be contained or 
even reduced. In short, these two plans reflect different class and country interests both 
at present and prospect. The current and projected condition of the is 
depressing, no withstanding utility and vitality of the debate about alternative 
development strategies. Intra-state inequalities are likely to continue with profound 
implications for national, regional and continental order and development (Shaw, 
1975). 
Adedeji articulates the atmosphere of depression well when he asserted that: 
, The of today is that after two decades of political for most African 
('flnntn,,,,,, the economic that was to follow closely on the heels of 
political independence still remains only a the African economy today is the 
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most open and the most exposed economy in the world, dependent on external 
trade and other external stimuli, technology, and foreign expertise. The very 
of the African govermnents have been procuring since 
indepe.ndence have come from theories of economic development that were developed 
during the colonial and neo-colonial to rationalise the colonial pattern of 
proaUCltlon in 
.U..,ILll..,i high rates of growth or diversification nor an lDClreasmg 
measure of self-reliance and self sustainment has been achieved in the African 
economy.'(Adedeji, 1982:280). 
Given such an unsatisfactory inheritance and trend, Adedeji calls for a more authentic 
strategy based on indigenous needs, values and life styles. i)U1".5"'~'~, idealistically, 
that the very dismal forecasts can only be avoided if an African programme contains 
'certain basic elements'; these are 'self-reliance and self-sustaining' development, 
democratisation of the development process, delineation, the creation of the right 
political and social emnronm,ents, the recovery of self confidence by the peoples of 
and the willingness to and meaningful 'co-operation' "'''''''''1'''. 
African states.' (Shaw, 1985: 1-20). With this broad of West political 
economy we can now tum to rationale for the formation ofECOWAS. 
Rationale for the Formation of ECOW AS. 
West African sub-region is endowed with a lot of mineral and other natural 
resources, nonetheless the region has witnessed unprecedented cases of starvation and 
human tragedies resulting from severe drought which affected the Sahel in the 1970s. 
New questions are therefore How can this potentially wealthy region cope with 
or avoid future socio-economic dislocations and suttertn~~s ..".u"",u by natural disasters? 
How can poorer state West share in the ... ."'nn.,,,, wealth of sister countries in 
the reJl~OIl{ How long will the countries of West continue to rely on hand outs 
--- --
from western countries, whose assistance tends to come in bits and pieces and in times-
of crises, often too late? (Gambari, 1991.16). 
study of West A.(i1ca' s political economy depicts that, the post independent period 
in the region in the early 1960s indicated striking features of underdevelopment: the 
predominance of a primary sector, a high concentration of income, sparse 
diversification in its production system, and an external market far out weighing the 
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internal trade andco-operation. West Africa requires some form of 
reconstruction as a group if political independence is to retain its meaning and value 
(Olaniyan: 1985:2). 
In an effort to address these questions and challenges the various West African 
countries decided to jointly harness their resources for the 
development of the sub-region. co-operation can be summed up in the 
words Adedeji he" co-operation among 
states is a sine qua non for the achievement of national socio-economic goals 
and not an extra to he given thought after the process of development well 
advanced" (cited in Asante, 1991: This desire for co-operation was also expressed 
by one of the founding fathers of ECOW AS, the former Nigerian head of state, 
Yakubu Gowon, who states that " ... the case for economic co-operation in 
West Africa is " It would according to him playa fundamental role in the 
development of the countries of the region the welfar  of the .. ",r,nl.,<! of West 
Africa (Gambari, : 14). 
The formation of ECOW AS has largely been seen asa product of ppst civil war 
Nigeria's foreign policy. After its civil war (1967-1970), Nigeria found that its 
........ ·.,<>.''''11 wealth, based largely on the export of crude oil, began to give it a more 
positive interest in developmental of the West African sub-region. The country's 
leadership had a vision of a more evenly developed West Africa, in which Nigeria 
would not a resentment provoking oasis of prosperity amid a sub-regional 
. (Gambari: 1991: 18). debate about the African development 
question has been considerably heightened and vigorously sustained by Professor 
Adebayo Adedeji (often to as father of ECOW AS), and he has been 
equated to Raul Prebisch of Latin America in the search alternative development 
strategies for the continent. While Frank and Todaro, among other scholars, were 
evolving a radical conceptual framework to challenge the traditional model of 
development within the context of Latin American experience (Asante, 1991), 
Adebayo was questioning orthodox assumptions within the context of African 
development since independence (Asante, 1991). One key of Adedeji's 
development strategy is the concept of regional co-operation and integration. Adedeji 
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considers .a regional approach, which is linked to 
r . - ~~ principle of collective 
reliance, as a sine qua non for the achievement of national socio-economic goals. For 
in no area whether it in the internationalisation of development process or 
international trade negotiations, debt policy, or adjustment with transformation- can 
-
much progress be made without co-operation among African countries. In his view 
national development efforts have to be supplemented by sub-regional and regional co-
operation development efforts. Particularly in the case of Africa where are 
fundamental reasons (as outlined in the political economy West Africa of this 
dissertation), why domestic efforts may not be optimal in providing at all and/or 
efficiently the basic requirements satisfying the social and economic needs of the 
people. Apart from cultural and tactical considerations, Adedeji (1979) that the 
main reasons 'for pooling of development efforts among countries are purely 
economic' (Ad edej i, 1979: 19-20). This is particularly the case for West Africa (say 
Africa in general),. where for historical reasons many of the countries are at present too 
small viable economic activities, particularly in the context of establishing and 
managing basic industries for the production of agricultural, industrial and natural 
resources. There is the problem oflow levels of per capita income. For these reasons 
African countries find it difficult to develop on an individual basis. Therefore in the 
of fundamental handicaps at the national levels the sub-regional, regional and 
multinational approach, could provide the answer to region'S developmental needs 
(Asante 1991: 10). 
Integration can contribute to the process if industrialisation in a number of ways. In the 
case of West Africa, the economic of nearly all the countries inhibits 
industrialisation through import substitution, growth of domestic demand, or export 
promotion. The small of each separate domestic market means that are 
relatively goods that can be produced for the local in an economic fashion. 
"'~'J_" are typically consumer items can be produced by light industries, and 
once the breweries, cigarette factories, textile mills, and similar establishments come 
into operation, there is little scope for further industrialisation. The development of an 
industrial sector to export promotion is even more difficult under the 
circumstances. In both cases the ability to specialise and the realisation of economies of 
are necessary but impossible to obtain when the market is too small (Renninger, 
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156) 
The concept of development is closely associated with the of regional 
integration because the integration process 
as merely a supportive measure. at 
been redefined; it is no longer regarded 
"'Jl'.,e""H"" integration are no longer inspired 
by considerations of pure as exemplified by East African 
Common Services Organisation; nor are structured to be only adaptations of 
doctrine of import-substitution as part policy for 'industrialisation by invitation' on 
a regional scale, as in the case of the Latin American Free Trade Association (Asante, 
1980). Regional int~gration is now designed primarily as a tool to combat and reduce 
external economic dependence, as in case of the Andean comnlon IS 
advocated as a grand strategy for solving the problem of 
underd~elopme~t, as in case ofECOWAS (Asante, 1991:86). The inauguration 
in Lagos, on May, 1975 was hailed as a break through the 
of to institute some form of economic co-operation and integration 
embracing the sub-region, which a zone than Western 
Europe, a total population about 160 million people a of US $125 billion 
(Asante; 1991: Linking countries, ECOWAS is the major regional 
scheme to attempt to the Anglophone -Franchophone divide, which bedevilled . 
previous co-operative movements West This was clearly explained by 
the then federal commissioner for economic development he 
said that: 
"We are here today to the myth that differences in language, culture, and 
economic level render the achievement of me;anIlllgI11ll C<I-ollera1tlOn 
in West Africa. We have precedents to guide us. It is a fact of history that after the 
Second World War, bitter enemies as Germany and France are now working 
tOgethler under the umbrella of the EEC. LU:'l:errlbolllrg, a relatively small country, is also 
co-op;:rating with economic like France and c ,prml>"v In the there are as 
many as nine languages. And these countries are no less heterogeneous 
the EEC is the richest economic grouping in the world because its 
members have learnt to share their and scientific which has 
accelerated their economic the EEC has taken so to Qe\relO<D to 
the that it has now reached, we in Africa must be realistic" (Adedeji, 1973). 
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event culmination of years of efforts by West to 
increase the and therefore the bargaining of their eC(mOmH~S 
Through a of econo~c 'sovereignty' their to their 
--economies so as to living standards of their u ....... 'u ..... i'lI 
---strug~le for political decolonisation into the area of economic ....... "vn;u.'.uuvu. !-In.!'''!"I,,, 
inauguration of ECOW AS must be seen as an attempt 
African states to 
dependency 1 
their economic opportunities and to reduce 
:90). 
COIltmUeS to be a deal of interest in co-operation amc)ng Oe\relCIDlfItl! 
severe economic instability of the 1970s, which both developed 
drew attention to the growing interdependence global 
and more effective international CO··OD!er'Ltl IS 
evident to come to dominate discussions at international 
..... " ....... ,'".""" revolves around the creation a International 
Economic or procedures, mechanisms, lead to 
a new and more rel,atl(mSJnIp between the developed 
(Renninger, 1 At the same time the failure the l'lOrm-~()U .. .u,,"v~~ ....... to 
produce solutions acceptable to the developing countries has 
In co-operation among developing countries themselves. 
links, economic and otherwise, and 
could rely more one another for a greater variety of goods and they 
would be correS'pO[IOmlgly dependent upon the developed major goal of 
third world including ECOW AS today is to decrease their present 
OelJenlOelrlCe on countries in the industrialised 
aml)ng Oe\relCIDlI1tl! c()untne:s, whether on the regional, 
concrete way of achieving 
154). 
The J.vtJU!U'V' subscribed to the 
..... , ........ '''''. and unfavourable with 
units obviously be better able to protect 
Tre>!lte>r co-operation 
"M""""", or inter-regional 
building collective self-
can help 
econonuc 
............ UJlp,with 
the external that influence their development prospects. a better 
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position, all, by being dependent upon outside forces- larger 
~~~te)~V~llP~jPt~~]'-P£~nrutm!~~~~~~~~~~~~~£~.Second 
the unit, the at its 
disposal. Pentland (1975), commented that" in third world, YTA':LTr",roA 
common makrkc~ts, cartels, and groupings are based on belief that in some 
form unity IS strength to exploitation and manipulation major 
economic powers and multi-national corporations, to resolve regionally 
economic and social problems, and to structural ......... "........ of the international 
economy" '"'uu', ....... , 1975:4) 
However, judging the difficulties experienced by more regional as 
Community and the Mano River Union, and the general history 
regional integration in it is difficult to be optimistic the cnal11ct~s a 
regional Common Market. The basic problem the strategy of self-reliance is that it 
presupposes a considerable I1PO'TPP of "'''''.,vu .... economic co-operation and integration 
which Africa has tried for a time to promote with limited success (Ake, 
1981: 169). 
economic h"" ... .,.h·t'" that could follow regional co-operation in Africa are 
hardly in Ul.;:1iIJUL"'. Indeed, some limited co-operation efforts involving the Francophone 
and Anglophone countries in projects utilising the Senegalese and Chad Basin 
have Still, additional economic justifications to 
some states to concrete steps towards establishment 
of a wider l>"I>'f........ of CO··ODien:Ltlcm in the reRlon. Almost all 
earn much of """''''"UJ.l~''' through the export of ..... ri,rt"I'> ..... , 
suffered huge financial-and 
serious disruptions the economic planning when the world for 
commodities fluctuate widely, as they tend to do. co-ordinated and reorganised 
production of crops in region could strengthen the income-earning capacity 
•• =" 
Africa as a whole, since a wide range of are produced there 
:24-25). 
hpr,p'h''\'rp the arguments a customs union in Africa, as in other under-
developed areas, rest primarily on the stimulus which unions might to the 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
creation of new productive capacity rather than to the more efficient utilisation of 
resources (Adedeji, 1970:220). However, the position West Africa is 
nl1·Tn", .. complicated by two factors: the newness of 
tradition of co~operation, As Nicholas Plessz puts it: 
nationhood and the lack any 
West Africa cannot be compared with the European Common economic 
integration affects countries with a tradition of nationhood .... In West 
.. IDtegJ'3U(lD would call both the t1"ansfonnation of the colonial customs unions 
of fonner French territories and for the elimination of the division those 
territories and other countries of the region' 1968: 13). 
There is also an co-operation in the exploitation, internal and export of 
mineral resources. This would undoubtedly lead to expanded production and wealth in 
and to a ~eduction costs. Oil, accounts for over 90 per cent of the 
exchange earned by Nigeria and has had a huge on the country's economy. 
High quality iron ore is located in Guinea, Mauritania, Sierra Leone and Liberia. 
Guinea produces bauxite as a principal mineral resource, but Ghana,Sierta Leone and 
Nigeria are also endowed with that mineral. Copper and are extracted in Mauritania 
and N1("' .. rl~ while diamond deposits are located in Sierra Leone, Guinea, Ivory 'VV'''-''', 
is the world~ s leading producer of columbite, while Ghana leads and Glllma. 
the In production of Gold and Joint the 
exploitation and export of these minerals could of the 
involved. This is even more v.",...... and hydroelectric resource 
(Gambari,1991:25). 
It was further argued that economic co-operation promotes economic efficiency via 
specialisation and smoothness of trade transactions due to change in the and 
nature of competition and change uncertainty and unilaterality of trade policies of 
individual states. In other words, integration about a more efficient utilisation 
resources and the harmonisation of economic and trade policies ushers in a smooth and 
orderly among grouping (Olaniyan, 1985:3). 
Another area of economic importance for the is the transportation, 
infrastructural facilities. The road and railway West 
designed colonial governments' needs and generally stfietChmlg from coast 
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to interior of the separate countries in the region, hamper the development of intra-
regional trade. Commodities tend to move from North to South (vice-versa) and rarely 
between West and The establishment"{)f~EG0WASwas to 
r- __ . __ ~ 
the conlmunic~ltio11S 
regional trade and investment can be accomplished not by any single country, 
however financially well off it may be, but by the joint efforts of all states in the reWlOn. 
supplemented with external assistance (Gambari, 1991:25). Thus in conventional 
theory economic integration will offer net advantages only if the on balance the trade-
creation effects far outweigh the trade diversion In West Africa it was 
perceived that because the differing comparative advantages of the different 
countries in the region, an economic will assist them all to rationalise their production 
patterns, and net trade creation will result (Adedeji, 1970: 219). 
Another economic rationale for the establishment ECOW AS is the potential 
industrial base that such a grouping holds. Although the resources and population of 
West Africa it a potentially strong base for industrial development, this will not 
become a reality until there is rationalisation and specialisation through a system of 
regional industries. The possibilities of economies of scale in the production industrial 
goods are there but will not materialise without positive measures to encourage 
regionwide investment industries and community policy on the location of industries 
(Gambari, 1991:25). serious prograntJ.me of regional industrial development, 
allowing for the establishment of industries to serve more than one country, would also 
a long way to reduce the incidence of high unemployment and underemployment, 
especially in the urban centres. There is also the question of redirection of trade, 
and land locked states. The internal trade is still conducted largely with the 
former colonial masters (Britain and France). although other industrialised countries 
are rapidly becoming important trading partners. However, unless there is a dramatic 
shift the present state of international economic order, the terms of trade could not 
be radically changed by the West African countries. Meanwhile, members of the West 
African economic community could develop new directions of intra-regional trade, 
under their control, which would be capable of rl'lt~"no the income of "1'1:1'7""'"'' in the 
region. Moreover, many states the are land-locked. have relied on ad 
hoc arr,an~~errlerrts with, and the goodwill of, coastal states to ........ , ...... ,''''' goods 
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between ports. With the establishment ECOW AS and the of economic co-
operation, the access of landlocked may regularised and placed on a 
sounder basis (Gambari, 1991:25). that, economic integration will 
~~~~~]~~~QI!Q..l1!_!_~~_activity through increased trade, hence it the 
economies and inter-industry has the effect 
of lo~ering-the"co~rof production 
As a prime mover in the negotiations that led to has its own 
reasons for integration of West The main ideas behind 
initiative are political, security and economic considerations. For political reasons 
Nigeria wants an arrangement that will put an to colonial divisions within 
Africa. Furthermore Nigeria believes that such a step will put an end to border disputes 
and will be an important contribution to African unity. Moreover, to Arikpo 
(1973), the federal military government held the that order to strengthen 
the bargaining position of African states with the EEC there must be a West 
economic community through which all states in the region will speak with one voice 
(West Africa, 1973). 
For security reasons Nigeria does not want to be surrounded by small countries that 
are heavily dependent on extra-African powers, France, military, political 
and economic survival. It is firmly believed in Nigeria that as long as there are 
West African states closely tied to apron Nigeria's can not 
be assured. Such states can either be manipulated against Nigeria or used as ".ur;UJ'r; 
ground for foreign powers who wish to cause disaffection and confusion in the country 
(Daily Times, 1970). 
experience of the civil war made it imperative for to pay more attention to 
her West African neighbours. the four African countries, which recognised the 
secessionist Biafra, two were in West Africa. The post civil-war reassessment of the 
country's foreign policy concluded that Africa must be the centrepiece the 
diplomacy. By implication, West Africa would an important focus the country's 
diplomatic activities. Never again should West African countries be staging grounds 
for extra-regional powers' attempt to dismember or destabilise Nigeria. Since France 
was a power that used its considerable influence on the smaller Francophone countries 
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for negative purposes during the civil war, ECOW AS might be used to reduce that 
influence (Gambari, 1991:19). In most Francophone states the influence of French 
government has been pervasive. It is no secret that it has been the cardinal policy of the 
French government to encourage close co-operation among West African 
colonies order to counterbalance the weight of Nigeria (Aluko, 1981: 17). For many 
years, policy had not economic and other forms of integrations 
between the former territories other parts of West Africa. It was that 
too many co-operations among independent West African states would inevitably lead 
to a revision of the 'special relationship', which eX1:stell, between 
colonies. Changed attitudes had now brought about adjustment in the 
special relationship and her former colonies. With the disappearance of 
Charles de Gaulle, the symbol and promoter of French speaking neo-independence 
1969, French speaking cohesion se' and with France began to decline. The 
military leaders along with Ould Daddah of Mauritania publicly began to demand 
the operation of agreements their relations with France which 
they had come to see as a web that bound them progressively to as 
latter bled them drier (Olusanya Akindele, 1986: 128). The federal 
Gen. Gowon felt that, the greater the distance between France and countries, the 
more likely that the Francophone West African countries would begin to perceive 
ECOWAS as an alternative source funds, ideas, and economic and trade relations 
(Gambari,1991:19). 
a result of diplomacy, and because of the successful completion of the 
first Convention which associated the African, Caribbean and pacific (ACP) 
countries to the in February the Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS) was formally established by the fifteen West African states in LAo.,,,",,,,, 
in May 1975 (West Africa, 1973). Nigeria's diplomatic role 1972 and 1974 
included the following. Dahomey ( now Benin) was successfully persuaded to 
abolish transit tax on all goods going from Togo to During 1973 a number of 
other West African states signed a of agreements to their with 
Nigeria. The restrained and shrewd diplomacy of the Gowon government was nr""'~T""fl 
with such enthusiasm and confidence neighbouring states that Hamani Diori, the 
then President of Niger and chairman of the CEAO, said in June 1973 that any 
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economic greem.ent in West that ",n.." ... ~.", ... ,,,.u ...... :.o would be 'unrealistic' (West 
Africa, 1973). 
April 1 the Heads of Government of and met to discuss 
improvements economic co-operation the region. The concluding communique 
called a meeting the council of Ministers of and Nigeria to prepare an 
a summit of West African Heads of This was held in Lome, Togo on 
15 December . The meeting attended by fifteen West agreed 
i'lt.' '-' 
that ultimate objective of . market. 
Francophone West of cultural 
inherited from France and of domination had come to perceive benefits 
which could accrue to them from the proposed community (Olusanya and Akindele, 
1986:128), Another trump card played by Gowon in July 1974 was 
when the decision was made to crude oil at concessionary to African 
countries, which had 
countries, especially Ivory 
formation the 
negotiation the 
for the 
own refineries. This was welcome by many African 
and whose support was crucial to the 
African economic community. Finally successful 
the February directly paved the 
ECOW AS. Indeed, Olu Sanu the then 
Ambassador to who presided over negotiations with during 
5, said categorically that without Lome Convention it would have been 
difficult, if not impossible, to bring about ECOWAS (Sanu, 1978). 
The ECOWAS which aelme:s its objectives and way in which they are to 
achieved, aims to an economic community over a year in 
stages. stage lasting two is to devoted to fact finding and 
organisation of community institutions. During period no new import 
may not be imposed nor should existing ones increased member states, In 
second lasting next eight there will be gradual elimination of customs 
duties and quantitative restrictions in accordance with a schedule to be agreed upon in 
a protocol. There will also the abolition of obstacles to the movement of 
~--
persons, services and (Ojo et al, 1985). The third the next 
be devoted to the abolition of the differences in the member 
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Beyond this, the treaty calls the harmonisation of industrial, 
economic and monetary policies, ... "' .......... 1"0 measures on foreign Im'esl:m~mt, the setting 
of joint ventures, reduction dependence on the outside world implicitly the 
of collective with the industrialised (Ojo et al, 
above it could • "' .. u" ... 'u that the ultimate ,n1",,.n-r'OI1",,.\" schemes in 
developing countries (West is to ' ... escape from caused by 
aeJJenael1ce on foreign colonial .... ..,.·II, .... ., who organised the structure economies 
to the needs and the metropolitan (Renninger, 1977: 
Regional integration is then seen as a means to change the situation whereby most 
memoers of the developing world remain as suppliers of raw and consumers 
assessing the relevance of conventional notions of .n1",,.n-r'<>hr,n to developed 
countries, we may immediately observe that the conditions favourable to trade creation 
are the very opposite in third world. Intra-group as case of West 
is a minor proportion total trade between states and the rest of 
world. Nearly all West countries are primary and their products 
Moreover, are heavily dependent on are competitive 
"""' .... nri" of their vu, .. v~, while importing Imlne~ctlalte UJ''''U'''''''''''~'''' which, 
so as they are produced at in region, are limited quantity 
poor quality. It follows foreign trade occupies a conspicuous proportion 
GNP and general economic activities of the West states. Export of primary 
'"'v •• "u ......... " the major source products or minerals 
Therefore, the application 
theory to integration <un'''H5 
the criterion of 
developed ",",,,,..,1" ... 
.,."<lIn,..,,, (Ganlbari, 
are attractive to 
exchange 
orthodox customs 
apt)ealrS to be of little or no 
potential opportunities 
could assist in the 
Accordingly, the most 
profitable domestic and investment, which turn 
of unemployed or underemployed resources. 
criterion with which to evaluate desirability and bellettt 
integration in developing sub regions like West is the potential impact on 
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which would develop should there be no integration arrangement. Put ,,,",,,nl" 
schemes developing like West Africa represent triumph 
hope a better economic future over grim economic present 
(Gambari, 1991: 1-10) 
According to Renninger, (1977), ultimate goal integration schemes in 
developing countries is poverty caused by dependence on foreign 
colonial powers organised structure of economies to suit the and 
convenience of the metropolitan economies. the point must be made that 
integration efforts in Africa have some political motivation. The commitment to 
political Intj"or,i:lfu\n within an economic CmnrIllUlli vanes am()ng its members For 
example, some memoers of ECOW AS share the of President Kwame Nkrumah, 
who an early political unification. General Al'¥.'U ..... Acheampong Ghana 
(Gambari, 1991), saw the formation ECOWAS as instrument to "remove 
of division and artificial barriers imposed on West from outside to 
recreate together kind of homogeneous which before 
colonialists invaded our (Gambari, 1: 1-10) 
among that are not motivated the potentiality 
ECOW AS "spill into political integration, is the perception of the 
economic community as a more pragmatic instrument the realisation African 
unity. Functional co-operation as demonstrated economic arrangements, can hardly 
be established and pursued purely its own On the pragmatic co-
operation is undertaken some political context however defined or 
understood by those involved. Since the birth of ECOW AS some two ago, 
.. ",~,. .... has continued to play a central role in community. 
on part arises the recognition of the 
economic importance of the organisation to pursuit 
Africa and the world. However, of Nigeria's central role 
commitment to 
as well as 
national interest in 
ECOWAS its 
mc:ep1t101rI, the march towards West 
been painfully slow (Asante, 1997: 28). 
economic co-operation and integration has 
we examine Nigeria's policy actions the Community, it is to 
.......... ,""'''' the defining characteristics of Nigeria's foreign policy. In light of an 
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attempt will be made at relating certain decision-making models in relation to 
policy in the community. will be discussed intandem with the on 
Nigeria's foreign policy. 
Decision Making Models and Nigeria's Foreign Policy - Strategic Options . 
. Foreign policymaking is essentially the task of devising strategies that a .... ,C>v •• -
capabilities to achieve the set by its leaders. the environments of 
a national policy decision system degrees of constraint upon its 
options and behaviour. In the foreign policy decision makers are not 
constrained solely by the demands made upon them by individuals and groups in their 
own country who wants to see particular values maximised or even by the pressures 
and realities of the external environment. They also operate within a system 
has own dynamics. the centre of it a bureaucracy, a major function of 
which is to relevant information from the external and domestic environments 
as well as that stored within bureaucracy itself-to bring it to bear upon a current 
more central is the that decisions are made by individuals, each with a 
qistinctive personality. interplay of the personalities of the decisionmakers, group 
. dynamics as decisionmakers mU~rac:t. n~oresc::mnlt1"'e 01rOCleSSI~S in the sense that top-
level decisionmakers are tied into different bureaucracies and other social groupings, 
and the qualities of the information processing system determines the to which 
foreign policy makers pay attention and the goals pursue the international arena 
(Merrit, 1975: 1-3). 
According to Snyder (1958) activities in foreign policy can be examined in terms of 
main form of behaviour, the decision to pursue one course of action rather than 
many others that might be pursued. Whatever the actors do, and however sound their 
actions may they proceed on the basis of prior choices, and the presence 
decisionmaking activity at the core of all political action provides a common focus for 
the analysis of otherwise disparate political actors, situations and processes. 
Decisionmaking sustains bureaucracies, dominates legislatures, preoccupies chief 
executives, and characterise judicial bodies. Decisions lead to policy, produce conflict, 
and foster co-operation (Snyder, 1958:342). 
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'From the they first tried to establish a discipline', asserts 
Hillsman in Olusanya and. Akindele, 1980), political scientists to 
understand decisions of government are made and by whom. This may so. 
But as Hillsman admits, what then was not the study of foreign policy 
process, as it is today. was not on were arrived at 
implemented .... '\.al,ll ..... the first approach was an analysis the legal ron""""· .. '" 
institutions, constitutional and prerogatives president and l'(\l'\ar",cc 
One of the outstanding useful by-products of these early studies was the discovery of 
the lobbies interest groups. Ironically it was discovery that attracted the 
attention Scientists to study process. 
movement arose against the early methods of international vv .... ,",,,,. 
protesters that a thorough understanding of international politics could not be 
furthered by a method, which confuses ideal with the (Olusanya and Akindele, 
1980: led to the the classical or rational actor model and later the 
bureaucratic or 
In the policy governments are often confronted situations that to test 
the operasonalisations of it policy strategies. The domestic policy IS 
characterised compromises ",tt,"'""n't" at striking a v<W ... u~, .... between 
political ",,,,,,,,rom situation more challenging it 
comes to a country's foreign policy; in other words, governments are eXI)ec'tect 
to react to unprecedented events outside national boundaries. such 
circumstances, policy planners find themselves situations where have to 
respond to events in the international arena, whilst promoting their domestic interests 
and abroad. 
The complications arising basic complexity and ill definition COInD()UI1tO 
policy-initiative. Simon (cited Parsons, 1995), in respect ill-defined 
problems, 
Although 
require problem-solvers to contribute to the problem definition. 
VUl''''U'" are ill government is structured. means 
that all prc,ble:ms have an org;amsatllon:aI or g0111ennm1ental context, a major 
influence on way in which problems come to structured. Ill-structured as they 
are, public issues are not clearly demarcated: we do not know where one problem 
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I 
begins and another ends. They overlap, intersect and bump into one another (parsons, 
1995: 89). The policy overlap, intersection and bumping into one another are not 
uncommon the international political arena. This is because there is always conflict 
of interests between different competing forces in the pursuance their national 
objectives. The question of national interest plays a pivotal role in determining a 
course of action in the international hence the need to relate the 
question of national interest to Nigeria's role in ECOWAS. 
The concept of national interest is used in both political analysis and political action. 
an analytic tool, it is employed to describe, explain, and evaluate the source or the 
adequacy of a nation's foreign policy. As an instrument of political action, it serves as 
a means justifying, denouncing, and proposing policies. Both in other 
words, refer to what is for a national society. They also share a tendency to 
confine the intended meaning to what is best for a nation in foreign affairs (Rosenau, 
1980: 283) 
While analysts have discovered that the value-laden character the concept makes it 
difficult to employ as a tool of rigorous investigation, actors have found that this very 
same characteristic renders the concept useful both as a way of thinking about their 
goals and as a means of mobilising support for them. That is, not only do political 
actors tend to perceive and discuss their goals in terms of the national interest, but they 
are also inclined to claim that their goals are the national interest, a claim that often 
arouses the support necessary to move towards a realisation of the goals. 
Consequently, even though it has lost some of its early appeal as an analytic tool, the 
national interest "'1"11,,, .. ,,,, considerable favour as a basis for action and won a 
prominent place in the dialogue of public (Rosenau, 1980:283). 
org,enthau (1954), advances that, ". , ... 1:.""",,,,,,,,1: is the perennial standard by which 
political action must be judged and directed." Morgenthau wrote, emphasising that, the 
"objectives of policy must be defined in terms of national 
interest"(Morgenthau, 1954:9). And exactly what constitutes the interest of a nation? 
Morgenthau recognised that kind of interest determining political action in a 
particular period of history depends upon the political and cultural context within 
which foreign policy is formulated",(Morgenthau, 1954:9). but he envisioned 
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accounting for these contextual factors by defining in tenus of power. For 
Morgenthau the power at a nation's command to that of other nations is, at 
any moment in time, an objective reality for that nation and thus serves to detennine 
what is and should (Morgenthau, 1954). 
It is important to note that, national entirely abandoned. 
though the nation is declining in importance as a political unit to which allegiances 
are attached, the process of is many decades- perhaps away 
from an end. Political actors will no doubt continue to extensive use of natlonw 
,rm"'''''''''T in their about foreign policy goals and their to mobilise 
support for them. And, to the extent that they do, political observers must take 
cognisance of the national 11">1',,, .. ,,,,,1- other words, while national interest has little 
future as an analytic concept, its use in politics will long continue to 
requiring analysis (Rosenau, 1980:293). 
a datum 
The concept national interest plays a central role in process of , ... 1"<, ....... ,,1'1 
Nigeria's policy ECOWAS, is no exception to this, as there are differing interests in 
region ranging from sub-national, national, multinational to regional power jostling 
in the region. As Nigeria pursues its policy in ECOW AS, there is often an overlapping; 
intersection and bumping into one and others interest, between the varied actors in the 
sub-region. It is both academic and social practical) to inquire 
state the (foreign policy analysis) art today not up more 
analytically useful sets of models and theories the understanding of the foreign 
policy process. If it has not, in what specific ways may 
of use for the understanding of Nigeria's policy 
decision-making models be 
ECOWAS? (Asobie, 1980: 
4) ......... "'01 ... issues, an attempt will be made at .... .;) ....... .; • .;)11"5 the of 
policy fonuulation the public Attention 
will be focused on two of the decision-making models; that is, the classical or rational 
actor model and the bureaucratic or organisational a of 
extensive on Nigeria's foreign policy it will be pertinent to the 
various writings on subject We can identify two categories on 
Nigeria's policy, based on paradigmatic assumptions and implications. 
These are the and the behavioural paradigms. These policy models will 
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eventually serve as analytic tools in what has shaped the contours of Nigeria's policy 
ECOWAS. 
central organising concept of realist paradigm is The Realist Paradigm: 
'power', supplemented the question of national interest. The central thesis of the 
realist perspective is that, states, acting through statesmen who personifY them, 'think 
and act in terms of interest defined as power'. adherents of the realist perspective 
assert that, this continuity and unity to seemingly diverse foreign policies 
of widely separated states at the same the actions of 
statesmen at points history possible (Asobie, 1980: 8). 
The realist perspective takes as it principal unit of analysis the nation-state. It assumes 
that no other units have any appreciable significance. Other elements of the society 
merely serve as either components of the nation-states or the environment within 
which it functions. For instance, two attributes of the state, sovereignty and 
nationalism, are believed to have such np.c:I<::1""rp. impact on policies of state that the 
responses of states to external events and issues are explained chiefly in terms of the 
clashes and sovereignties (Asobie: 8). 
The bulk of literature on Nigeria's foreign policy the pervasive influence of the 
realist paradigm on the study and analysis of Nigeria's foreign policy. These writings 
take the State, as their principal unit analysis. The basic assumption 
underlying these is that, in specific terms, the Nigerian represented 
-by the chief executive and his foreign minister are the principal actors in Nigeria's 
foreign policy. the literature on Nigeria's foreign policy, the Nigerian State is .... ,,...."',... 
it is vested with the attributes of a human person. One frequently meets, the 
such as 'pathological to foreign-inspired 
of a pan-African security force; Nigeria's attitude ambivalence and 
reluctant acceptance ofthe doctrine of non-alignment etc (Asobie: 8-9). 
The propagators of the tradition to the study of policy accept 
that, the Nigerian State is shaped, influenced to a large extent determined by the 
traditional 'elements of national power'. These elements of power otherwise, described 
as of domestic environment or include, geographical location, 
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economy, military capability, the political and occasionally, the 
nature and ideology the ern""""""no the realist tradition, too, most of the 
writings on Nigeria's foreign policy are predicated on the assumption that, in external 
relations, the Nigerian State behaves or ought to behave rationally. According to this 
to behave rationally, this context is to pursue the national interest 
defined in terms of power. Thus Asobie, (1980) that the two foreign policy 
objectives, which are most frequently identified in this kind of literature as constituting 
a priority for Nigeria, are national security and rapid economic growth. All other 
objectives are treated in much of the literature on Nigeria's foreign policy as tertiary or 
peripheral (Assobie, 1980: 10). 
The realist perspective treats the State as a homogeneous and unified actor. 
Only rarely identified, in their some or 
conflicts policy makers. then, are identified in reSiOejct 
to the methods and vigour with which national interests, on a 
consensus is presumed to exist, may be pursued. (Asobie: 10). 
Finally, some of the writings of the paradigm on foreign policy reflect 
the assumptions of a balance power model. These writings perceive Nigeria's 
policy as characterised by a struggle by Nigeria to establish herself as a regional 
power or a leader in Africa. In this bid for leadership of Africa, Nigeria is pictured as 
being competition with Ghana or less frequently, Zaire (now Democratic Republic of 
Congo). Some of these works perceives the rivalry for power and influence, especially 
in West Africa, as a between and (Asobie, 1980: 10). 
The Behavioural Approach. 
The dissatisfaction with the approach, which became manifest in the 1950s, gave 
rise to a protest movement, which was later identified as the 'behavioural approach'. 
An important distinguishing mark 'of the behavioural approach is its focus on individual 
human beings, rather than political units or collectivities, as a unit analysis, 
Unlike the realist paradigm, the behavioural approach encourages the analyst to look at 
political actors, and foremost, as individuals who have emotions, prejudices and 
predispositions of human beings. (Asobie, 1980: 1 Under the behavioural approach, 
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not only is the actual human as distinct institutions, to the 
centre of attention but also, more importantly, the political process is related to and 
explained terms of the motivations, feelings and personalities of the participants as 
individual human beings (Asobie, 1980: 13). 
Among the numerous writings on Nigeria's foreign policy, Gordon 1. Idang in his book 
titled, attempts to analyse 
Nigeria's policy within the wider context of the behavioural approach. The author's 
purpose was to undertake ' a between the 
domestic political process and foreign policy, as a case study. The 
attcemlDt to study and analyse Nigeria's policy from perspective of the 
behavioural paradigm was not made explicit, nevertheless it was apparent in f;lP'I'PT!;I 
(Asobie, 1980). was frequent reference to the personality 
characteristics of the key foreign policy decision-makers, their attributes or 
aispositions, their perceptions and values, and the impact of those on Nigeria's foreign 
policy. Second, it is clear that he attached a lot of importance to the question of 
quantification. For instance he quantified attributes of the members of the Nigerian 
A.A. ........ " .... of Representatives and the Senate, the differences in foreign policy perceptions 
and attitudes federal legislators, and the main characteristics of the coverage of 
foreign policy issues by the press in terms of timing, frequency and content. 
Third, his inclusion of a section; on 'Foreign policy Elites', and their dominant 
attitudes and perceptions and the policy making process as wen as the emphasis which 
he places on the distinction between the 'operational' environment and 
'psychological' environment of the decision-makers reflect an adherence to the 
behavioural approach (Asobie, 1980: 15). 
A few other writings that have touches of the behavioural approach fall squarely in the 
specific category of studies of decision-making. These are the works of Asobie 
(1980), and to a more limited extent, Oladije Aluko (1981)(Olusanya and Akindele, 
1980). 
The Bureaucratic or Organisational Process Model. 
some purposes, governmental behaviour can be usefully summarised as action 
75 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
chosen by unitary, rational decision-maker: centrally controlled, completely informed, 
and value maximising. But this simplification must not be allowed to conceal the fact 
that a government consists of a conglomerate of semi-fedual, loosely allied 
organisations, each with a substantial of its own. Government do sit 
formally and, to some fact, on top of this According to this 
model, governments perceive problems through sensors. Governments 
alternatives and estimate as their component organisations 
process; act as these organisations enact routines. Governmental 
behaviour can t,h"'· .. "'t ....... '" be understood, according to a second conceptual model, 
as deliberate choices and more as outputs of large organisations functioning according 
to standard patterns of behaviour (Allison, 1971: 67). 
As Allison and Halperin (1971) have explained, the bureaucratic politics model is 
centred on the assumption that the maker of government policy is not a single 
calculating decision-maker as the rational actor model . suggests. Rather, it is a 
conglomerate of large organisations and political actors who differ substantially about 
what their government should do on any particular issue and who compete in 
attempting to affect both governmental decisions and the of government. 
Therefore, the use of the model leads the analyst to an examination of the influence of 
organisational behaviour on the processes of policy decision-making processes (Allison 
and Halperin, 1971). 
The central thesis integral to this model is the proposition that policy-making involves 
£5 .... uUj'£5 n/~Tween groups of interests. 
Halperin (cited in Olusanya and Akindele, 1980) puts it, foreign policy is the 
product of a process of 'pulling and hauling' among numerous individuals, many of 
them working in large complex organisations or bureaucracies. These individuals may 
have some shared images of their society, but they also have different interests and 
priorities: many of them are preoccupied by events at home and deal with events 
abroad only as those events interact with, and affect their ability to pursue, their 
interest at home. Consequently, what government does any particular l1· .... !lr~nl'''' 
can best be understood not as a planned and carefully directed effort to 
IffillUeltlCe other states but as a result of bargaining actors or players positioned 
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hierarchically in government. And a tn1"''''H1C'1''1 policy action that from outside the 
government looks like a methodically orchestrated attempt to achieve a well-defined 
national interest, may, in a shaky compromise between rival elements 
the bureaucracy, each pursuing its own distinct organisational or personal lnt,PTP'<1t<1 
(Olusanya and 1980: 3 
To be responsive to a broad spectrum of problems, governments consist of large 
organisations among which primary responsibility for particular areas is divided. Each 
organisation attends to a special set of problems and acts in quasi-independence on 
these problems. Each organisation attends to a special set of problems and acts in 
quasi-independence on these problems. But few important problems fall exclusively 
within the domain of a Thus behaviour to any 
important problem reflect the out put of partially 
co-ordinated by government leaders. According to this process government leaders can 
substantially disturb, but not substantially control, the behaviour of these organisations 
(Hanrieder, 1971:342). 
According to the organisational model, at any given time, a government consists of 
existing organisations, each with a fixed set of standard operating procedures and 
programs. The behaviour of these organisations- and consequently of the government-
relevant to an issue in any particular instance therefore, determined primarily by 
routines established prior to that But organisations do 
change. occurs gradually, over time (Allison, 1971). 
The organisational process that of international 
politics are in three critical senses, outputs of organisational processes. First, the actual 
occurrences are organisational outputs. example, Chinese entry into the Korean 
war-that is the fact that, soldiers were firing at UN soldiers south of Yalu in 
1950-is an organisational action: the action of men and women who are soldiers in 
platoons which are in companies, which in turn are armies, responding as privates to 
lieutenants who are responsible to captains and so on to the commander, moving into 
Korea, advancing against enemy troops, and according to fixed routines the 
Chinese army. Government leaders' decisions therefore, only trigger organisational 
routines. Government leaders can trim the edges this output and some 
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choice in combining outputs. the mass behaviour is determined by previously 
established procedures (Allison, 1971). 
i:)e(:ona. existing or~~arulsatlOnal routines for employing present physical capabilities 
constitute the effective options open to government leaders confronted with any 
problem. The fact that fixed programmes exhaust these leaders do not always perceive. 
the range of buttons that leaders can push. But in every case it is critical for any 
understanding of what is actually done (Allison, 1971). 
Third, organisational output structure the situation within the narrow constraints of 
which leaders must contribute their' decision' concerns an issue. Outputs raise the 
problem, provide the information, and make the initial moves that colour the face 
the that is to leaders. (1967) 
"presidents rarely, if make decisions-particularly in foreign .,TT',,,rC'_1 the sense of 
writing on a clean basic decisions, which confine their choices, have all too 
often been previously made" (Sorensen, 1967). organisational model theorists 
therefore, that, if one understands the structure the situation and the face of 
the issue-which are determined by the organisational outputs-the formal choice of the 
leaders is frequently anti-climatic (Allison, 1971). 
Three inter-related points emerged from the central thesis integral to bureaucratic 
politics of decision making model. The is that in foreign policy decision-making.: 
the chief executive does not command; he persuades and coaxes. The second, point 
, 
that, individuals do not submerge their political and personal interests and act in the 
interest of the nation. Their shared images as weB as organisational and private 
1n-te: ..... "t" come to play. third point is that, a policy consists set of shaky 
compromises between rival in the bureaucracy. In all, a decision is, therefore, 
the result of 'pulling and hauling' among many players who attempt to advance their 
divergent or conflicting concepts of personal, group, organisational and national 
interests. It is stressed too that both the bargaining process and the results are 
importantly affected by a number of constraints, in particular, organisational processes 
or procedures as well as shared values (Asobie, 1980:32). An attempt would now be 
made at explaining the Rational Actor or Classical model of decision making. 
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The Classical or Rational Actor Model. 
In trying to the comlpexities which surrounded the Cuban Missile crisis of 
October 1962, and the critical decisions made by President John Kennedy, Allison 
proposed three models which he believes would be adequate in providing some 
explanations to the Cuban Missile Crisis (Kuye, 1989:45). The central questions, which 
were vital to the explanation of the crisis, were: 
Why did the Soviet Union place "f-.. ~.f-"""·1'" offensive missiles in Cuba? 
- Why did the United States respond with a renewal quarantine of ...... "'MAY shipments 
for Cuba? 
Why were the missiles withdrawn? 
What were the "lessons" of the missile crisis? (Allison, 1971:2). 
In attempting to address these questions Allison (1971 came 
propositions through a model application approach. suggested that: 
with three 
1. Professional analyst of foreign affairs (as wen as laypersons) think about problems 
of foreign and military policy in terms of largely implicit conceptual models that 
have significant consequences for the content of their thought. 
Most explain behaviour of national governments terms 
one basic conceptual model, that is Rational Actor or Classical Model 
(Modell). 
3 . alternative conceptual models here labelled as Organisational Process Model 
(Model TI) and a governmental (Bureaucratic) Model (Model TIl), provide 
a base for improved explanations and predictions (Allison, 1971: 3-5). 
Allison (1971) suggested that all three models are applicable when explaining historical 
events but it would be useful to set the respective frames of reference for each 
situation. contends that 'predictions about what nations will do or would have done 
are generated by calculating the rational thing to do in a certain situation, given specific 
objective" (1971: 5). 
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Having examined other models of decision making, Allisonian Model I, The 
Rational to the most adequate in analysing policy posture in 
ECOWAS, with specific to the 1983 1985 expulsion orders, the 1985 land" 
border closure and Nigeria's pivotal role ECOMOG. 
Allison suggested that in order to be to apply all three models, a consideration of the 
questions posed by each model is appropriate (Kuye, 1989:47). Some of the questions 
posed by Model I are: 
1. What is the Problem? 
What are the alternatives? 
3. What are costs and benefits aSSOCl.ate:Q with alternative? 
4. What is the observed pattern of national (governmental) values and shared axioms? 
5. What are the in the 'international strategic market placeT 
Model IT analyst would ask the following: 
1. Of what (and organisational components) does the government 
Which organisation traditionally acts on a problem of this sort and with what 
relative influence? 
3. What repertoires, programs, and SOPs 9standard operational procedures) do 
organisations for ""'''''.'''''5 information about problem available at various 
decision points government? 
4. What repertoires, and SOPs (standard operational procedures) do these 
organisations have generating alternatives about a problem of this sort? 
5. What. repertoires, programs, and SOPS do organisations have for 
implementing alternative courses (Allison, 1971). 
The questions posed Model lIT include: 
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1. What are the ...,""',,, .... ,F'. 
problems? 
channels producing actions on kinds of 
Which players in what position are centrally involved? 
3. How do of job, past stances and personality the central players on 
this issue? 
4. What deadlines will force issue to resolution? 
5.What are the foul-ups likely? (Allison, 1971) 
From the above restatements the information on all three models, it could 
...,au" ........ that Model I is most appropriate in analysing Nigeria's policy course in 
ECOWAS. (Kuye, 1989). Allison's further complements this view of Model I when 
stated that " Model I emphasises, on the one hand, the problem and the context that 
create incentives and pressure for a government to choose a particular course of 
action, and, on the other, national (or governmental) values and axioms that create 
propensities to respond in certain ways" (Allison, 1: 257-258). Kuye (1989) 
asserted that Model I examines the actions and decision-making process a sole-
national actor. For Nigeria's policy in ECOWAS between 1979-1997 following 
leaders Alhaji Shehu Shagari, Gen .Muhammadu Buhari, Gen. Ibrahim Babangida, 
Ernest Shonekan and Gen. Sani Abacha were the sole actors. 
The first model of decision-making analysis was developed as part of the realist 
approach. But it was not an explicit theoretical model devoted specifically and 
consciously to"the analysis of decision-making processes. An implicit conceptual model 
or the 'rational actor model' dominated the point here is that, before the of 
explicit theoretically and methodically conscious studies of foreign policy, the It 
is further argued that an understanding of chief characteristics of the 'rational 
actor' implicit model win enhance our appreciation of the scientific the 
development of explicit decision-making models (Asobie, 1980: 
23). 
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distinguishing mark of the rational actor model is of 
society. 
the state is 
mlc;:m,iUlCmaJ society is pictured as a multi-state a which 
at least, the actor. And sources of behaviour of the 
state are looked for what is as the 'objective realities of its position in the 
world'. More specifically the action of the state is explained largely in terms of the 
action and reaction of another states. Overall, the image conjured is that of a world 
made up of hard, impenetrable, 'billiard balls' hitting one another interminably (Asobie, 
1980: 23). 
Besides, this implicit conceptual model treats the state as a monolithic entity identical 
to every other state motivation and behaviour. Happenings in the international 
"""1~"''''' are treated as actions of and of state are seen as 
acts of their In national which are to act 
on behalf of the are perceived or depicted as unitary, purposive actors (Ibid: 
23). 
.I.U"'I"lL" of significant differences in interests and focus, most and ordinary 
laypersons attempt to understand happenings in foreign affairs as the more or less 
purposive acts of unified national governments. Laypersons personifY rational actors 
and speak of their aims and choices. Theorists of international relations focus on 
problems between nations in accounting the choices unitary rational actors. 
concentrate on logic of action in absence of an actor. For 
of point of an is to show how the nation or 
gO'vernment could have to act as it did, given the problems it 
For example, in confronting the problem posed by the Soviet installation of strategic 
missiles in Cuba, Allison, (1971), in using the rational actor model, frames the puzzle: 
why did the Soviet Union decide to install missiles in Cuba? He then the unit of 
analysis: governmental choice. Next he focuses attention on certain concepts: goals 
and objectives of the nation or government. And, finally he invokes certain patterns of 
1 .... +" ... .,1""""" if the nation performed an action of this sort, it must have had a goal of this 
type. analyst has 'explained' this event when he can show how placing missiles in 
Cuba was a reasonable action, given Soviet strategic objectives. Calculating the 
rational thing to do in certain situation, specified objectives (Allison, 1971) 
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generates predictions about what a U • .nLVU will do or would done. 
Thus, the act of deciding is reduced to 'choice of alternative' means governments 
can achieve a certain goaL An appreciation of the 'means relationship and 
peculiar conception of means and ends is critical for a full understanding of the rational 
actor model. In this model, 'means and ends' of states are defined in abstract terms. 
Thus 'power' is regarded as the chief means to all ends; and 'national security' is 
as the primary and commonest 'ends' or goals of all states. Accordingly, as Arnold 
Wolfers (cited in Olusanya, 1980), pointed out, an adherent of this model ideally 
begins with a of there 'to analysis of for 
power. All the time, he In however, 'the to which power is 
available or attainable frequently affects the choice of ends'. This is why, the analyst 
believes, 'prudent statesmen' will always endeavour to 'keep their ends and aspirations 
'safely within the which their country possesses or is ready and willing to 
muster' (Asobie, 1980: 23-24) But what does it mean to conceive of behaviour as 
'action? When one thinks of activity as 'intendedly rational' or studies behaviour as 
goal-directed, what does these notions entail? According to (Allison, 1971), the basic 
concepts of these models of rational action are: 
_ 1. Goals And Objectives: goals and objectives of the agent are translated into a 
'payoff' or 'utility' or 'preference' which represents the 'value' or of 
alternative sets of consequences. At the outset of the decision problem the a 
payoff function which all possible sets terms of his and 
Each bundle of consequences will contain a number of side effects. 
Nevertheless, at a the agent must able to rank order of preference each 
possible set of consequences that might result from a particular action (Allison, 1971: 
,29). 
Alternatives: The rational must choose among a set of alternatives displayed 
before him in a particular situation. In decision theory these alternatives are 
represented as a decision tree. alternative courses action may include more than 
a simple act, but the specification of a course of action must sufficiently precise to 
differentiate it from other alternatives (Allison, 1:29). 
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3. Consequences: To each alternative is attached a set of consequences or outcomes of 
choice that will ensue if that particular alternative is chosen. Variations are generated 
at this point by making different assumptions about the accuracy the decision-
follow from the choice of each 
alternative. Thus, constitute benefits and costs in terms of 
strategic goals objectives (Allison, 1971:30). 
4. Choice: Rational choice consists simply of selecting that alternative whose 
consequences 
considered 
highest in the decision-makers payoff function. Rational choice is 
mtu:lmt:smg (~lison, 1971:30). 
categories formalise the concept of rational action that underpins economic, 
decision and game theory, as well as the less structured notion that underlies our 
everyday assumption of hum?J1 purposiveness both in -individual behaviour and in 
national foreign policy. Thus, rationality refers to consistent, value-maximising choice 
within specified contexts. rigorous model of rational action maintains that rational 
choice consists adaptation within the context of a payoff 
function, fixed alternatives, and consequences that are known (Allison, 1971: 31). 
This paradigm exhibits the basic logic of a cluster of approaches that has been labelled 
the classical or Rational Actor Model. Analysts who think in these ""'.t."' .. " .. ..,"',, package 
the activities of various officials of a national government as actions chosen by a 
unified actor, strongly analogous to an individual human (Allison: 31 An 
action is explained by .,.Pt-,,,,.,.p,nf'P to the aims of the unitary, national actor. The modem 
literature of strategy employs a model of this sort. response to the Soviet 
Union's emplacement of missiles in Cuba must be understood in strategic terms as 
simple value-maximising escalation. American nuclear superiority could be counted to 
paralyse Soviet nuclear power; Soviet transgression of the nuclear threshold in 
response to an American use of lower levels violence would be wildly irrational 
since it would mean virtual destruction of the Soviet Communist system and the 
Russian nation. All that was required was for the to bring to bear its and 
local superiority in such a way that that American determination to see the missiles 
removed would be demonstrated, while at the same time allowing Moscow time and 
room to retreat without humiliation. naval blockade-euphemistically named a 
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'quarantine' in order to circumvent the niceties of international law-did just that 
(Allison, 1971:336-7). 
An appreciation of 'means-ends' relationship is critical for a full understanding of 
the rational actor model. In this model, 'melins' and 'ends' of states are defined in 
abstract terms. Thus 'power' is regarded as the chief means to all ends; and 'national 
security' is taken as the primary and commonest 'ends' or of all states. 
Accordingly Wolfers (in Akindele and Olusanya, 1980), pointed out that, an 
adherent of this model ideally begins with a 'theory ends' and from 
'to analysis of the quest power. He further posits that the degree to which 
power is available or attainable frequently affects the choice of ends. This is why, 
rational actor model analyst believe that, prudent statesmen will always endeavour to 
keep their ends and aspirations safely within the power which their country possesses 
or is ready and willing to muster (Asobie, 1980: 24). 
Whatever the drawbacks this implicit conceptual model, with realist . 
paradigm of which it is a part, it made certain important contributions to the 
development of a scientific study of international politics. First through insistence 
on understanding what international politics is, instead of speculating on what it ought 
to be, it laid the initial foundations empirical research. Secondly, its search for 
'fundamentals' that underlie political behaviour was an early attempt to introduce into 
the science of international politics the necessity to explore the essence of a 
phenomenon instead of accepting superficial manifestation. Third, the model 
ec()gnmcm of the significance of the search uniformities in politicaJ 
behaviour as a for the formulation of general propositions. (Asobie, 1980: 24). 
to the aforementioned, and for the purpose of this study, Nigeria's policy will 
be examined from Classical or Rational Actor: Model I. Allison (1971), that 
concepts could be to sharpen the applicability of the Rational Actor: Model 1 
since it is defined as an abstraction or representation of political (Dye, 
. 1981:43). This definition is true when "political systems, or elite or groups or rational 
decision making or incrementalism or games (Dye, 1981: 43) are abstracted from the 
world an attempt to "simplify, Clarify and understand what is really important 
about politics" 1981:43). As Thomas Dye (1981) states: "certainly the utility 
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a model lies in ability to order and simplifY political so that we can think about it 
more clearly and understand the relationships we find in the real world... A model 
should help to direct research inquiry and research into public policy ... Finally, a model 
approach should an explanation of public policy ... (Dye, 1981: 43-44). 
In any choice options, the following of this model are considered 
appropriate when Nigeria's policy ECOWAS. the quest for integration 
in West Afiica Nigeria is with critical and is at times forced to take 
tough decisions, whilst attempting not to the integration process and destroy its 
leadership role the sub-region. The Rational Actor Model 1 has the following 
advantages. 
1. The Rational Model 1 promotes a systematic, orderly approach to the study of 
policy problems when a national actor is involved. 
2. Rational analysis assist problem definition or the location of decision space, which 
is considered as a vital, steps in policy analysis. 
3. It helps to assist in satisfYing information is needed by all parties ton a 
policy all good decisions are based on adequate information. 
4, Rational choice can help articulate and clarifY the wide range of practical choice and 
the consequences of various potential alternative choices. 
5. It reduces the incidence hidden value judgement on the part of policy-makers 
(Kuye, 1989:57). Having explored the discourse on the process of policy making, we 
can tum to the specific policies pursued by the different Nigerian governments towards 
ECOW AS during the period under review. With general background of decision-
making models foreign policy, an attempt will now be made 
policy ECOWAS. 
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CHAPTER THREE. 
OVERVIEW OF NIGERIA'S POLICY IN ECOWAS-1979-1997. 
Introduction: 
I 
Nigeria has the human and physical resources necessary to manipulate the international 
system for its national in an interdependent world. By the end of the 1960s 
and 970s, was showing of a growing political stability and wealth at 
home and abroad, at the West African sub-region and the continent. 
Two major potential power, have been responsible for this: population and oil 
resources. With the end of the country's civil war and a successful policy of national 
reconciliation, Nigeria as one people constitutes the largest concentration of African 
population in one country. Suffice it to now that in Nigeria there is a direct link 
between domestic politics and the making of foreign policy. According to Gambari 
(1989), the domestic political arrangement and the mann r of conducting political 
business invariably the conduct ""''''''VLJ,.,. The question 
as to whose foreign policy we are about? He 
Nigeria's policy has never been directly related to the masses the people; 
rather it is formulated, articulated and implemented in highly elitist circles. Hence the 
country's foreign relations have reflected the needs and aspirations of a national super 
elite business, bureaucratic, military and traditional ruling groups. Never very 
cohesive, this national elite is deeply divided along ethnic, regional religious and 
ideological lines. Hence, to Gambari (1989), the history of Nigerian foreign 
policy has been to some extent related to a search for national consensus behind the 
major outlines of the country's externally projectable goals and objectives. 
The absence of a sustained unity of purpose abroad has resulted in the conflict between 
those who represent what one may be called the radical impulse on the one hand and 
those who reflect a conservative view weight on the other. From this enduring conflict 
comes foreign policy positions which are often tentative and uneasy compromises. 
Alternatively, successive post-independence governments have often adopted the loud 
rhetoric of the radical elements in the country, while quietly pursuing essentially 
conservative policies abroad (Gambari, 1989: 5). 
87 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
of aSyInnlletlry between rhetoric 
policies can found in Nigeria's economic structure and external ec()nC)llU,C 
relations. Gambari (1989) postulates that, other than the and resources put 
building a sub-regional market future manufactures, which culminated in 
establishment ECOW AS, no efforts have made to change 
direction and Nonetheless, history of 
f;-" .. ""10' ... policy is not simply an activity as the would put plus ca 
change, plus c 'est la meme chose. have been important shifts of emphasis and 
by the leadership, of the room that a state with a dependent economy has to 
manoeuvre realm 1989: 6) . 
. Acconting to Ojo (cited in Aluko and Shaw, 1984), two salient an 
contradictory 
1960 that 
have marked external relations since its ma.ep€~naefl(~e 
continuity and change. First, despite, changes in the 
been an continuity in the 
of the foreign policy. Most analyst succeeding to 
so much more dynamic than its as to a 'new 
(Ibid: 190). But differences in dynamism reflect only of a cosmetic nature; 
are merely of style. Fundamentally, external relations with 
........ u>.J, .. " like have continued unchanged except degree 
and even this apJ)ears to fonow a progression Shaw, 1989: 
Similar continuity (in substance) and change (in degree) been discernible in both 
political economy and strategies development. have been changes in Size, 
composition structure of the class, in the rate crTn'nIT" and development of 
the economy, and the mode and development P,,,ULllU/5' But these 
changes are and social relations of production, 
salience of state capitalism, and state-financed free as well as continued and 
expanded into the economy. Put differently, the political economy 
is status 
parameters of 
on1em:eo, based as it is on a neC)-C(}IOl1U:U capitalist order within the 
elite the 
substance of foreign policy is not 
. 1984: 161). 
to continuity in the political eCC)llorny (Ojo, 
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I , 
! 
In this vein Ojo (1984) that, continuity in substance and change in i 
foreign relations and political economy are product of the interactions 
global economy and the Nigerian state and between the latter and dOli 
formations. Because the global economy has presenlted the same 
restraints to successive governing groups, who eschew fundamental change in 
political economy but rather share the same basic approach, objectives and strategy of 
development, the responses have been same: contuinty in search 'multiple entry 
visas' into the global economy rather than 'exit this has meant 
pragmatism, and a cautious foreign policy of non-confrontation with major 
exc:ept over emotionally-charged matters such as colonialism and apartheid 
(Ojo, 1984). 
On the other hand uvI.4U;)v each suc:ce~~alrl~ governing had different kinds of 
relationships with domestic socio-economic formations, there have been differences 
tactics and style, which individual personalities and opportunities available to the 
leaders serve only to eX~lcelrba1te Where social formations were inchoate in the 
colonial era) or looked to state (regional) governments for the protection of economic 
in the terminal and immediate post-colonial years) powers of the 
Nigerian state (central 'federal' government) were circumscribed (vis-a.-vis regional 
governments) especially in economic matters. The national state pretended to 
act as a r",t;:'r.,.", of economic life while the groups most conscious of distinct 
interests and better organised to advance them- regional governments- regulated 
the politico-economic (Rimmer in, Panther-Brick, 1978). 
However, as the Nigerian State becomes more powerful vis-a.-vis regional government, 
as tends to happen in all federal states, there is a shift in focus towards national 
government in social groups' competition for benevolence. As a result, the national 
state is further strengthened. It is thus able to use social formations own end 
rather than the other way round. As the fortunes of businesses, communities and 
households come to hinge on its favour, 
group against another and """"";un,,,,, 
benevolence. It has thus able to 
national state is able to play one social 
international forces who count on its 
a higher " ... UT ...... of tactical and stylistic 
In policy, as is manifested in the contuinty and change in its external 
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relations (Ojo, 1984: 
The second salient external relations has . . Increasmg 
on and often role in regional and continental continued 
expanded incorporation into the global economy. the mid-1960s, and 
especially after civil war, has gained a pre-eminent standing continentally 
and, in contrast to earlier marginality, has internationally become the most powerful 
black African state, or the major black power in modern international politics 
(Mazuri, 1977:2). It is therefore in of the 'continuity' and 'change', with """",'''''rt" 
to regime-change 
ECOWAS. 
political economy that we shall eXall11111e 
Nigeria in ECOW AS- The Shehu Shagari Era 1979-1983. 
policy in 
The Second Republic in began with introduction of the constitution 
under Alhaji Shagari as the President on October 1, 1979. The basic principles 
underlying Nigerian policy independence did not any significant 
change the Second Republic. These principles were as follows; is 
principle of the sovereign equality all state irrespective their The second, is 
the respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty of aU states. The third, is the 
principle non-interference in the affairs of states. fourth, is the 
commitment to peaceful settlement of dispute. The fifth, is the promotion of African 
through functional co-operation. 
of colonialism, and apartheid in South 
'"' ....... v •• '" with the powers would 
1978). 
sixth, is the commitment to the eradication 
The final principle is that 
on (The New 
challenges faced the new as it ushered in decade of 1980s. 
Internally, it had to keep its electoral promises to revolutionise agriculture, , ...... ,.,,.. ... ,,,,,, 
and expand social provide employment to the rapidly grown population 
especially the urban areas, maintain political stability. these were in the face 
of sharply declining prices for oil the mainstay of the economy. On the foreign policy 
front, the main challenge was to maintain the momentum progressive actions taken 
since Murtala Muhammed came to power that continued to enjoy the support or'the 
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miiJrnled elite (Gambari, 1989). There was an even the more problematic question. In 
of the fact that the source of Nigeria's oil-based national wealth is the West, her 
national power is anchored in 
policies, particularly ""'0'0 .. 1"1,., 
the greatest to the country's African 
ECOWAS and the liberation Southern 
emanates from West. How then does the civilian or indeed any regime in 
interact economically with the West a dependent while .-.;'U ....... ,,' .. 
vaguely and without deep conviction or sustained effort to the Eastern bloc models 
of social justice and national liberation, yet walk in the ideological "non-alignment" 
middle? (Gambari, 1989: 10). 
Not unnaturally there was no significant shift in foreign policy from that of Shehu 
Shagari's predecessors. The vertical ties continued unabated, though the horizontal 
ones were not neglected. However, there was a discernible 'low profile' in style, with 
little of the occasional exuberance of the former military regime to 'confront' big 
powers or to assert African by taking an 
African consensus had (Aluko and Shaw, 1984:212). 
However, there were some elements of continuity and change in the basic principles of 
foreign policy under the Shehu Shagari government as as in the three concentric 
in which relations operated, namely relations with the powers, 
relations with Africa and relations with neighbouring countries in the ECOW AS sub-
""'0''''''''' (Aluko, 1988: 6). 
With the change 0'/""""''''''1'TI",,,,t and on October 1 1979 was the 1:!"'~1' .... n 
for Alhaji a totally personality from either 
Murtala Muhanlffied or Olusegun Obasanjo. While two military 
in swift action, Shehu Shagari 1'\1'''.t ...... '''r1 pat:1ence, prc:::vw:JC(luun, some 
form of Hamletish dithering up to the point not any decision at all. Alhaji 
Shehu in 1982 in annual ... ' ..... M • ..-.... Policy address, that his O('ll"",rnrn"''''T 
was not out to court 
U""VUI':'''' not ne(~es:san 
Given all personality 
popularity' adding that ' in a long distance victory 
but to the sensible runner' (Shagari, 1982). 
TTAlr<>nroA" then, one could understand the 
in expressing their respective 
international community (Aluko, 1988:27-28). 
position to the rest the 
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Under the Shehu Shagari government, Nigeria continued to be guided by the basic 
principles their policy towards its neighbours especially those dealing with the 
inviolability territorial frontiers, the peaceful settlement of conflicts, and the 
promotion of unity them through multilateral and bilateral Bilateral 
"'''''''<lV'Ull''', scientific and cultural agreements were strengthened with Republic 
Benin, and Cameroon. Indeed early 1982, the Shehu Shgari 
government wanted some payment arrangement that would facilitate the importation of 
rice from Cameroon to instead of from North (Nuko, 1988: 22). 
As in past, the Shagari government tried to strengthen the ties among the 
ECOW AS states. Apart from supporting the ECOW AS secretariat with financial 
resources, the Shagari government had taken active part in promoting unity 
in West Africa. Thus in November 1 President Shagari 
"we are pledlged to continuing our support for the community (ECOW AS), and to co-operate 
with other member states to ensure that the conmtumty does not become divided 
itself." (Shagari, 1982). 
administration continued to uphold the commitments of the military to the 
survival ECOWAS. Nigeria % of the annual budget ECOWAS 
and hosts its secretariat in Lagos (now relocated in Abuja). new 
interventionist and rather expensive sub-regional policy was occasioned the security 
problems exposed by the civil war. The establishment of the community at great cost 
to Nigeria was part of the attempt to change isolationist policy of the first Republic 
(Falola and Ihonvbere, 1985: 193). In his first participation in the deliberations of 
ECOW AS Heads of State or Government in May 1980, Shehu Shagari declared that 
his administration 'shall continue to give fun support to the community in the 
realisation of its goals and objectives' ( FaIola and Thonvbere, 1985). Shehu 
Shagari government aided the Sahelian states financially, invested projects and 
provided 90-day credit facilities for ECOWAS members buying its crude oil. 
Nonetheless, President Shagari was unable to reconcile himself to drastic political 
changes in Liberia and Ghana. bloody Liberian coup of 1980, led by Master 
-.;"" .. ,,..""o"u Samuel was met with outright condemnation from Nigerian leader. 
The decision not to allow Master-Sergeant of Liberia to attend the ECOWAS 
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meletmig in Lome and the OAU Economic summit Lagos, was due to Nigeria's 'big 
voice' in process of arriving at the moves. President Shagari did not hide his 
reservation the Doe administration when he said that: 
" ... soonafter the coup in Liberia, there was an economic summit meeting of the OAU in 
Lagos. Soon after Sgt. Doe had massacred the leaders of Liberia he wanted to come and 
attend the OAU in Lagos and we thought that this was an opportunity to discuss the 
issue concerning recognition of governments by people of such leaders 
who are blood thirsty. Leaders who had done despicable acts to the embarrassment of 
just after washing their bloody hands would walle into the OAU and and 
dine with other leaders of Africa" (FaIola and llionvbere, 192). 
In the case of Ghana, when President Rawlings refused to stop the execution of 
corrupt leaders and politicians not only did oil stop flowing to Ghana due to 'technical 
problems', it was alleged that Nigeria planned to invade Ghana. In addition, some 
Ghanaians who claimed to be policemen and had fled from the 'bloodthirsty' Rawlings 
government were wide exposure in the Nigerian media. Ghana was also asked, in 
spite of terrible position, to pay up the oil debts it owed the Nigerian 
National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC). The by the Shehu 
government in January 1983, to expel illegal immigrants from Nigeria within two 
weC~Ks_ has become one of the most SlgrutlC8lrlt his foreign policy. The decision 
though not a contravention of the ECOWAS protocol on the free movement of 
persons, left a bitter taste in the mouths of the affected countries, the general 
goodwill for the success the community. The protocol on labour mobility has 
promoted the movement of thousands 
Ihonvbere, 1985: 192-193). 
West Africans to Nigeria (FaIola and 
The Shehu Shagari administration, in view of declining revenues and resue!;sness 
within of non-bourgeois internally, was forced to take the extreme 
measure of expelling aliens. Despite all the pledges made by the Shagari government 
about promoting regional economic unity as in ECOW AS, January, 
1983, the smne Shehu took the controversial to 
over 2 million illegal aliens, most of who were other ECOWAS countries within a 
forth-night (Aluko, 1988:23). The presence of illegal immigrants working Nigeria in 
contravention of the Nigerian Act of 1963 and the ECOW AS protocol on 
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free movement persons was becoming increasingly intolerable to the federal 
The changing conditions and climate of economic boom of the early 
1970s accentuated this, while the country was approaching a crucial election that year 
and, becoming concerned about matters of security. The federal 
government therefore announced on 17 January 1983, that all unskilled foreigners 
residing illegally in the country should leave in two weeks (Asante, 
1986: 158). The federal government later reviewed order to allow an extension of 
four weeks that terminated on 28 February 1983 was granted to all those employed in 
skilled regularisation of the stay in of professional and technical 
grades provided their employers were able to make adequate representations for 
Expatriate Quota slots to be granted for the posts they occupied; all citizens of 
ECOW AS member states, Cameroon, and Chad who had been living in the country 
prior to the coming into of the 1963 Immigration Act to remain in Nigeria 
irrespective of what they do; and confirmation the fact that by virtue of section 8, 
O-Slectllon l(a) the Immigration Act, 1963, the order did not affect employers of 
the Federal and State government (Asante, 1986:. 158). 
This decision was unprecedented in relations with her neighbours. From the 
late 1960s and throughout the 1970s, Nigerians were expelled from Ghana, Equatorial 
Zaire and few other African countries. But at no time did Nigeria retaliate. 
decision of January 1 to (Nuko, 1988), to expel over 2 million 
'illegal from of and reasons was as ..,"'.,,,..,D. 
measure taken without any appreciation problems involved and the 
such a decision (Nuko, 1988: 23). 
years, the 1 .. 01'1 .... '" of the Second Republic n .. "I .... " to meet the 
"'''<''''''U5'~'' they faced. The economy deteriorated, weighed down with huge internal 
and external debts accumulated amidst charges of mismanagement and 
fraud (Gambari, 1989). Nigeria's social services were in shambles. There were serious 
threats to domestic and stability, especially after the 1983 elections, which were 
accompanied by much dispute and widespread violence. Nigeria's leadership in African 
affairs eroded seriously as the country vacillated on issues such as Western Sahara and 
Namibia. The governments intervention the Chad conflict and participation in the 
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fated OAU peace-keeping force perhaps led to the unintended and possibly disgraceful 
consequence of installing a power N'djamena opposed to Goukoni Waddeye, 
the Chadian leader who had invited the force in the first place. Moreover, 
neighbours had scant respect for the country, and some of them even crossed into its 
territory and attacked killed civilians and soldiers with impunity (Gambari, 1989: 11). 
ECOW AS was a state of tremendous crises. In general, it was as if Nigeria had 
rapidly slipped back into the policies of to the West and hesitancy in 
African affairs, closer to the situation in the 1960s. Under Shehu Shagari, Nigeria 
appeared to be a demographic and economic giant on the continent, but a political 
dwarf in African affairs. was reminiscent of the early 1960s when Ghana 
contemptuously ... "''1-,''' ...... ,.1'1 to Nigeria as 'big for nothing' (i.e. failing to use economic 
strength for bold action) when African issues were concerned. However, a country 
may relatively huge resources without playing a role commensurate to its status 
or potentiaL The example of the United States between the two world wars is a clear 
illustration of such an undesirable possibility. The challenge diplomacy 
was how to translate the country's potential resources and its power position in Africa 
into reality by bringing weight creatively and constructively in solving Afiican 
problems (Gambari, 1989: 11-13). 
} 
Nigeria in ECOWAS- The Gen. Buhari Era-1983-1985. 
The perceived failure of the Second Republic to deal with the nation's domestic 
problems and external relations was used to justify the Second Coming of the soldiers. 
On new year's eve 1983 the government of Alhaji Shehu Shagari was overthrown in a 
bloodless coup led by General Muhhamadu Buhari and subsequently, he formed the 
Supreme Military Council (SMC), which took over the running of the affairs of the 
state. The new military government enjoyed widespread popular support as the New 
Year of 1984 began (Gambari, 1989: 11). 
The twenty-month rule of General Muhammadu Buhari is often remembered as one in 
which Nigerians swallowed bitter pills prescribed as cure for the country's ailments. 
After overthrowing a regime which was generally regarded as corrupt, incompetent, 
and ineffective, and which brought the country to the precipice of economic collapse, 
the Buhari settled down to take economic, political and diplomatic measures 
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which it saw as nec:essal to save the country from collapse (FaIola and Ihonvbere, 
The Buhari regime seems to have interpreted public approval of emergence 
as a blank cheque to conduct public affairs in whatever way it deemed fit. While 
acknowledging the contribution of falling revenue to the 
believed that part was the unnecessary attachment to sentimental 
compromise for the of preserving national unity conduct of the 
affairs of the state. It was prepared to tough and hardheaded decisions designed 
to bring sanity into the society and solve the country's problems, .no matter whose ox 
was gored and whose feelings were hurt (Adefuye. 1992: 108). 
In relations the Gen. Buhari regime, adopted the same un-sentimental, 
realistic and hardheaded approach that it has adopted in its conduct domestic 
policies. Against the background of what it inherited from the Shehu Shagari a 
country on the brink of economic disaster, internally infested with crime, (Gambari, 
1989) and which was externally threatened by smaller neighbours by strong 
extra-African powers, Gen. Buhari regime operated from premise that a 
credible foreign policy abroad must of necessity start with security and stability at 
home. Gen. Buhari regime, was poised to use foreign policy as an ""H""~".1GA 
instrument for rebuilding the shattered economy and internal security. Unlike during 
the Yakubu Gowon and Olusegun Obasanjo eras when Nigeria sacrificed 
some on of Afiican unity solidarity, it was clear 
in Gen. Buhari' s initial statements that where the national interests of 
conflicted with those of our neighbouring states particular and Afiica 
there would be no automatic yielding to the latter (Gambari, 1989:34). 
nnl·".u.~r the Gen. Buhari regime did not deviate from basic strands of Nigeria" s 
foreign policy among which are the promotion of Afiican unity and solidarity, support 
the liberation movements and commitment to the ideals of ECOWAS. One the 
very first diplomatic activities of the regime was to dispatch a high powered delegation 
of members of the Supreme Military Council led by Major-General Domkat Bali to 
neighbouring countries. The delegation met President Kerekou of Benin, Seyni 
Kountche of Niger, Paul Biya of Cameroon, and vice-president Tahiru Ganasu of Chad 
on the lIth, 12th, and 14th January, 1984 (Adefuye, 1985: 111). During few 
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months of coming to power, Buhari tried through diplomacy to 1111"l1l',r"",Q. 
relations with West Afiican countries. Of was improvement in 
Ghanaian-Nigerian relations much of 1994. Indeed, the relationship between 
these countries and improved considerably that 1984, the Heads of State 
of Ghana, Fit-Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings, General Eyadema of Togo, , General 
Matthieu Kerekou of Benin; Lt-Colonel-Koutche of Niger came to Lagos for a 
" ... U.UU.lL me,etU1lg with Nigerian Head of State, General Buhari. Although at the end 
of the meeting, a number of treaties and protocols were signed by all the of 
State to co-operate in security matters and combating smuggling, in extraditing 
criminals, and dissident elements, no tangible action has followed these treaties. 
Smuggling and other criminal activities across their frontiers continued for some time. 
And moreover, Nigeria refused to open common borders with these neighbouring 
countries since April 1984 until the military coup of 1985 (Aluko, 1988:39-40). 
objective was to assure countries that the new administration was committed to a 
policy of good neighbourliness while their in enhancing 
security and checking and hostile activities towards (Adefuye, 
1985). 
The belief that smuggling was one of the major causes of the econonuc 
dilemma was instrumental in the decision of the Buhari regime to close Nigeria's 
land borders (Gambari, 1989). It was the first indication that the regime intended to 
pursue firm nationalist policies toward other countries the region. Despite repeated 
appeals for the reopening the borders by the affected countries the border remained 
closed until 1985 when the Buhari regime was overthrown. In explaining the reasons 
for the prolonged border closure Buhari's Minister Agboola Gambari said: 
"Secunty considerations were almost paramount, at the initial It 
was strongly believed that some of the politicians who were on the list of most wanted 
persons had gone into hiding with the intention to flee Nigeria by land through the 
countries. The economic dimension was also very important. The activities of 
smllgglers and currency traffickers were very to the economy. Severe 
loss of revenue occurred goods of were illegally exported through 
neigllbouring countries." (Gambari, 1989: 53). 
There was also but unrecorded flight of Nigerian currency in circulation at . 
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anyone Furthermore, there was the uneasy feeling that Nigeria's neighbours 
were cheating the country over. Initially their effectively devalued the 
Naira through extensive currency trafficking. Then with the heavily devalued Naira, 
they purchased legal as as contraband goods from Nigeria especially those goods, 
which the country imported with scarce foreign exchange (Adefuye, 1985: 111). The· 
Gen. Buhari regime came to power with the firm conviction that the Shagari 
administration had collapsed in largely because the leadership's inability or 
unwillingness to take tough decisions to lU ... U ... !', .... economy in the face of declining 
oil revenues. Hence one the first decisions of the new rulers was to adopt measures 
to put the economy back on track. The closure of the land borders was one such 
measures. (Adefuye,1985: Ill). 
It is ironic, that not withstanding the border closure the Gen. Buhari 
administration played an important role in the formation of the Quadripartite 
agreement with immediate neighbours to west Republic Togo and 
Ghana. process leading to the Quadripartite Agreement began with arrival in 
of a special envoy from President Nyassimbe Eyadema of in 1984 seeking 
a at the level of government country and Benin as 
well as Ghana. The primary concern of the Togolese government was the 
activities of Togolese dissidents, who were believed to be operating in Ghana, perhaps 
with the support of the Ghanaian authorities, and who should extradited to Togo to 
criminal charges (Gambari, 46). 
General Buhari, in reply to President Nyassingbe Eyadema's message, su~~gested a less 
restrictive focus to such a the four of state. proposed a wider 
agenda to include co-operation agreements to deal with all illegal trafficking in the sub-
arms and ammunition, currency, goods, and services. Nigeria's objective was 
to formalise the trade relationship, reduce smuggling, and immigration. 
Co-operation in security matters could also cover extradition of criminals from one 
country to the other or to where they might wanted to and 
prosecution. It was clearly unsatisfactory that Nigeria and Ghana had extradition 
1" .. """,1" .. "" with Britain but none with one another or with their neighbouring countries 
(Garnbari, 1989,: 46). 
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expanded agenda apt)ea:reCl to satisfy Ghana, which could have probably not 
shown interest in the earlier, restrictive concerns of Benin Republic was initially 
cold to the of a new and comprehensive system designed to check the illegal 
movements of goods, currency, and peoples. her economy was suffering 
badly from the continued closure of the Nigerian border. shrewd character, 
President Matthew probably endorsed the for the agreements on 
the assumption that that was what Wanted to reopen her land 
borders (Gambari, 1989: 46). 
Quadripartite ,gre:em,ent was m parts. In the first, an extradition treaty, the 
four parties agreed to extradite to each other, on the basis reciprocity and according 
to the rules and conditions stated therein, those persons accused or convicted of 
specific crimes or offences committed in one country and found in another. However, 
political offences were excluded from extradition request. The second agreement 
concerned co-operation between the four signatory countries. 
Recognising the need to mount a multinational fight the upsurge of crimes that 
to stability, and development of the West 
African the four to co-,oplera'[e m c;:p~T'('hln for persons 
involved in criminal activities (Gambari, 1989: 
third and very crucial part dealt with mutual administrative assistance in customs, 
trade and immigration matters, The objective was to combat smuggling and other 
activities prejudicial to the economic, fiscai, and commercial interests of the four 
countries, Care was taken, however, to place this particular agreement within the 
framework of ECOW AS. Emphasis was also placed on the respect for equality of 
parties to the operations of the agreernerlt, which was aimed at promoting the mutual 
interests of the peoples of the four countries. Smuggling and how to combat it were 
particularly sensitive to and Nigeria Ghana sought strong 
measures to combat the menace in sub-region (Gambari, 1989: 47). The 
was ratified on 10 December 1984 in ....... ,,,,v>:> Nigeria, by 
Ghana, and Togo. 
For Nigeria, this was a diplomatic triumph. Without giving in to a precipitate re-
opening of the country's borders, it somehow laid the foundation for border 
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closures unnecessary. Nigeria was so satisfied with the Quadripartite that 
the military government directed that negotiations be commenced immediately. 
to their spirit and substance to and Chad. This was, not 
accomplished before the termination the Gen. Buhari administration (Gambari, 
1989: 49). 
The Agreement was the major international action of the Administration in the 
West African sub-region in 1984. It is indeed a ,,"'rt, .... o tesltlffilJny the ."Tr,,, ... n 
determination of the to put COI1S1(lenlltlClfl of Nigeria's security above that 
African sub~region that the government got the the unity of the peoples of the 
gre:ement ".~" .. " .• without being pushed to a precipice re-opening the country's 
borders. General Buhari attended the 1984 ECOW AS summit but resisted pressures to 
reopen the border because he did not believe that it was in Nigeria's interest. even 
turned down the offer to be ECOW AS Chairman on grounds of urgent 
commitments on the domestic scene. extent to the ideals 
ofECOWAS began to be doubted by neighbouring countries (Adefuye, 1992:113). 
Although, the Buhari government has declared its commitment to the survival 
ECOWAS as a viable institution, much of its actions have belied this. The closure of 
the borders might not have been a breach of the letter of the ECOW AS Treaty of 
1975; it is a breach of its spirit. To worsen matters, military government of General 
Buhari decided on 15 April 1985 to all illegal immigrants within three Ul.,,,,' .. r<! 
700,000 mostly West nationals were "'''''J.!,.., ..... ,.... from 
which is of the 1983 (Aluko, 1988: 40). 
While the 1983 expulsion order affected an estimated 2 million illegal inlmigrants, 
1985 illegal numbered about 700,000. This second order was issued for much the same 
reasons as in 1983: the abuse ECOWAS protocol on movement 
of persons secon~J. the involvement of However, 
was however, .. "'rI,,.. ... un'''· a troubled economy that tuI1lorunelltal reason for the 
COI1ltlmllea to be badly hurt by crude-oil a when jobs were 
scarce and basic goods were high, there was a tendency to regard in 
midst of Nigeria's huge population as an unacceptable strain on the country's 
limited resources 1986: 158). 
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As 1985 progressed and the full of the administration's efforts to revamp the 
economy and instil public accountability and national discipline to be felt, public 
alienation grew. were reports widening split among of 
Military Council and rumours about an impending coup. Under such 
conditions, public , ... +.",.."",,+ in foreign policy issues diminished and the administration's 
achievements were consigned to the back stage (Newswatch, 
The Gen. Buhari administration did not survive these and speculations. The 
Gen.Buhari administration was overthrown on 27 August 1985. Major 
Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida succeeded as Commander-in-Chief and of 
Federal Republic of Nigeria. During his first broadcast to the nation, President 
Babangida gave reasons for the change of government and added foreign policy to the 
areas of public issues in which his predecessor was believed by the military to have 
failed the nation(Gambari, 1989: 208). 
Nigerm In ECOW A8--The Gen. Babangida /Ernest Shonekan Eras-1985-1993. 
"Weare ECOWAS and the ECOWAS is us. Economic now been in 
exi~;tenl::e for 11 years. While II years in the life of an organisation could be likened to but 
a step in a long journey, I believe the time has come for us to set our sights higher and 
broaden our horizons ... Let us constantly ourselves that the ultimate of 
the ECOW AS as conceived by the founding fathers, is the economic and social integration 
of the ". General Ibrahim Babangida, 1986. 
With coming to power of the new military of General 
given high premium. maiden broadcast new described 
the policy of as in dynamism (Akinyemi, 1982) . 
......... " ...... administration's pursuit of foreign policy: "our foreign policy in 
the last 20 have been characterised by inconsistencies and incoherence. It 
.... v.,.. ...... the clarity to us know where we stood on matters of international concern 
to enable. other relate to us with seriousness"(Babangida, 1985). The new 
regime was no doubt aware the public criticism of Buhari's policy posture. 
Elements of the academic community and the media had pointed to the apparent 
. contradiction between a policy of concentric circles that describe West Africa as the 
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first scene of action the act of expelling closing the borders. The point 
was made that aliens were much less of a problem to the Nigerian economy than 
the Buhari administration thought were (Adefuye, 1992: 118). 
One of the Gen. Buhari administration was Bolaji Akinyemi. His 
appointment as Minister External Affairs by General Babangida crowned his long 
involvement with foreign policy, having served as Director-General, 
Institute of International Affairs (NIIA) for seven Akinyemi and Gambari (the 
Affairs Second Republic) their of how 
should implemented. Gambari has known to criticise the 
vagueness of the concept of Africa as the CeI1ltre1Dle<~e of Nigerian policy, -'0,"'0 that 
areas priority must identified (Adefuye, 1992). much was reflected in the 
re,ume. Akinyemi on the other hand concentric approach of the Gen. 
favours a more "''''''~TTnlP role cast in 1'1"\1"""""u~f"""" mould 
within Africa and beyond. He believes that with the huge human and material resources 
u.u",u'",_ Nigeria should live up to its destined and play for black people the 
socio-economic development of the continent. Akinyemi is basically in support of the 
COrlCel)t that Africa as the and would want it rigorously implemented 
(Adefuye, 1992: 118-1 
In a lecture "A Farewell to Policy" and delivered to the end of tenure as 
Director-General, of NlIA, Akinyemi expressed his belief that Nigeria should play a 
meamlngI1UI role in the world. this to can only possible the 
following are 
stable 
• A Prosperous 
politically stable West Africa and Africa. 
• An Economically prosperous West Africa and Africa. 
• A Secure West 
After elaborating on what should be to Make Africa stable and secure, 
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Akinyemi advocated an intensification of inter-West link. 
Nigeria should take the lead by engaging industrialisation to to 
the ECOWAS work the convertibility of Naira within the sub-region 
(Adefuye, 119). 
A grandiose, activist foreign policy with considerable visibility in Africa was 
Akinyemi's dream for Nigeria. Within a few months of his assumption he 
forwarded to General Babangida a set of proposals designed to Nigeria 
rightful place in the black world. It is not surprising that Akinyemi was 
opposed to the inward-looking of Buhari' policy which seemed 
to limited Nigeria's field of operations He is known to have criticised the border 
closure and expulsion of the aliens on the grounds that both acts did more damage to 
commitment to ECOW AS and OAU than they provided solution to the 
economic problems (Adefuye, 1992: 120). 
One of the by the new military government was to reopen the borders 
with its immediate neighbours, which had been closed 1984. This was no doubt 
rec,elVf~Q with appreciation by the affected countries and the membership of 
ECOW AS who were questioning the pioneering role of Nigeria in the community; 
after the 1983 and expulsion orders and the continued border closure. The re-
operung the hitherto closed borders on the assumption of office earned 
administration considerable praise. slgrung the second phase of the ECOW AS 
protocol on the movement of and goods, as well the 
implementation of the ECOWAS Insurance Scheme (ECOWAS Brown Card Scheme)-
all go to show Babangida's commitment to the revival of the regional body 
(Babawale, 1985: 115). 
In a bid to show its genuine to hold together as one, 
Babangida attempted to step into the December 1985 border clash between 
Mali and Although this was done in conjunction with Libya, the .. t1-,,,",, 
and the Francophone states (of intentions) made it possible for 
t<r<:>'nf''' to stage a diplomatic coup against Nigeria in the mediatory moves. In the end, 
received a moribund defence pact of the Francophone states-
ANAD, to take credit for the amicable settlement conflict (Babawale, 1995: 
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114). was to take consolation in the July 1986 ECOWAS 
summit at Abuja President Ibrahim Babangida was elected chairman for a 
second term by unanimous decision. It is left analysts to decide whether this was out 
of love or for Nigeria, or an attempt by other ECOW AS states to avoid 
financial burden that might accompany such a role (Babawale, 114). 
On the ,,,-,,an:;( front the Gen. Babangida administration made attempts to cultivate 
relations as a way of promoting the Community spirit. Prior to the Second 
Coming of the military in 1984, President Samuel Doe of Liberia's relationship with 
the Shehu Shagari administration had been sour after the bloody Liberian coup of 
1980. The Shehu Shagari administration had Samuel to 
Liberia's seat at the OAD in 1980. When the Babangida .. "'01 ........ '" 
took over in 1985, Samuel Doe set out to personally cultivate Nigerian leader 
conscious of the country's geo-political importance in the region (Vogt, 1992: 222). 
Babangida responded warmly to overtures and Lagos helped to 
finance and staffa Graduate School oflntemational Relations Halla", ... after the Nigerian 
President in Monrovia and Doe enrolled in school as a student. Nigerian lecturers 
and Professors were seconded to teach in that school and were paid by the Nigerian 
government foreign (Vogt,1992: 222). 
However, ueceInoc~r 1987 a new H,-", ..... n"" for I-ivt·"" ..... 
Nwachukwu was appointed. It is important to mention at this juncture that his 
appointment did not change stand on issues relating to ECOW AS 
General Babangida Community issues a priority. The thrust of the 
Nwachukwu era was the economic sector. This approach was christened 'economic 
diplomacy'. Disclosing content of the new strategy in Nigerian diplomacy, 
Nwachukwu stated that: 
"The solution to Nigeria's national economic difficulties demands that we take a critical 
look at our domestic and it also requires realistic co-operation 
with other countries. This entails negotiations and activities that will attract 
foreign investments and other assistance required for the successful accomplishment of our 
national 1988: 11). 
The n1"1,m':u"., objective of economic diplomacy was restoration international 
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COl1!ldlen(~e in the Nigerian economy and the attraction 
capital to help in stimulating domestic economic "'I'1"U'lt,,,,,, 
took over the control of the external relations m 
more investment 
When Nwachukwu 
1987, priority was 
accorded to policy initiatives designed to attract support for the Structural Adjustment 
Programme. In doing some administrative adjustments took place within the 
and in overseas missions (Adefuye, and Investment 
Department was out of the Directorate of International Economic Co-operation 
with responsibility for (a) stimulating information flow on trade and investment 
between Nigerian diplomatic missions abroad, relevant arms of government and 
private (b) co-ordinating econ01nic and business information with the relevant 
economic ministries and the organised private sector; (c) and updating 
trade statistics and economic information the use of Nigerian missions abroad 
their functions of and (d) handling complaints and 
enqmnes missions; (e) to attract and investment 
possibilities including debt equity conversion in order to reduce Nigeria" debt stock; 
and (f) co-ordinating trade missions abroad in liaison with the Federal Ministry of 
Trade, the Nigerian Export Promotion Council and other relevant economic Ministries 
(Adefuye, 143). 
Gen. Nwachukwu's economic diplomacy had its cultural dimension. It was generally 
that one way of lessening Nigeria's dependence on was to restore 
agriculture, the traditional economy many Nigerians, to its pride of place. In this 
vein Gen Nwachukwu noted that, " before oil, economy was based on 
peasant farmers who toiled the land to produce our agricultural products which 
produced % of our foreign (Gambari,1989:53). 
It was believed that if agriculture could be revamped and given the necessary boost, 
the country would not only be able to feed herself, it would also be able to export, thus 
improving the foreign ",,,,,\.,.ua.<'5'" situation. Economic diplomacy ensured the 
necessary support of foreign governments and international lending agencies to the 
agricultural policy, which made the small farmer operating his local environment and 
in his the focal point of attention. Agricultural Development 
Project (ADP) established in 1986 with the objective of raising food production, farm 
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income and improving the living standard in seven states of the federation was 
grelem€mts concluded with the World Bank (Adefuye, 1992: 144). nnllUlC€~a by loan 
The focus of the was the small farmer who accounts for 90 of the crop output. 
International support for revamping agriculture was also secured for the promotion 
agricultural co-operatives. Bi-Iateral agreements with UNDP, ILO, provided technical 
assistance for the 1'1.110''''''''''" Agricultural C-operative Management Development Centre 
10 The of international support for agriculture was a remarkable increase 
in marketable surpluses (Gambari, 1989: 47). 
The ECOW AS sub-region received considerable attention the course of the 
implementation of 'Economic Diplomacy'. cultural justification ECOWAS 
has already been made. It is an organisation created to correct what the 1884 
partitioning of Mrica did by separating kith and kin and putting them 
countries under different colonial powers who then imposed their different cultures 
including of government and education on the Afii.cans. 
Nwachukwu always believed that; 
" ... the objective of ECOW AS dove-tails with Nigeria's policies for national development 
and external relations. It is UflIleC(;:ssary to over-worry about the obstacles which continued 
attachment of some the Francophone states to France will pose to the realisation of 
ECOWAS objectives." (Nwachukwu, 1988). 
The Gen. Babangida administration strongly believed that the realisation of the 
provisions of the ECOW AS treaty was important to the survival of Nigeria both 
politically and strategically (Adefuye, 1992: 145). In Gen. Nwachukwu's view 
ECOW AS was the most important experiment directed towards economic and social 
t"tl"ar,~ttr\n in the West Afii.can sub-region to which is fully committed" 
(Nwachukwu, 1988). General Nwachukwu quoted General Babangida's statement that 
remains the most important at economic 
ntp,CJT<Oir1"n on the African continent, a fact which bestowed on us a very heavy 
responsibility to see it survive and grow as a part of our own contribution to the attainment 
of an African Economic Conununity" Ifto,eru've 1992: 146) 
General Nwachukwu attended all the ECOWAS meetings and directed that bi-Iateral 
talks aimed at promoting trade between Nigeria other countries should pay special 
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attention to ECOW AS states. Thus, following reached 
General Babangida's state visit to Ghana between lOth- 12th January, 1989, an 1 
person Nigerian trade mission visited Ghana to coincide with the Ghana International 
Furniture and Wood Working Exhibition. Discussions that were held centred on the 
implementation of relevant ECOW AS protocols and agreements in a way as to 
between the two countries. The obstacles to movement of 
and persons were identified and both products that can be 
exported to each other (Adefuye, 1992) 
The discussion also focused on the important role of the Banking sector in promoting 
trade between the Ghana and Nigeria. While recognising some of the shortcomings of 
the West Clearing (W ACH), it was agreed that it should constitute a 
more effective payment system. At the formal meeting of the two sides, they agreed to 
submit to their respective governments proposals to establish joint-venture projects in 
a caustic soda plant, coastal shipping services, packaging and in Aluminium smelting 
1992: 146). 
The ECOW AS protocol was also the framework within which discussions were held 
"''''Tn,'''_'''... Nigerian businessmen and their Liberian counterparts, between 19th- 26th 
March 1989. Both delegations shared optimism in breaking new grounds in bi-
lateral economic co-operation that would set the for other ECOWAS member 
states to As two current lists of Pv."'"U·f<;l 
n .. r.n,,"'TCO to facilitate the consumption of the proposed bi-lateral trade It 
was also that information on and opportunities would be 
regularly exc:haIlgea. body known as the Liberia! Trade with 
Lagos and Monrovia, was set up to monitor agreements reached. The two 
that, joint venture projects set up in tyre, oil 
sectors (Adefuye, 1992: 147). policies of the 
naoarlgtCla administration was a demonstration of that, in the of 
search for economic opportunities, emphasis was placed on for 
co-operation African neighbours whom shared historical 
and cultural links (Adefuye, 1992: 147). 
It suffices to now that Nigeria sought.. . fuller economic co-operation within the 
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framework of ECOWAS and multi-lateral and bi-Iateral institutions like the River 
Authorities and the bC()flOmlC Joint commission (peters, 1997: 212). It is even 
C011teltldf:d that that it was in the interest of regional integration that the Federal 
government decided on the establishment of the National Boundary Commission as a 
specialised border problem-solving institution. The decision by the Government to set 
up the as prime agency for peaceful resolution of border conflicts and 
the promotion of transborder co-operation and good neighbourliness was ostensibly 
strongly influenced by Nigeria's ever increasing commitment to regional 
endeavours on the levels both West Africa and the The ..... ",,,,,,,,,..,. 
financial, material and human resources committed to ECOWAS and OAU must 
facilitated government's acceptance of the proposal for a supplementary 
transborder co-operation policy (Obiozor et aI, 1994: 82-83). 
Obiozor et al (1994) have argued that, it must have been rightly appreciated that 
regional integration programmes, however brilliantly articulated, would remain mere 
in situations that prevail allover Africa where states are hardly able 
to see to on matters relating to shared borders. border co-operation 
policy would galvanise critical support in addition to out of Nigeria 
and limitrophe countries a model border conflict-free enabling environment, UIVI.;IV;);,)dI 
for the achievement of wider integration projects (Obiozor et.al,1992: 83). 
major foreign policy move that can be identified with Nigeria in ·1990s is 
ECOMOG's intervention In Liberia and Sierra Perhaps Nigeria's (Gen. 
Babangida's), most and controversial policy move has been the 
Liberian-ECOMOG- mission.(Babawale, 1995). The stage for Nigeria's involvement in 
the Liberia was set at the thirteen the Authority of Heads States which 
met in Banjul, from 28-30 1990 under the chairmanship of Blaise 
Campaoare Burkina Faso. The summit took place against the background of 
growing incidence of intra and inter-state disputes, which imperilled peace and stability 
in the region. Particular attention was focused on Liberia where there was extensive 
press coverage of the carnage and random killings leading to large outflows 
refugees (Owoeye, 1 137). 
development placed severe burden on neighbouring countries. Inevitably 
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therefore, the was of prime consideration especially because there were 
indications that some member states of were guilty of complicity the 
It was within this context that General Babangida, proposed and 
received community endorsement for a standing Mediation Committee which 'should 
intervene, in a timely fashion, whenever disputes . The committee was to 
consist of five members: Ghana, Mali, Gambia and Nigeria. The Committee set 
the pace for formation of ECOW AS Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), 
which was to and help resolve the crisis in the war tom Liberia (Owoeye,1993: 
137). The Mediation Committee further agreed to implement the peace plan whose 
essential elements were: 
.. That the warring factions observe an immediate cease-fire, 
.. That an ECOWAS cea.se-nre Monitoring Group(ECOMOG) be set up to monitor 
and supervise the cease-fire, restore law and order so as to create the nec:essarv 
environment for free and fair elections to held, 
.. That a National Conference of Liberian warring factions, political parties and 
i ... t.", ... ",,,t groups be held to establish a broad based interim government acceptable to 
the people of Liberia, 
.. That general and presidential elections be held within 12 months, That ECOW AS 
and other International bodies should 
and fair; and 
l"" .. nJ'''' the elections to ensure that they are 
.. That no leader of a warring faction should head the interim 
whoever heads it should not be eligible to contest the ensuing presidential or 
parliamentary election. (Bundu, 1994:2). 
Not only was Nigeria to supply a substantial percentage of the soldiers, it also opted to 
bear a .,~aja<,}",~'l11JL}", sum of the cost which observers put at 70% of the total cost 
(Babawale, 1995). The decision to intervene in Liberia itself generated controversy 
both within and outside Nigeria. One, because some Nigerians thought the government 
intervened in the crisis to help the then Liberian President, Samuel Doe. Two, the 
decision itself contravened the OAU l'nll·l'Tpr which expressly forbids interference in the 
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internal member states. However, Nigeria had a ,,1'r'OI1'<>011' 
the sub-region remained relatively, at least, to 
conflict-free (peters, 1997:212) 
ntplrp<1t in seeing 
parts of the continent, 
In this Babangida defended, the ECOMOG action when he 
is no the fact that when certain events occur in this subregion, 
depending upon their intensity and magnitude, which are bound to afiect 
politico-military and socio-economic we should not stand by as a helpless 
and hapless spectator. We believe that if the events are such that they the potentials to 
threaten the peace and of the in collaboration with 
in this sub-rellIon is duty bound to react or respond in appropriate manner 
necessary to either avert the disaster or to take measures to ensure peace, 
aU'I''''''''''.h and (in Nwachukwu, 1991:104). 
In spite of these appeals to regional stability, domestic criticism of Nigeria'S 
involvement in ECOMOG could be related to the programme of transition to civil rule, 
which the military administration was implementing. Critics the administration have 
always alleged that President has a hidden agenda to perpetrate himself in 
power; a charge he firmly denied. However, the now drew attention to the 
January 1993 date possibility a may 
provide a pretext for elongation of the regime's tenure and military rule (Vogt, 1992: 
224). In any case, those who respected the President's integrity were also worried 
about the morality of bequeathing a legacy that could tum out to be a 'Nigerian 
Vietnam' to an incoming civilian administration (African Guardian, 1990). 
Gen.Babangida was to allay domestic fears about prospect of ECOMOG, when 
he said, 
"Liberia will not be a Nigerian Vietnam. Our mission there is clear, precise and 
attadnable." JIe also to assuage anxieties: "Neither nor the 
members of ECOMOG forced their way into Liberian conflict in a manner remotely 
resembling military adventurism" and added that "The ECOMOG is a peace force, it has 
no intention and was not established to capture Liberia. In fact, one might ask:, capture 
Liberia for who and from whom and for what purpose?" (in Nwachukwu, 1991). 
In the face of criticisms of Nigeria's role in ECOMOG seen in some quarters within 
Nigeria as a way of prolonging military rule, there was mounting pressure on the 
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regIme to stick to the transition programme. In May 1992 
at in in a number of 
demonstrations demanding resignation of the government demonstrations 
were violently suppressed by the security forces. the political tempo for a return to 
civilian rule increased, the Gen. Babangida administration succumbed to the voice of 
the masses and caned an election on June However, early June 1993 the 
ABN leadership obtained an interim injection in the Abuja high court prohibiting the 
presidential election from place, pending the results of its aPl:,eaJ for the 
ext€mSl()n of military until 1997 (McCaskie, 1997: 787). 
However, rejected the injunction as invalid and stated that the election would 
take place as scheduled. The rate of participation in the presidential election 12 June 
was relatively low, part, to the confusion occasioned by the Abuja court 
action, but inspite of the low tum out, international monitors throughout 
.. "' .... ""':>11 that it had been conducted relatively Two initial results, 
released by NEC, indicated that of the 6.6 million votes cast 14 of the 30 states the 
had secured 4.3 million the NRC million. In 11 of the 14 states (including 
Bashir Tofa's, Leader of the of Kano), Chief M. K 0 Abiola (leader the 
SDP) was believed to have obtained majority votes. ( McCaskie,1997: 787). 
Shortly afterwards, however, the announced that the remaining would not 
by the be until further notice. This followed further injunction 
that prohibited promulgation of the several other applications were presented 
in a number of courts, an attempt to delay or suspend the electoral process. 
Widespread followed, and protests were voiced that the NDSC had 
deliberately sabotaged the elections. the promulgated election results, 
indicated that ChiefMKO Abiola had won majority of the votes cast in 19 states 
and in 11 states. However spite of domestic and international 
on 23 June, 1993, the NDSC declared the election to be invalid, halted all 
court proceedings pertaining to the election, suspended the and repealed all 
decrees relating to the transition to civilian rule (McCaskie, 1997: 787). 
the of mounting Gen. Babangida announced that the election had been 
""'!:I ...... "''' by corruption and other but that he remained committed 
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to the transition on August handover. ChiefM. 0 Abiola, however, continued to 
claim, with much popular that he had been legitimately elected to the 
presidency. The United Kingdom subsequently announced that it was to 
bilateral links with and imposed a number of military sanctions, while the 
immediately suspended all assistance to the government (McCaskie, 1997: 788). In 
light of domestic and international pressure, Gen. Babangida announced that an interim 
national government was to be established, on the grounds that was insufficient 
time to permit the scheduled .transition to civilian rule on 27th August. On 27th 
August, a 32-member interim federal council, headed by Ernest Shonekan 
was installed. Shonekan was designated as Head of State and commander-in-
chief of the forces, and transitional for return to civilian was 
extcma(~a to 31 March 1994 (Africa South of the Sahara, 1997). 
Following establishment of the Shonekan pledged his commitment to 
the democratic process. However, in October, the SDP demanded that M. 0 
Abiloa inaugurated as president, and refused to participate in the next elections. In 
the same month Shonekan established a to the 
that had resulted the annulment the June presidential elections. But the 
resultant dramatic increase in the of fuel prompted widespread anti-government 
demonstrations, and the NLC announced the resumption of strike action. Meanwhile, 
proposed revision of the electoral register was undermined by the refusal of 
supporter of SDP to participate, and it became clear that new schedule for the 
transition to civilian rule could not be met (Africa South of the Sahara, 1997). The 
failure the ING to effectively deal with the political following the 
annulment of June 12 it almost inevitable for the military to 
intervene in order to 'rescue' the country from total collapse and anarchy. 
The Gen. Sani Abacha Era - 1993-1998. 
Consequently, on 17 November following a meeting with senior military 
officers, Ernest Shonekan announced his 'resignation' as head of and 
immediately transferred power to General Sani Abacha. On the following day Gen. 
Sani Abacha dissolved all organs of state and bodies that had been established under 
the transitional process. replaced stare governors with military administrators, he 
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prohibited political activity and announced the formation of the l:'TCIVISlOnal ",-,,"UI""'" 
Council (McCaskie, 1997). 
Osaghae (1998) has argued that, the projection of the military coup as a voluntary 
relinquishing of power by the defeated regime was a deliberate ploy to make the new 
regime acceptable. An announcement of a coup would in all probability have turned the 
anti-military of civil society the despite growing demands for the 
military to intervene because of the inability of the Interim National Government (ING) 
to deal with worsened national crisis (Osaghae, 1998: 273). 
nU"AU"" from the beginning the .. A""",...... .. faced hostility from the Western powers, 
who \l1P',\UE'·r! the re·,em,emenc:e of the military as a major set back for the democratic 
transition that was on course. At home were mixed reactions. the obvious 
inability of the ING to deal with the deepening political and econ mic crisis and the 
fact that there had been clamours for the military to intervene, was a muted 
welcome for the take-over, but many who welcomed it expected no more than a short-
lived rescue operation. However, there were a few demonstrations against the coup by 
University students in Ibadan, and Lagos, while sixty-seven senators issued a 
statement asking Nigerians to rise up against the military in defence of their rights, In 
spite of this, ordinary people simply adopted an expectant wait-and-see attitude, 
hoping that the new regime would be able to take the country out abyss 
(Osaghae,1998: 274). 
The Abacha is likely to down history as the most despotic g01vermnem in 
Nigeria's post-independence history. The harassment which came from within and 
outside the country and which created intense opposition and hostility towards the 
regime from very beginning little or no room any reflections on, or 
reSIJomSe to, complex problems facing the country. (1998), has 
authoritarian prism which most actions the were 
its underlying though poorly U\.<I'UCl.IL .... U nationalism 
inward-looking which brought it regime of old. The 
nationalist approach to the eCO,nOtIDc 
abrogation of liberalisation policies 
which led, other to the 
1994 and an adamant attitude to Western 
creditors; the country, seemed to, be targeted at the 
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cow' elites; and the involvement of actors of the Buhari regime (including 
Gen.Buhari himself) in strategic of administration were manifestations this 
nationalism and in-ward looking character (Osaghae, 1998: 
The inherited a most fragile economy worse by the riots, strikes and other 
acts of civil disobedience and the resulting state of anarchy, which paralysed the 
country in the aftermath of the annulled 1993 election. The economic indicators for the 
1993/94 showed decline. 1993 real GDP growth rate was 2.6 cent and fell to 
""''''.'''''' 1 per cent in 1994, from in 1991, 4.7 in 1991 and Consumer 
price inflation was officially estimated at 57.2 per cent in 1993 and over 60 per cent in 
1994, up from 44.6 per cent 1992. Unemployment high as retrenchments 
continued in the public private sectors. Although oil prices showed marginal 
recovery, reaching US$16 per barrel in 1994, the oil sector remained in deep crisis 
because of the debts estimated at $800 million owed to the oil companies by the 
NNPC, and the reluctance of the majors to expand their investments. This led to 
drastic fall in exploration activities: only 500 million barrels of new deposits were 
produced 1993, compared to 1.5 billion in 1991, and byl994 only fourteen 
s1X1een locations were compared to the active fourty 
locations in 1991 (Osaghae,1998: 281). 
It important to note at this juncture that the Babangida, Shonekan and Abacha eras 
were characterised by one major policy move within ECOW AS sub-region, 
and that is the ECOMOG intervention Liberia and Sierra General Abacha on 
coming to power pledged his commitment to Nigeria's role the ECOMOG 
peacekeeping force. By mid-1996, the Nigerian contingent deployed in Liberia had 
been reduced to a number of about 6000. However, the Abacha regime and some other 
ECOWAS member states sent additional troops to Liberia to support the conduct of 
elections in July 1997. The elections were successfully held under the supervision of 
ECOMOG~ the ECOMOG force played a crucial in providing the much-needed 
security, in a country where the state security apparatus had collapsed (Africa South 
of the Sahara, 1997). 
Osaghae (1998) advanced view that, the hostility towards the Gen. Abacha 
rAn' ....... '" and its harassment both domestically and accounted for its foreign 
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policy being largely reactive and incoherent. 
mostly on consolidating hold on country and limiting the attempts by the 
international community to isolate it, and foreign policy was made to serve need of 
this struggle survival and consolidation. The survivalist imperative also partly 
explains why the government pursued a policy aimed at diverting attention 
away from the internal and tensions (Osaghae,1998: 307). 
At the West African sub-regional level, ECOWAS remained the major focus, although 
it was less active than it had been preVIOUS This was partly due to the 
franco phone countries that were more involved in the of a parallel economic 
union- the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UMEOA)-formed in January 
following the devaluation of From that time the francophone 
heads states rarely attended the annual summits, and ECOW AS became increasingly 
an Anglophone But even more important was that most countries in 
were greatly troubled by political instability and economic decline, and were 
preoccupied with solving these problems. Nigeria herself was in situation, and 
between 1994 and 1 the head of state was unable to attend ECOWAS summits and 
other crucial However, in July 1996 Abacha became ""<.im",,,.., 
ECOWAS, and Nigeria seemed once to be playing it rightful role the 
organisation (Osaghae,1998: 307). 
In spite the crisis at home, in Nigerian troops were dispatched to Sierra 
Leone, in response to a formal request by the Sierra Leonean government for military 
assistance to repulse attacks by rebels of the Revolutionary United Front (R1JF). 
ECOMOG remained the most important collective undertaking in which Nigeria was 
involved, but intractability the war Liberia led to threats by Ghana, the other 
major participant the peacekeeping mission to pull out Nigeria also considered 
pulling out, but the international acclaim for its involvement, which was a good 
counter-balance to isolation, dissuaded the leaders from such a move. 
ECOWAS summit in Ahuja in July 1996 initiated a new offensive under which 
an interim was formed and the warring factions agreed to disarm and 
elections, as is mentioned above (Osaghae,1998: 307). 
The "'P,rnrTlPI1t also pursued collective development projects, one of which was 
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the gas pipeline jointly funded by Togo and Ghan~ and involving the laying of 
pipes to supply from Nigeria to these other countries. The agr'eelnel1t was ""i'\'.''''''' 
September 1995. However, relation with other countries ... gO""" was affected by 
the government's determination to contain opposition and dissident activities, as well 
as the responses of these countries to its isolation by powers. For example, 
relation with neighbouring Benin under President Soglo was strained by that country's 
support for dissidents in Nigeria, and rumoured agreement to a military 
established there. Relations only improved after Mathew a long-
standing friend of Nigeria was returned to power after defeating the incumbent 
President 1996 elections. There were proposals by prCI-,g4JV(;:rmnel1t 
commentators to "'''''''"''''' assistance to countries like Mali and Sierra Leone which 
voted against Nigeria at major international forums (Osaghae: 309). However, the 
rt:>01lfY1t:> of Gen. Abacha made efforts to secure the support of other West African states 
in its against the Western-led international community, including South 
Africa (especially when it boycotted the 1996 African football Cup of Nations hosted 
by South Africa). this purpose, it relied partly on Article of the 
ECOWAS treaty which provides for the formulation and adoption of 'common policies 
on to negotiations with third order to promote 
and the interests of the (Revised ECOWAS Treaty, 1992). 
Sub-Regional Stance. 
Following the military take-over of power in Sierra '-'v,JUv in March ECOWAS 
leaders expressed their dismay at the action and demanded that the military 
relinquished power to the civilian government of Tejan Kabbah, which it had 
overthrown. However, the new military junta did not heed to the warning against its 
actions and instead went ahead and forged an alliance with the Revolutionary United 
Front (RUF), whose fighting had wrecked havoc on the people of Sierra Leone. 
Kamajor hunter militias who had been fighting the RUF years refused to 
Armed Council (AFRC) and vowed to and return the 
legitimately elected government of President Tejan-Kabbah. However, as this was 
going on in the provinces, the newly constituted AFRCIRUF force was busy carrying 
out a systematic looting of the capital Freetown. Many people were forced to in 
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the face of the and sought refuge in nearby Guinea and Liberia. Freetown was 
looted, bombarded and wrecked. The Ministry of Finance building and the government 
treasury were burnt down on the day of the coup on 25 May 1997, with loss of most 
vital payroll records (New Afiican, 1 11). The world reacted with shock and did 
not mince words in condemning the act of barbarism that was place Sierra 
Leone. The UN reacted by resolution 11 of October 8, 1997, which UUL'V"','" 
an embargo on Sierra Leone with to ammunition and fuel but not to 
humanitarian supplies. the regional level, the ECOW AS leaders were dismayed and 
distanced themselves from the military junta thus making it difficult for the 
junta to establish any ties with the neighbouring states. ECOMOG, the military wing of 
ECOWAS, was invoked by the regional leaders to restore democracy to Sierra -'-''''-'n''. 
by maintaining a tight noose on Freetown in order to monitor UN embargo on the 
junta. 
Under the auspices of ECOWAS a meeting was held in Conakry, between the junta 
and the ousted Tejan-Kabbah At the Conakry talks it was agreed that the 
government of President Tejan-Kabbah be restored by April 22, 1998. But after the 
signing of the agr'eelnellt in October both sides showed themselves mistrustful and 
recriminations were flying thick and fast. Major Johnny Paul Koroma the junta leader 
sounded as he wanted to whole agreement when he delivered an anti-
Nigerian demanding all Nigerians troops leave 
ECOMOG cmmtf:reCl by accusing the junta of being insincere even when they, ..... "" .... 
the Conakry accord and warned of terrible consequences if it remained intlransigent 
their input the RUF who were now Freetown at the invitation of the AFRC, said that 
it would not its leader F oday Sankoh who was 10 
was set Further talks got underway in Freetown mid-November 
attended by General Victor Malu, then commander of ECOMOG forces the 
region. junta hardened position saying that it would disarm its own 
troops because this would mean the disarmament of the national army, something it 
had not agreed to. stake was the disarmament combatants, which should have 
started at the of December. The deployment of ECOMOG troop across 
Sierra Leone was behind schedule. Meanwhile ECOMOG continued to tighten 
sanctions priority to blockading fuel product and arms (New Afiican, 
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1998). 
The Nigerian government increased its troops in to about, 4000 as a way of 
showing determination to reinstate the ousted civilian government. In the face of 
sanctions ordinary Leoneans continued to suffer and to live in a permanent state 
of fear. With ECOMOG troops occupying Jui and Lungi, and gradually tightening the 
noose round capital, the junta was busy conscripting hardened criminals, giving 
only a few days training before arming them 47 rifles (New African, 
1998). This and the retaliatory Nigerian bombing raids led to mass exodus of civilians 
into the countryside and neighbouring Guinea. As the standoff between the 
AFRCIRUF junta and ECOMOG continued, ECOMOG lost its patience at what it 
refers to as persistent violations the Conakry accord and junta provocations and 
attacks on its forces based at Lungi and Jui. On the 11 February 1998 ECOMOG went 
on the and after a few days of which Freetown paralysed the 
Nigerian-led ECOMOG force in chasing the junta forces out of .... "".,.i"I"I,nm 
For several days and after fighting, over 120 lay 
streets with scavenging dogs ... ..., ...... 11"1". on Three commercial 
in the 
were looted by 
retreating junta The telephone exchange and power stations were n",,,'t .. n, 
junta forces that had fanned out into the bush and towns nearby 
regrouped and launched two attempts to retake the city but the Nigerian-led 
ECOMOG force defeated them. As part of the process of its mopping up of city, 
ECOMOG empowered the local police to search and recover all looted property from 
homes, docks and even on the high seas. However, the sudden collapse of the 
junta resistance from Freetown could have been the tactical decision to retreat into the 
countryside ands to the war back into the provinces. This was probably true of the 
RUF for whom this could simply mean getting back to business as usual because, prior 
to the coup, their operations were largely confined to the countryside. If they were 
going to take a stand it will be on their own territory (New African, April 1998). 
In the aftermath of the fighting, ECOMOG drew public and international attention to 
the potentially disastrous humanitarian situation facing the populations in both the 
southern and eastern regions of the country. Food and medical supplies had either been 
exhausted or plundered. the progressive deployment of ECOMOG troops 
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meant that as the junta forces were being pushed from one town to another, they were 
able to regroup and attack towns and villages along their escape routes. One group 
was doing just that in the towns in the North such as and Port Loko. 
But were stilI to fight for, including the diamond district of 
Kono, which has with or without a rebel war a hotbed of competition among the 
political for the diamond 'loot' (New African,1998: 10). 
international community applauded 
government by the Nigeria-led ECOMOG 
restoration of the Tejan Kabbah 
but that applause did not come 
without much controversy over Nigeria' single-handed role in 
role has raised some fundamental questions, which would be 
of the case. 
process. Nigeria's 
the analysis 
Finally, policy within ECOWAS from 1979 to 1997 has been characterised 
by continuity change, mostly approach but not While the 
ShagarilBuhari had taken actions which made Nigeria's to the 
community questionable, the Babangida/Shonekan/ Abacha regimes reinforced 
Nigeria's commitment to the community through their pioneering role the 
Community and moreover in their pivotal position in the operations of ECOMOG. In 
the next the effects of policies on ECOWAS and its operations in light of 
spe:ClIJlC actions taken by different regimes in will be explained. 
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CHAPTER FOUR. 
ANALYSIS OF THE CASE STUDY. 
Introduction: 
Leadership is a vital element any political system and this is particularly crucial when 
a of embark on a process of integration, such as ECOWAS. Fot this 
involves not merely the maintenance of an existing status quo, but a series of creative 
acts for which courage and imagination are required as well as the normal political 
skills of reconciling and resolving conflicts between different sections of the 
community, (Olaniyan, 1986:130). (1973), argues that in a process 
integration, three functions are of particular importance if it is to 
momentum: (a) a function which involves decisions about the 
direction the process is to (b) a tactical function which is concerned with the 
selection of specific within that overall strategy; and (c) a continuous negotiating 
function which is directed at building up the coalition of interests and arriving at 
compromises necessary to maintain a steady inflow of decisions On individual policy 
'''''''AV''. He further that without the successful accomplishment of tasks, 
projected union is likely to fail, it will lack a sense of direction, a clearly aelme:a 
set immediate objectives and a capacity to maintain confidence its ability to fulfil 
the expectations focused on it (Pryce, 1973: 41-42). 
There is no doubt that Nigeria is one of the leading actors in the activities 
ECOWAS. The administration of Gowon, had sensitised the nation to the 
relevance of integration in the region and the continuous role which country 
/ 
must play if arrangement is to survive. Thus, the various successive military 
civilian governments always recognised this fact It was this vain that Chief M.S. 
" .... ,0 ...... ' the Minister of National Planning the Second Republics, remarked in a 
policy statement at the Secretariat on 5 June 1984 that: 
"Nigeria would continue to play an active role in the affairs of ECOW AS because in it 
lies to a great extent our ..,.,.,,,,,lp<: ability to liberate themselves from their economic 
predlailltl(mts and instability" (Nigerian 1984: 6) 
The community is seen as a valuable tool enhancing eCClnO][IllC development 
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in Nigeria as it is wen articulated in the concentric theory Nigeria's foreign 
policy of period under review- (1979-1997), ECOWAS's. Thus, over the years, 
Nigeria has emphasised and assisted in the creation of the structures. Nigeria 
in the building institution as a prerequisite for the establishment a 
meaningful integration arrangement. Its annual contribution constitutes 
the community's budget. This is paid in order to ensure the effective 
operation of the Community's activities. Further financial assistance has also been 
extended to the Secretariat located in Lagos (now relocated to Abuja), in times of 
financial crisis. For in June 1985, Federal settled a sum of 
80,000 outstanding Community's for 
similar the Federal had active support to the formation of 
such regional institutions as the West African Clearing (W ACH) the 
ECOWAS bank which are vital monetary and trade missions in the region (The 
Guardian, 1985: 10). But what remains questionable is the role of Nigeria in the 
tactical function, which to specific steps the adoption of the strategy for 
selecting integrative measures. It is generally argued that the Community had in several 
ms·tan,ces embarked upon 'white elephant' integrative which later presented 
obstacles to its One typical example is the issue of the movement 
of persons within the region (Adisa, 1986: 131). 
This makes it important to focus on the intc~gf<ati"re measures adopted by ECOW AS in 
relation to Nigeria's policy course in the Community. Attention needs to be focused on 
Article sub-sections 1,2 and 3, which deals with the movement of persons vis-
a-vis the 1983 and 1985 expulsions of illegal immigrants from Nigeria and the 
subsequent closure of the country's land borders between 1984-1985. The analysis will 
further on Article which deals with the 'Issue of Landlocked States and 
Island member States' in relation to the prolonged land border closure by Nigeria with 
her immediate neighbours (ECOW AS Revised Treaty, - 41). 
Article sub-section 1,2 and 3 which deals with 'Regional Security' will be brought 
to focus in consonance with Nigeria's pivotal role in Regional Peace-Keeping force 
ECOMOG (ECOWAS Revised Treaty, 1992: 36). An attempt win therefore be made 
at investigating the underlying policy dynamics that precipitated these actions and 
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moreover "'''' ..... ,,u.''' how, or to what extent Nigeria's policy posture has helped to shape 
or reshape the efforts at regional integration in West Africa. and some other 
related issues will addressed presently. Thus, we now tum to the the Free 
Movement of Persons within the Community vis-a.-vis the expulsion of 
immigrants from Nigeria in 1983 and most of who were citizens of ECOWAS 
member states. 
Regional Mobility in ECOW AS and The Nigerian Expulsion Orders Of 1983 and 
1985. 
The Shehu Shagari administration, in late January 1983, expelled about three million 
people-mostly from ECOW AS countries- out of the within two weeks. This 
was continued by Federal Military Government of General Buhari, which came to 
power in a coup d'etat on 31 December, 1983. according to Aluko 
(1985), of Federal of Nigeria announced on 17 January, 1983 by the 
then Minister of Internal Alhaji Ali Baba giving all '''illegal'' immigrants 
amounting to about two to three million, fourteen days to leave This 1"'''''''''1''''(1 
'the worst international crisis for Nigeria since the end of the civil war in January 
1970', This wrought to Nigeria acrimony and sharp disagreement with friendly as well 
as hostile international'actors in some respects worse than the international reactions to 
the Nigerian Civil War (Aluko, 1985). Apart from the international castigation that 
greeted the decision, it is believed to have done some incalculable damage to the 
stability and progress of the ECOWAS. The expulsion order, though not a violation 
the ECOWAS protocol on the movement of persons, was in some quarters 
as 'dampening' the spirit of 'goodwill' within the Community. 
There is no doubt that free movement of labour is fundamental to effective regional 
integration since this could lead to efficient utility of labour and optimum output the 
for this to be realistic, certain conditions •. ,must be fulfilled. 
according to Mihailovic (1976), include adequate information system about 
employment opportunities in the member states and increased social amenities to 
adequately cater for needs emigrants. These are still lacking in most ECOW AS 
member states, more experienced regional integration arrangements in Latin 
America and the Caribbean are silent on the issue of the movement labour ,,,h,,,, .. ,,, 
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this could precipitate political problems because unemployment and economic 
recession in member states. in the where this principle had been accepted, it 
had remained an ideal on paper rather than in practice, as most Member states 
failed to provide the adequate facilities for such movement because of 'national 
.... t .... "''''t" . (Mihailovic, 1976:165-168). 
However, labour mobility in West Africa has a long and varied history. before 
colonialism, West Africa, like the rest of the continent, was the scene of mass 
movements. was trade and intermingling between people of the sub-region. 
Mabogunje (1972) had prior noted that during the pre-colonial period, people "were 
across ethnic and, in process, 
with "respect to the position of such drl~noprC! 
norms were developed 
"hi-....... ,"' ... 1- societies," and various 
institutions were established to cope with their needs and problems (Mbogunje, 1972: 
3-6). Colonialism did not appreciably alter this trend. Rather, it re-created the 
conditions for free movements and stimulated such movements through 
improvements of transportation by rail, road, sea, and air. This practic~ has continued 
up to modern period in the region (Asante, 1986: 150). 
Traditionally, the entry (and exit) of the alien is a jealously guarded nrp'l:!pnlP of the 
state. Under general international law, a state may be under obligation to admit its own 
nationals, but the admission aliens is traditionally the preserve the state. 
Hence, the alien may be refused admission or after admission could be deported 
deported in the of discretion by a though this may be subeject, to limited 
review by the courts. Although bilateral agreements on free movement, such as that 
between Ghana and Togo or exchange of notes between Nigeria and Ivory Coast in 
November 1964 on visa abolition, have from time to time imposed obligations on these 
states in respect of each other's nationals, these obligations been subjected to far 
reaching exceptions and have often been enforced on a bilateral level (Asante, 1986: 
151). 
This traditional picture has been modified by the ECOWAS protocol on 
movement of persons in May 1979 and in 1992 (ECOWAS Doc., N P 
1/5/79 and ECOWAS Revised Treaty, 1992). As far as ECOWAS is concerned, the 
movement of labour is part of the philosophy of founders and it is written into the 
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Lagos Treaty establishing the Community. According to Asante, (1986), the basic 
principle of the Community is that the economic process must not be distorted, and 
goods, capital, and services are to be permitted free movement then it would represent 
a distortion labour is not. The ECOW AS Accord therefore provides for the free 
movement of goods and citizens within the Community. the ECOWAS' 
movement the to accept rnl1m"",n1" and to move freely for 
purpose within the territory of member states, to stay there in order to carry on 
employment and to live during employment. This includes the abolition of visa 
and the right to reside anywhere in the West African sub-region (Asante, 151). 
However, this right to enter, reside, and establish business in any territory is 
to be accomplished in three all taking a minimum transitional period of 15 
from the definitive entry into force protocol. The first stage, which took 
immediate IS of is the right of 
residence, while the third and last is the right of a citizen of one of country to 
establish business in another country (ECOW AS Treaty, 1979). Under the first a 
citizen of the community has the right to visit any member state· than his own for a 
period not exceeding 90 days without visa requirement. He/she shall however, be 
required to valid travel documents. Not withstanding these provisions clearly 
stipulated under Article 3 of protocol, member states of Community "shall 
reserve the right to refuse admission into their territory ... any citizen who comes within 
the category of inadmissible immigrants under laws."(ECOWAS Treaty, 1979). 
However, the provisions of the protocol should not operate to the prejudice of the 
citizens the Community who are already in """ ..... "' .... "" and established in a member 
state, provided they comply with the law in general and in particular the immigration 
laws of the member state (Asante, 1986: 154). 
The ECOW AS protocol on the movement of persons has implications for the 
political, social, economic and cultural spheres of the member states and raises some 
fundamental questions; To what extent have the of West Africa been prepared 
to accept their new role of being their brother's keeper? Have the landlords in West 
Africa been told to start (now) to condition their minds to accepting tenants 
West African countries who may turn up to work or trade? the traders in West 
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Africa aware that they to room for one another irrespective of country of 
origin but certainly in the spirit ofECOWAS? (Asante, 1986: 155). 
Furthermore, James Nti (1980), reiterated that: 
Are there enough job openings for aU those who seek jobs bearing in mind the level of their 
qualifications and skills ... Are their qualifications to in the host country? 
If they are, are such employers prepared to them correctly at the level to which they 
rightly belong or are the employers prone to take advantage of the fact that such job-seekers 
are and are prepared to and any salary in an attempt to body and 
soul together in a place far away from home? (Nti, 1980). 
These are some of the problems that relate to the movement of persons, as 
enshrined in the ECOWAS Treaty. Some of these problems have arouse a deal of 
apprehension m some member states. This is particularly sharp and 
penetrating where a substantial number of ECOW AS have flocked 
in recent of profitable opportunities. According to Asante, 
(1986), the ImplemlentatlOn the first phase of the protocol has generated such an 
apprehension and indignation that it prompted the Nigerian government to expel 
"illegal" immigrants from that country in January 1983 and April 1985, respectively 
(Asante, 1986). 
Under the section of the Protocol currently in force, ECOW AS citizens are not 
allowed to accept employment without (Revised ECOW AS Treaty, 1992). 
evt~nrleu~ss. through various means, the ECOW AS citizens as wen as persons from 
non-ECOW AS countries have taken employment in without the 
papers contrary to the Nigerian Immigration Laws. According to Onwuka 
(1982), a disturbing aspect of this is that, this group is not easy to monitor and thus 
constitutes added problems to the Nigerian Ministry of Internal Affairs. In addition to 
this, the growing bulk of ECOW AS expatriates in the cheap labour market was 
believed to have negative on the cohesive action of the Labour Unions in Nigeria 
because 'guest workers', as they are called in the European Community, are not 
only ready to accept inferior condition of service but are readily available to replac~ 
their Nigerian counterparts (Onwuka, 1982: 199-200). The questions then are; what 
were the domestic conditions that precipitated the expulsion orders? Were the 
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expulsion orders based on rational decision making and if so what are the implications 
of relative 'rationality' between member "foot-A"" 
In utilising Allisonian framework of Rational Model 1 which sees 
international society ... as a multi-state system, a system in which the state is either the 
sole or, at least, the prime actor. Allison (1971) posits that, the behaviour of the state 
is looked at for what are regarded as the 'objective realities of its position in the 
world.' In spite of significant differences in interests and most and 
ordinary laypeople attempt to in foreign affairs as the more or 
purposive acts of unified national governments (Allison, 1971:4-5). This model has 
reduced the complexities associated with the rational decision-making "to a simple 
matter of sellectmg among a set of given alternatives, each of which has a given set of 
consequences: the selects the alternative whose consequences are performed in 
terms of the agent's utility function which ranks set consequences order of 
preference" (Allison, 1971: 5). Therefore the actions of the Nigerian n-"""" .... ", .... " .... t,, 
relation to the issues which forms the subject of this analysis, will be treated as 
alternatives chosen from a set given options, thus applying the Allisoniam Model I 
of rational behaviour in policy choices. For this study we shall focus on the internal 
factors which determined Nigeria's course of action and the consequences of these 
policy moves on ECOW AS. We can now tum to the internal variables that contributed 
to actions, of the governments and on ECOWAS. 
The Internal Dimension. 
-According to Asante (1986), Nigerian public reaction to the large of illegal 
immigrants into their country, as well as to other developments in country may be 
grouped into three main categories. is the 'negative employment effects' the 
ECOWAS protocol that have provoked criticism and disgust among some labour 
organisations, the press, and individuals. For instance, the Gongola branch of the 
National Union of Construction and Civil Engineering Workers, strongly 'condemned 
ECOW AS for having made it possible for contractors in the State to indulge in 
employing 'cheap labour' from ECOWAS and non-ECOWAS neighbouring countries 
'while Nigerians roam about without jobs'. Such indiscriminate recruitment, according 
to the Union, is • a calculated attempt to undermine the Union's organisation' 
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(National Concord, February 1981). 
However, this position was not pervasive in the Nigerian society. For instance, to 
bent on maximising profit, the of this 'exploitable 
labour 'godsent'. Thus, for the unskilled Nigerian worker, who has been 'out-
manoeuvred and undercut,' the ECOW AS citizen is a threat and a rival. Besides, the 
preference for this exploitable group of ECOWAS citizens as as ECOWAS 
expatriate professionals to indigenous Nigerians was believed to have wider 
implications for the Nigerian economy. This is because it is viewed as undermining the 
Nigerian Indigenisation of 1972 and that reserved employment's 
for Nigerians (As ante, 1986: 157). 
One factor that is considered today as a catalyst the expulsions was the um"l"''' ........ ''''rI 
the parts the country which, involved some foreigners. 
The fact that riot in Kano in 1980, in which over 4,177 
civilians were killed as as over 100 policemen and some army personnel lost 
was led by a Camerounian, Mallam Muhammed Marwa, alias 'Maitasine', 
and that 20% of the Muslim fanatics that participated in the riots were aliens from 
neighbouring African (mostly West African) states such as Niger, Chad, Cameroun, 
Mali and Burkina Faso created the widespread impression among many Nigerians that 
it was illegal who were behind the basic threat to the security in their country 
(Aniagholu Report, 1981: 
However, according to Aluko (l990), this is an exaggerated view. This is because even 
the Aniagolu Report into the Kano religious disturbances in December 1980 did not 
place the whole blame on illegal aliens. Indeed, the majority of the people who 
participated in the riots, and similar riots such as Bulunkuntu near Maiduguri, 
and Kaduna in 1982, and in Yola in FebruarylMarch 1984, were Nigerians. This they 
further argued was also true of the armed robbery in Nigeria. It was easy for the 
government to find an easy way out by making scapegoats of the illegal aliens. While it 
was surely the case that some illegal aliens had participated actively in criminal 
activities in Nigeria, it was also true that some of them had contributed positively to 
the socio-economic development of the country (Aluko, 1990: 422). 
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The root cause of the religious riots in the North since 1980 was to found not only 
in religious fanaticism, but also socio-economic frustrations of the people. the 
weekly magazine, West Africa, has put it, 'the religious riots represented the 
breakdown of the traditional values of the society of the old North.... In short, it is a 
crisis of modernisation and added that the religious fanatics are simply the 
lunatic fiinge of a deeper social movement that will take a long time to work itself 
through' (West Africa, 12th March, 1984). Thus whether the illegal aliens were ever 
completely flushed out or not in social upheavals are likely to continue for 
some time some parts of the country (Akindele and Olusanya, 1990). 
Kano religious disturbances of December 1980 shook Nigeria in two main ways. 
the leader of the fanatical Islamic Movement that started the armed conflict 
against the Northern authorities and other Muslims not his doctrine the 
Prophet Muhammed was a fake and that he was true prophet was an alien 
from Cameroun. Apart from him, other illegal aliens neighbouring states were 
involved in the religoius disturbances, as below: . 
• Niger Republic---162 
• Chad Republic---16 
• Cameroun Republic--4 
• Mali Republic---2 
• Burkina (Aluko, 1990: 429). 
Secondly, according to the Aniagolu Report, these illegal aliens supported by over 
6,000 Nigerian Muslim Ianatl(~S subsequently were able to defeat the Nigerian 
police detachmelnt sent to quell the revolt by killing nearly 60 Nigerian pOlllce:OITlCerS 
including some senior officers, while injuring nearly 100 other policeofficers (Aniagolu 
Report, 1981'16-17). Indeed, it was said that if the army had not been brought in to 
suppress the religious revolt with superior arms and ammunition, the 'Maitasine' 
fanatics might have possibly affected the whole country (Aluko, 1983). 
Although the Federal Government was shaken almost to its foundation, the Shehu 
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Shagari government soon recovered from the shock. December 1981, most of 
who participated in the violent religious revolt were pardoned and released by 
the President. Although were subsequent violent conflicts in Borno , 
Kano and Bauchi states in October 1982, those responsible for them were chiefly 
disciples of 'Maitasine'. In view of this the government did not take any 
serious view of the presence of large illegal in Nigeria. For all of the non-
that led or participated in the Kano riots had either killed or deported. 
(AIuko, 1990: 429). 
However, it was the sharp political disagreement and recriminations between 
and Lagos, after the Ghanaian military coup of 31 December, 1981, as well as the 
involvement of some Ghanaians in some crimes that was more crucial for the 
expulsions orders. Aluko (1976) asserted that, it must be remembered that since 
independence March 1957, Nigerian and most Nigerians have 
regarded Ghana as their rival the leadership role in especially until 
1970(Aluko, 1976). Although there was a relaxation, even cordiality in 
between them and especially when the two were under elected governments 
in the case of Ghana from late 1979 until 1981 when President Limann's government 
was overthrown a coup d'etat led by Jerry Rawlings. During this period, 
while official relations them remained friendly, the then NPN Federal 
government portrayed the then Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) as being anti-Ghanaian. 
It was even said that the Limann government had to protest in 1981 to the then UPN 
for killing and harassing Ghanaians in Nigeria (The Sunday Tribune, Ibadan, 13 
February, 1983). 
But with the overthrow of the Hilla Limann regime, the situation was for two 
reasons. The Shehu Shagari government did not like the coup d'etat against the 
Limann regime in Ghana with which it had affinity. Secondly, the Jerry Rawlings 
government a quasi-Soviet of government was anathema to the 
g01vernment but which was viewed with some understanding by the then UPN 
(led by Obafemi Awolowo). Ghanaian-Nigerian relations were so tense that 
President Jerry Rawlings government that the Nigerian government was making 
preparations to invade Ghana in order to restore the deposed Hilla Limann to power. 
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Although this had no basis in fact, it was <>,.. .. ,-..,,,,,, believed in Accra to have substance 
(Aluko, 1990). 
Largely as a result of all this, a number of hostile measures and bitter exchanges took 
between Accra and from January 1981 until the expulsion order January 
1983. Aluko, (1983) argued that, for nearly four months after the Ghana coup of 31 
December, 1981, the federal government suspended of crude oil 
to Ghana in an attempt to destabilise the Jerry Rawlings experiment. Apart from this, 
from March 
and VlCI~-VE~rsa 
December 1982, the nationals of Nigeria and Ghana were harassed 
Indeed, during this period the federal government deported a number 
of Ghanaians. On 10 January, 1982, many Nigerians were harassed, arrested and 
detained in Ghana. These included an officer of the Nigerian Airforce (Aluko, 1983). 
harassment and detention of Nigerians in Ghana 1982. 
While the Nigerian government decided to resume supplying crude oil to Ghana, this 
was to be based strictly on cash rather than on the 180-day credit facility granted to the 
Hilla government. more important were the measures taken to control 
Ghanaians that had been found to be fraudulent and guilty of Among those 
deported from .......... 0 this period were !;nmnnT.n Kodzo Okuzed accused of 
defrauding some state of one million Naira; and the Reverend Victor 
Sackey who admitted that he was sent by the Jerry Rawlings government to spy on 
Nigeria. In November 1982, the Nigerian government deported another fifty-three 
Ghanaians who were without valid documents and jobs. Against all cases, the 
Rawlings government had protested vigorously-stating inter that such acts 
were regarded as unfriendly (Aluko, 1983). 
In the meantime, partly because of all these developments, and the involvement of 
aliens especially' Ghanaians in crimes, most whom had come into Nigeria in 1982, 
fleeing from the Jerry Rawlings government; and partly because of the policies of the 
Jerry Rawlings PNDC government in Ghana itself, the federal government directed 
that the Ministry of Internal the Ministry of External and the ........... ,..,"' ... 
Office of the President should work out a strategy coping with the This 
inter-Ministerial was responsible the deportations 1982. All 
events were met with strictures the (Aluko, 1990: 
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However, on 3 January 1983 violent attempts were made by armed robbers to break 
into the residence of the then President Dr. Alex Ekwueme, and among those 
caught by the police were some Ghanaians with their identity papers. was the 
straw. The federal government immediately authorised the Ministry of I .... ,." ...... '" 
to tackle urgently how to deal with what it called 'the menace the Ghanaians and 
other illegal aliens in Nigeria' (Aluko, 1983). 
6 and January 1983, top officials of the Ministry were ready with their 
recommendation for the Minister. At first it was said that they confined their 
recommendations to the Ghanaians. shortly before submitting their final 
recommendation to Alhaji Ali Baba, the Minister Internal Affairs, they widened it 
to encompass all illegally staying in Nigeria (Aluko, 1990: 437). 
Another contributing factor to the expulsions was the state of the economy. The 
parlous state of the economy contributed to the expulsion order. As a result of the 
combination mismanagement, inefficiency, and unparalleled official corruption, and 
the glut in oil world market, the economy that was relatively buoyant throughout most 
of the slumped by early 1981. Instead of the real growth rate of 7.2% 
envisaged under four-year Plan 1981-1985, there was only a growth 
rate of2% 1981 and, this fell below 1% The balance of payments surplus 
the country that stood at 2,402.6 billion Naira in 198-0 turned to a deficit of 1,500 
million 1982. The foreign reserves of the country that amounted to 5,684.2 million 
Naira in 1980 had fallen to about 780 million Naira at the end of The public debt 
that stood at million Naira in 1980 had to billion Naira in (West 
Africa, November 1982). 
The austerity measures that were introduced in April 1982 had done little to improve 
economy. Inflation in 1982 reached a record level of over 25%. Unemployment 
had reached an alarming proportion nearly 20% the work force. Moreover 
manufacturing and construction companies who could' not easily import raw materials 
and spare parts, because the austerity measures the Shehu Shagari government 
created more unemployment daily. Given factors, then expelling illegal aliens 
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must have 
government and 
an election 
tempting if partly as a measure for failures of the 
as a popular move to create jobs for thousands of Nigerians in 
Ali Baba on 1983 that one reasons for 
the expulsion 
Olusanya, 1990: 
was to create job for (Akindele and 
Two years later in 1985, the expulsion was repeated 
established Federal military government Buhari, 
all illegal were the 10 May, 1985. 
order an immigrants, the 
numbered about 700,000. This second order was issued for much 
in 1983: the immigrants' abuse of ECOWAS protocol on 
the recently 
on 15 April that 
expulsion 
illegal aliens 
same reasons as 
movement of 
persons and second, the involvement of immigrants in fundamental 
reason for the was according to r"O."""nc (1986), economic: a troubled economy 
continued to badly hurt by pnces. a when jobs were 
scarce and goods were there was a tendency to the aliens 
in the midst millions of Nigerians as an unacceptable strain on the country's 
limited resources (Asante, 1986: 158-1 two actions by successive Nigerian 
governments in and 1985, are to have sent the signals to the 
affected entire ECOWAS But of ECOWAS, 
Nigeria had to ........ 'r"",.,r national interests. 
Consequences of the Expulsion Orders on ECOW AS. 
Externally, the consequences of the decision were adverse and nostlle. the larger 
extra-African it provoked spirited and even "''''''''.''~'''~'''~'V'' of the 
Shehu Shagari as irresponsible. It some senous 
incalculable to Nigeria's policy and standing <un''''''R Powers, 
lost her bid to and even in 
become chair 
Conference in 
Lagos, March, 
Although 
World countries. It was reported that 
the Economic Commission to Nicaragua at the Non-aligned 
Delhi early in March 1 because of the quit (The Punch, 
Aboubakar LI''''''''''-'l.JUUL said the 
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quit order was not a of the ECOWAS Protocol on the movement of 
persons, it was surely contrary to the spirit of the protocol. In any case, the Heads of 
States of other West African states thought differently from Diaby-Quattara and hence 
their decision to ask the then chairman of ECOW AS, President Mathieu Kerekou of 
Benin Republic, to visit Lagos to discuss their concern with the leaders. 
President Kerekou did on 16 February 1983. Although the communique issued at the 
end that one-day visit inter alia that both President Mathieu Kerekou and 
Shehu Shagari felt that the expulsion order would not affect ECOW AS, the truth is 
that the next phase of the Protocol due to come into effect in 1984 and which was to 
provide for the freedom of residence of the ECOW AS citizens within the member 
states became harder to implement than ever before (Aluko, 1983). Aluko (1983) has 
further argued 
ECOWAS, while at 
one of the ironies of quit order was the weakening of 
same time strengthening the eCCmOl[lUC community of the 
Francophone West African states called Communaute Economique Afrique 
d'Occidentle- CEAO (Aluko, 1983). 
While it is conceded that technically, Nigeria has not breached any part of the 
ECOW AS Protocol on free movement of persons by its expulsion of illegal 
it would seem, however, that this by the government of Nigeria 
does a blow not only at the ofECOWAS but at the whole concept of 
West African unity which, has the Mid-nineteenth century being the main spring 
behind any effort at establishing a community in the sub-region. Throughout the 
colonial period, no West African was considered an alien by any West African country, 
especially the four former British colonies of the Gambia, Ghana, Nigeria and Sierra 
Leone (Asante, 1986: 159). 
Although admittedly, this concept of West African unity would seem to have been 
modified by the attainment independence by these countries and by the subsequent 
establishment of separate national institutions and currencies, it is still an important 
concept that continues to draw West African countries together. ECOWAS, Asante 
(1986) asserts is therefore, the only all-embracing institutional expression of this old 
concept of to which all stalwart West African nationalists the last r>.,. .. ,i-l""",-___ n-,r.rn 
Africanus Horton of Sierra Leone through Casely Hayford of '-"u< •. u.., to the 
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nationalists like K warne Nkrumah and Nnamdi Azikiwe---have made 
It has been a 'symbol' of West Afiican nationalism and an inspiration to 
pan-West Afiican thought and activity. And although with the formation of ECOW AS, 
this concept has been transformed into practical reality a thing is born, 
it is still a jealously guarded concept that draws West LeU.'"'''''''''''' countries together 
(Asante, 1986: 159-160). 
The West Africa (1983) that, any serious distortion of this concept is 
likely to strike a deep blow at the foundations ECOW AS itself And it is these 
aspirations associated with this age-old concept that the Nigerian quit orders would 
seem to have effectively disturbed. Besides, even technically, taking the ECOWAS 
treaty itself, the Nigerian action is strikingly not in consonance with the "' ....... "" .... 1 
undertaking by the states of ECOW AS to " make every effort to plan and 
direct their policies with a view to creating favourable conditions for the achievement 
of the aims of the community ... "(West 11 18, 1983). 
Furthermore, the April 1985 expulsion order, and the way it was applied ran counter to 
the spirit and ideals of pan-West Afiican solidarity; it was also a flagrant breach of 
Nigeria'S commitments under Article 14, Clause of the December 1984 regional 
security agreement signed in Lagos between Benin, Ghana, Nigeria and Togo, which 
required a member country to protect other members' citizens in its territory (Asante, 
1986: 160). 
The reaction from Ghana, whose nationals were the affected- about one 
miUion- was very caustic. Ghanaian Times described the quit order as an 
'electoral gimmick' by the then NPN-controlled Federal government to divert 
attention from its failures so that it could returned to power later in 
August/September 1983 (West Afiica, January, 1983). The Ghana radio and the 
Ghanaian Times condemned the expulsion order, and said it was a deliberate attempt 
'to create mass hysteria by infiltrating Sudan-trained mercenaries into Ghana to subvert 
the Ghanaian government' (West Africa, January, 1983). The Ghanaian Head of 
Rawlings described the alien's order as a 'calculated plot' against his 
government. (The Observer, London, February 1983). 
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Cautious not to aggravate the underlying tensions and that long 
jeopardised the dream of regional unity, the governments affected by the quit order--
Ghana, Benin, Niger, Chad and Burkina Faso- remained remarkably 
restrained in their official to the expulsions. But the accusations and counter-
accusations over the manner in which the process unfolded consumed the largely 
government-owned media in all the countries of the fuelling animosities and 
highlighting how little progress has been made the quest for regional co~,ooc~ra110n 
(Africa Report, 1985: 10). 
Obed Asamoah Minister explained that: 
"I would be less than frank if I were to say that the expulsions have not had any effect on our 
relations with they had some chilling effect, and 1 think it will be quite 
some time before our relations can back to they were before the exercise" 
Report, 1985). 
However, from the Nigerian government's point of view, the expulsions were justified 
in narrow legalistic terms-an estimated hundreds of thousand of nationals from 
countries were residing Nigeria flagrant and deliberate disregard of 
the ECOW AS protocol on the movement and which at that 
of implementation, limited aliens to only 90-day stays before their 
status. But to the affected, the legal right to expel illegal immigrants was 
not in question- the motivation for doing so, the logistics of the exercise itself, and its 
implications for regional and ultimately continental co-operation were. There was a 
feeling that Nigeria was flexing its muscles in callous disregard of the effects upon its 
weaker neighbours, many of whom were still from the economic consequences 
of Nigeria's land border closures of April 1984 (Africa Report, 10). 
Further, the move arouse a certain amount if indignation, for what country in West 
Africa does not house its share of its neighbour's nationals, particularly when drought 
and famine have spawned a new generation economic refugees? And who would 
deny arbitrary nature of colonial borders, the permeability of West 
...... " ........ ". .. '" and the encouragement given not only ·by colonial administrators, but also by 
independent African governments to the free flow of labour across national 
boundaries? Heir to the crumbling economy left by President Shehu Shagari, 
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Major-General Buhari's Federal Military government was making at scaling 
down the ambitious developments dreams, once inflated by now-dwindling 
oil to a more realistic level. Austerity, however, has understandably been a 
difficult pill for Nigerians to swallow after years of prosperity, for the government's 
efforts have signalled rising unemployment, shortage goods and 
spiralling inflation millions of its (Africa Report, 1985: 10). 
In retrospect, the order issued by the Nigerian government requiring all aliens to 
"'J"., .......... .,"" their residency or deportation was at understandable; 
econonnc had provoked similar expulsions at times in West Africa's 
post history. Invariably, an opportunity to score points at home by acting 
upon heightened xenophobia in light of economic often engendered a powerful 
motivation, and for Nigeria, it was much less so. In an ,nt.>ftn on Lagos Radio in 
Idiagbon, explained that mid-may, the then Nigerian Chief of Maj.-Gen 
while Nigeria was concerned about the plight of the citizens of its neighbours, it could 
not <close it eyes to the serious social and economic constraints imposed by the 
hitherto unrestricted influx of millions of illegal immigrants '. (Africa Report, July-
"",YJ',Y"~, 1985). 
Although the countries affected by the quit order were highly in their 
response the expulsion orders still some hostile response from some West 
African countries. There were hostile reactions from countries like Liberia, Mali, 
Gabon and even Niger. For instance, President Musa Troare of Mali had previously 
agreed to visit Nigeria between 11 and 14 1983. On 8 February, he sent a 
polite saying that on medical advice he was unable to out of his country 
(Aluko, 1983: 439). Likewise, President Omar Bongo of Gabon, scheduled to 
Nigeria on the 18 February, had to trip indefinitely. President Paul Biya 
of Cameroun who was to host the summit me1etmlg of the Chad 
about the middle of February 1983, sent an lU..,i)O)a.J",'" to ......... j">...,"" that that period 
would not after all be convenient (Aluko, 1983). 
Samuel Doe, issued a statement denouncing the quit order, and 
..... i+".r""li $100,000 to the Ghanaian government to cope with the returnees. As earlier 
stated, the expulsion order met with vitriolic attacks from Accra. The quit order soured 
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Ghanaian-Nigerian relations in a way of the early 1960s era Kwame 
Nkrumah and Alhaji Tafawa The government Hissene Habre, which the 
government had assisted in critical ways, condemned the alien law as 'sudden 
and brutal'. government of General Kountche Republic deplored the alien 
law as contrary to the of African unity (West Africa" February 1983). The three 
Presidents of the MRU articulated genuine sentiments when they appealed for an 
PTl'IprOcp1"'iI''iT ECOW AS summit on the subject, even though some of them are not 
without stain (West Africa" January 1 Coming at that particular time, however, 
the move though technically in order, does seem to strike a blow at the spirit of 
ECOWAS, much as Ghana's own border closure last or Sierra LJ .... , ......... 
expulsion of members of the Fullah community in 1982. All 
like have been conditioned by serious economic downturn, suggesting that 
this is not the time for advance regional co-operation. the ECOW AS summit in 
May 1982 Cotonou set up a committee to investigate new orientations for the 
organisation, and also to study how to make it work in practice, and Nigeria was in the 
forefront of those that for ECOW AS to start making real advances. 
Paradoxically, it is precisely at times of economic hardship that group togetherness 
should commend itself more (West January 1983). 
. Internally, the decision provoked hostile reactions though these were hardly noticed 
abroad. The main opposition parties apart from the banned NPN party condemned it. 
The leader of the Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe deplored the quit order, and added tha.t it 
was bound to damage Nigeria's leadership role in Africa as as her commitment to 
African unity. The UPN led Obafemi Awolowo, described the expulsion order 
as 'obnoxious' and 'diversionary tactics' to divert attention from the failures at home. 
The party promised to nullify the law if voted into power at the federal level in the 
general elections oflate 1983 (Aluko, 1990:439). 
Although the Nigerian press were unanimous in their support for the order partly out 
of ignorance, and partly out patriotism, a number articles did appear in many 
Nigerian news papers condemning the expulsion order as playing into the hands of the 
opponents of Africa.n independence in South and right-wing groups in the 
industrial western countries while worsening the plight of the black people in the same 
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white societies of the industrial north. Some commentators similar critical 
views on Nigerian television sets (National Concord, February 1983). 
However, the same nationalistic sentiments which were behind some support 
of their government's quit order were aroused in Ghana by returnees' reports of 
and violence, and Ghanaian government were required to calm the 
inflamed tempers calling for retribution. In a Ghanaian-Nigerian soccer match 
scheduled to take place in Accra shortly the expulsion was postponed in order to 
avoid violent confrontations. The of official recrimination however was , , 
admirable, that some hundreds thousands of Nigerians reside in the countries 
affected by the quit order, and some form of retaliation, or otherwise, would 
not have been surprising (Afiica Report, July-August, 1985). 
Fears such a were aroused when the Burkina Faso government issued a 
directive requesting all Nigerians residing in the country to report to a military camp in 
Ouagadougou on May In anticipation that some of 10,000 nationals were about 
to be shown the door. the Minister for External Ibrahim Gambari declared that 
Nigeria was prepared to any of its citizens who might be obliged to leave any 
other West country. But the 2,000 Nigerians who assembled at the barracks 
were advised by Minister of Administration and Security, Ernest 
Ouedraogo, in style characteristic of the Sankara )Vemnl1enlt, that 'in 
we are revolutionaries and pan-Afiicans. All Afiicans are at home in Burkina 
Nigerians were told that there was no question of reprisals or expUlsions by 
Burkina government, and were instead merely advised to their status if their 
resident permits were not order (Afiica Report, July-August, 1985). 
In most integration schemes the EDUCE, CAC etc., the protocol on the 
movement of persons has proved to be highly sensitive and controversial. The 
ECOWAS protocol is unique in sense that it is more comprehensive and more 
spelled out than similar provisions of EDUCE (Article and (Article· 
14), although the objectives and intentions of these provisions are the same as those of 
ECOW AS. the other hand, the treaty of the defunct Afiican Community 
made no such provision for the free movement of labour or capital within the region. 
somewhat constitutional defect of the treaty proved to damaging to the 
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Community. m 1970 a new labour policy m 
exclusively for its own ..,.u .... ..., .. ." 
(Ravenhill, 1979:238). 
a move 
employment 
20,00 out work 
Similarly, and further afield in Latin America, the general treaty """~'''VH'''U.''''15 CACM 
committed the member states to the free movement of goods and services but not 
of persons. a region characterised by the frequent overthrow governments, it was 
felt that free movement of persons was a political and security and not, like 
trade, a strictly economic matter falling under jurisdiction of the Ministries of 
Economy. spite these considerations, free movement of so 
nr""ClCl1f,cr a controversial issue the 1960s that it led to a crisis resulting in an 
outbreak of war two members of CACM-- Houndras and Salvador--in 
1969 1970: 70-72). 
These selective cases would to significance the ECOW AS 
movement of person's provision. The ECOWAS protocol provided for only a 
fragmentary freedom. For, in the case of the for example, free 
movement persons provision confers rights upon individuals justifiable before the 
national courts, either of their own state or of another member the ECOW AS 
protocol offers no such rights. In circumstances, a Community who is faced 
with a deportation order in an ECOW AS member state has no implied legal to 
any (Asante, 1986: 1 Therefore, as a result this in ECOWAS 
protocol that with free movement of persons, the orders 1983 and 
1985, can not be on legal grounds but also on the of good will. 
With to ECOW AS, Nigeria pointed out that it been acting entirely 
within the ECOW AS rules. Protocol on free movement peoples is one of 
ECOW AS key but it has only been applied so up to its ' the 90-day 
visa free which is blamed Nigeria the although it seems only a 
contributory cause. may also, benefit of statethat it was perhaps 
mistaken to advance the 'free movement' aspect of ECOW AS before 
had been made other sectors, so that in Nigeria this was only aspect 
ECOWAS was popularly known (West January, 1 
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As indicated the protocol on free movement of persons, is to be implemented in 
three stages. With the first stage coming into second stage, which was to 
come into in 1984, to suspended to expulsions. Under the 
protocol, a citizen of one ECOWAS country should, starting from 1984, have an 
automatic of in another ECOW AS country. But the trauma of two 
expUlsions, which in several cases affected persons who had been born in Nigeria or 
have to 1960, was such that only a will be thinking 
this The expulsions may, therefore, have ensured that the 
protocol does not advance into its (West May 1985). 
The expulsions may also have impeded ECOW AS progress in other ways. It is 
important to note that protocol on free movement of persons, has been the most 
achievement of the so and most of the community it 
is the only aspect of ECOW AS that has had any meaning their lives. its 
frustration even before it has root, seems likely to ECOW AS even more 
irrelevant the public perception, at a time when it needs strong public support 
order to overcome lack of political yAH that prevented progress in other areas 
(West May, 1985). 
""""'11.1"'111"1;<, aliens in mass quit order may appear the 
perennial migration of illegal labour and a means 
solution to West Africa's 
gatnmlg domestic political 
eCCmOl!l11C crisis. But 
&nT .... ,..,,,"",, have failed both to 
the shown that 
CltlzeJlS S(~ekmg a better life in their 
neighbours' backyard and to from famine and drought from 
H"''''UllJ'l''. to south search of survival. It is even argued in Report 
(1997) that, no African nation can afford to tum its back on the of 
neighbours therefore, for the tables can easily turned (Africa Report, July-August, 
1985). 
Nigeria's actions in the implementation of phase one of the 
protocol on the persons, was not the only source concern to 
community. Many member states, one or the other adopted policies that were 
in outright disregard the provisions of that phase. However, Nigeria's expulsion 
illegal twice implemented on a massive scale, as well as the long border 
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closure between 1984 and 1985 singled out the country, the erstwhile v .... ,,'''vu of pro-
ECOWAS sentiments, as the main crisis point in the implementation of the 
. movement policy of ECOWAS. a result of Nigeria's it was obvious that 
while it atrophied the basic elements the community residence rights envisaged 
under the first Nigeria's initiative prevented an out come that might have 
signalled the end for the only ECOW AS policy that could lay some claims, even if 
token, to implementation (Abutudu, 1989). 
Moreover, just as no West African government can deny that economy has 
benefited at one time or another from the free migration of labour, neither can it shirk a 
share of the responsibility for the illegal within borders. It was 
of the economic the sub-region that the ECOWAS protocol on the free 
movement of persons and goods was drafted (Africa Report, 1985). Therefore the 
1983 and 1985 Nigerian expulsion orders, though not a brea.ch of the ECOW AS 
are considered to be a contravention of sprit of the 'ECOW AS family" 
which had led to its establishment. two orders derogated from the spirit 
goodwill in the Community and moreover it a lot questions unanswered as to 
Nigeria's commitment to the Community it had pioneered to establish. The second 
phase of the protocol on the free movement of persons which was to allow the right of 
residence any member state community which was supposed come 
into into 1984 v"""' ..... ,'" much more harder to implement than it ever was. 
Nigeria's Land Border Closures -1984-1985: Consequences on ECOWAS. 
The Nigerian military government of Buhari closed borders when it first took 
power on December 31, 1983. Nigeria kept the borders closed until late January 1984, 
as the government wanted 'to prevent wanted persons from sneaking out of the 
country'. The borders were re-opened for a short while. However, borders were 
shut again in late April 1984 to prevent illicit trade and currency smuggling when 
Nigeria declared a surprise change of its banknotes. Since the second closure, the 
borders were only opened temporarily, to allow the transit of emergency supplies 
through Niger to Chad. The Nigerian government maintained that the borders were to 
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be kept closed indefinitely (Africa Report, November-December, 1984). 
Of all the h"" .. ,I'1", .. that the sub-region has experienced since the inception of 
ECOW AS, the Nigerian closure of its land borders to aU neighbours, is 
believed to have had the most serious impact on Firstly of the 
economic might of the country and secondly that was affecting all 
landlocked states in the The drought coupled with the reliance some 
of countries on goods imported worsened their situation, a 
of the prolonged land closures coupled with the and repeated 
expulsions large number of immigrants, most 
ECOW AS member states, Nigeria's cornmlImem to 
question moreover, it was seen as weakening the 
ECOW AS was meant to foster, 
whom were citizens of 
community was put into 
'regional solidarity' that , 
One of ECOW AS, and organisations it, is to the 
restrictions imposed on movement of people across national borders, This objective 
seems particularly relevant in West African sub-region, where borders by 
colonialists for their own convenience were so arbitrary that they literally divided 
pe()PU~S who historically the same, have some attempts the 
to on these historical relationships, Long before ECOW AS was established, 
had been the Ghana-Mali of the Nkrumah which however, could not 
be implemented in practical terms, More recent efforts include the Senegambia 
Confederation (which has already collapsed), and proposed Ghana-Burkina union, 
details which are still to be spelt out. Also to be included is ECOW AS 
whose conception is infinitely more ambitious and certainly more (West 
Africa, May 1985). 
spite what out more prominently in have been 
influences. as the ECOWAS protocol on movement of persons had 
sought to contacts its member such 
contacts between have often impeded by the closures of national borders. 
Since the ECOWAS 
lengths of include 
went into borders that shut for "'''''''"i",o 
Ghana-Togo border from 1982-1983, the Ghana-Ivory 
Coast border, the Liberia-Sierra Leone border Nigeria's land .,., .... ,.."', .. '" with all her 
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(West Africa, May 1985). question arises is why 
Nigerian decide to close its borders in spite of the perceived 
consequences on the neighbouring countries and spirit of ECOW AS at large? 
The weekly Africa ma:gazme has at that, the entire borders 
closure (except the one of April) were motivated political differences, which 
tended to short-lived. The Nigerian April was for economic reasons and 
for more than one The borders were originally closed in April to facilitate 
the Nigerian currency. They however remained closed the 
currency change the to stop smuggling 
goods these countries. Since then, a regional agreement has been 
"' • ..., •• "' ... between Nigeria, Togo, Ghana, would seem that a satisfactory 
am:mg,ement for controlling the borders was still not worked out the 
remained closed indefinitely (West May, 1985). 
The border closure by the Buhari administration serious irritants in Nigeria's 
relation's with countries in sub-region. ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, .. - the legality of measures nor 
the purely national considerations them was 
and commentators. Nonetheless, Gambari (1989) 
questioned by most 
argued that these 
decisions did not promote good-neighbourliness. On the contrary they are believed to 
have undermined the ofECOWAS and Nigeria's leadership pretensions, not only 
the but also on the continent as a (Gambari, 1989: 51). 
Gambari (1989) 
collective wisdom the 
that, it was perhaps a testimony to the 
of the sub-region that Gen. Buhari was 
chairman the Quadripartite and later ECOW AS, precisely to 
encourage Nigeria to her borders and to induce more 
mindedness. It well of course, that countries the multilateral 
organisations in the sub-region could not the isolation of Nigeria. They worked 
hard to coax the Gen. Buhari administration out of nationalist 
POlICU::S, which affected the welfare of the sub-region (Gambari, 52) 
In the midst of severe drought and depressed commodity prices, prolonged 
closure of borders was believed to have weakened the economies 
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am~ctf:a c()untne:s. Niger suffered the most closure. Nearly 500 from the 
sea at closest point, Niger is entirely landlocked, and territory 
and dispersion of its population have always made transportation 
""'+lJ'lJll\," "",rtr""rn""lu difficult. The of the border with meant that all 
.rn .... nrT" must pass through Benin, whose ports and highways were inadequate 
to uansplOIl supplies of food and drought relief then needed by (Afiica 
Report, November-December, 1984). 
uv~ ...... ~ closure also affected 
were normally derived from sales in 
fortune when Nigeria invalidated the 
""V1"lnrt revenues, nearly 80 
Moreover many 
in favour of new 
cent of which 
lost a 
lrr""nl'u Unable to 
enter to exchange the old notes for new ones, watched 
11 .. 11..11 ... ".,"lY as their money became government of Niger implored Nigeria 
to border, but the strength of the CF A the Naira 
prompted extensive cross smuggling, consequently, the then military 
Lagos, were to (Afiica Report, 
November-December, 1984). 
President Kountche 
Nigerian Defence .I.'.L/,j,U,,,.,,,,. 
made strong rep1resentatl()ns, through the 
Dornkat Bali, to the leadership of the 
new in Nigeria on the border issue. The closure of the land border adversely 
economy, depended almost entirely on for supplies of 
petroleum products. of these items were already 
malrntest in Niger. In a sent through Defence minister, 
.. ".'-'''''". Kountche made passionate declaration that: will continue to 
find her proper place in Africa the world as a whole and politically. 
Nigeria down. If you the whole of Africa is " (Gambari, 1989: 52). 
ues011te the appeal by "'''' .......... Kountche of Niger re-c)pernng of the vv .......... 
remained closed and enormous hardship There was a 
of nearly every staple food, including beans, and vinegar. Oil and 
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gasoline, nonnally imported from were in short supply, making it difficult to 
distribute whatever goods can obtained. The border closure caused tensions 
between the neighbours. Nomads from Niger continued to pass through the penneable 
borders, intense resentment among fanners, who felt that the 
Nigeriens were depleting grasslands that were already shrivelled by drought. It was 
even reported that Fulani herdsmen from Niger raided attacked several villages in 
Sokoto State and that at least people were killed (Africa Report, November-
December, 1984). 
Benin Republic, which was also anc~ct(:a by the border most strongly, made 
passionate pleas to authorities to reopen the border as early as 11 January 
1984. The was the visit to Cotonou by Gen Bali, Defence Minister, to explain 
the reasons for the change government in Nigeria and to sketch the external 
relations of the military regime. Recognising Nigeria's concern about illegal activities, 
which dominated bilateral trade and other interactions between his country and 
Nigeria, President Kerekou assured Gen. Bali that Benin's security agencies would 
actively assist in apprehending smugglers and currency traffickers. The host President, 
however, argued that only with the reopening of the border could nonnal activities be 
resumed between Benin and Nigeria, especially in the border areas (Gambari, 1989: 
The closure of the Nigerian border also affected Chad in direct and urgent ways. The 
French were particularly concerned and so were the Americans. President Reagan sent 
Vernon Walters, then roving ambassador, to ...... a.l"'V'" twice with the special mission 
of persuading the new administration to reopen the borders or at least allow urgent 
supplies and relief materials to pass through Nigeria to Chad. Gen. Walters had an 
unenviable reputation as a special envoy, usually sent by the United States to twist the 
arms of recalcitrant foreign governments or to convey unpleasant news. By the time of 
his second visit Nigeria had agreed that the USA could use port facilities in Port 
Harcourt as well as Calabar to convey supplies, petroleum, and 
to Chad. security Nigeria did not 
materials through 
to the US' 
request to allow the use of Lagos as the main port for the off-loading and transit 
materials to Chad and moreover the land borders closed as a matter of 
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principle (Gambari,1989: 52-53). 
Gambari (1989) advances that, one lesson US interventions was that 
U .... ~lV"'~."lU could not prevent a powerful state on which Nigeria had come to be 
economically dependent from achieving its strongly pursued This asserts has 
wider implications the future of our country's foreign policy, especially in dealing 
with the west (Gambari,1989: 53). 
Careful not to ...... "'." .... ,"1') .... Nigeria's sovereign right to close her land border, the Heads 
of States of the neighbouring countries seized every opportunity available to register 
their displeasure. In this vain, the Presidents Eyadema Togo and Benin 
Republic attempts to link the reopening the border with their consent 
to sign Quadripartite Agreement in Lagos. Although impasse that developed on 
that occasion was broken and the Agreements signed by the four heads of state, 
two visiting Presidents remained sour about President point was 
not lost when on Gen. Buhari when he said that the delegates to the next Ministerial 
meeting the Quadripartite Agreements, scheduled 1985 in 'should 
be able to travel by road' (Gambari,1989: 54). 
actions respect of the implementation of phase one of the protocol on the 
free movement of persons was not the only source concern to community. Many 
other member states, in one form or another adopted policies which were in outright 
disregard of the provisions the treaty. However, Nigeria's expulsion illegal aliens 
twice implemented on a massive scale, as well as the long land border closure singled 
out the country, the of pro-ECOWAS sentiments, as the main 
point in the implementation of the movement policy of (Abutudu, 
1989). 
These measures, or in place 1985 the more advanced phase two (Right 
of Residence) was scheduled discussion and adoption sent a shock wave of 
apprehension across West Africa on the future ofECOWAS. initial 
to the elaboration of the of the Residence Phase did nothing to assuage this 
growing diffidence about the Community. In it is believed to have heightened them 
(Abutudu, 1989). It however been that Ghana, the country most affected by 
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Nigeria's mass expulsion aliens was the most positively disposed towards the 
adoption and implementation of Phase Two. Tacit support for to the second 
phase also came from Benin and Togo (West Africa, May, 1985). 
F or security reasons due mainly to their small and sandwich location between 
Nigeria and Ghana. Benin and Togo had initially reservations about the idea 
of movement of persons in general. But by that time closure 
their transit economies from their major in Nigeria, result was a 
shift by these countries from reluctant accommodation to open support for any 
community policies that would ensure that the borders are kept (Owoeye, 1993: 
111). 
Thus, the basis of the crisis free movement ECOW AS was portrayed in 
unambiguous position of the Gen. Buhari Administration that as long as 
economic crisis persisted, illegal aliens would not be tolerated in the country. While 
successor administration of Gen. Babangida kept this in it attempted to distance 
itself from two immediate predecessors' rather short si~hted policies which had 
virtually isolated Nigeria from the West African sub-region, while immobilising 
ECOW AS. This took the form of shifting from employment of stalling and 
active opposition to take off of Phase Two as recommended by the ECOW AS 
bureaucracy, to an initiative the form of new proposals which radically the 
idealistic framework envisaged implementation the community policy 
on residence (Owoeye,1993: 11 
Inter -State Relations and Nigeria's Role ECOMOG. 
One foreign policy issue that has been identified with Nigeria in 1990s is its pivotal role 
ECOMOG's intervention in Liberia and Leone. The decision of the ECOWAS 
to send a peacekeeping force otherwise known as ECOMOG into Liberia late 
August 1990 has generated debate on the role of this organisation in ensuring sub-
regional security. In the wake of foreign military interventions Africa in the 1970s, 
the question of regional security was already a major preoccupation both 
ECOWAS and the exclusively jrancophone regional grouping, CEAO. Thus, within 
framework these separate groupings, member states adopted protocols on Non-
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aggressIOn and on Mutual Assistance on Defence. ECOW AS protocol was 
adopted in April 1978 while that on Mutual Assistance on Defence was adopted in 
May 1978 (Nwokedi, 1992: 1). 
The stage for Nigeria's ,involvement Liberia was set at the 13th of the 
Authority of Heads of States and Governments of ECOW AS which met in Banjul, 
Gambia, from 28-30 May 1990 under the chairmanship Sir Dauda Jawara of the 
Gambia. The Summit took place against background of growing incidence of intra 
and inter-state disputes that imperilled peace and stability in the Particular 
attention was on Liberia was extensive press coverage carnage 
and random killings leading to a large outflow of refugees. This development placed 
severe burden on neighbouring countries. Inevitably, issue was of prime 
consideration especially there were indications that some member states 
were guilty of complicity in the simmering crisis (Adisa, 1993: 137). 
However, the fact that Nigeria both dominates the sub-regional force in terms of 
financial and manpower resources, has created some unease among some ECOW AS 
member states. This regional approach to development and security related is 
now viewed as a option to individual state policies which in most cases 
failed to yield the results. we into the COinplexrttes 
surrounding role in ECOMOG, it is but fitting one to an of 
the changing international political landscape; which is believed to have lend more 
weight to regionalism. 
The African stake in regional military co-operation has increased significantly in the 
aftermath of the Cold War. before then, developed world had always shown a 
marked reluctance to assume responsibility for restoring and imposing in the 
continent. External interventions occurred but without passion, regularity or l'I",n',.",,,, 
of enthusiasm demonstrated in the Middle Asia. Such intrusions in 
the African terrain affect a posture of military adventurism. exact a high domestic 
and international price and more than not, technical and logistical 
difficulties. Extra-African powers (such as the United State, Britain and France) were 
thus hard to persuade that such ventures were worth the cost. Big-power police 
actions took place only in circumstances where there are political, economic or 
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ideological motivations (Adisa,1993: 205). 
The effect of the changing international landscape in the aftermath of 
'perestroika and glasnost' has been to obviate such tendencies. The United OJ .... """, 
which has emerged as dominant power in the wake of Soviet dissipation, is 
indifferent to the African plight in the absence of a communist bogey_ Colonial powers 
such as Britain and France, that traditionally have a history of vested interest, have 
began to downgrade the value of commitment to Africa in favour moves toward 
European integration. The consequence is that African interest and concerns have been 
relegated to the backstage in the new global order (Adisa, 206). 
Ironically, this process margulaHsatlon IS at a time when the African 
pn::m1um on and political stability astronomically. The democratic wave 
that accompanied the 'wind of in Eastern Europe has impacted seriously on 
the continent provoking a of political upheavals in a plagued by 
shaky political social religious, racial cultural tensions, 
corrupt bureaucracies deteriorating economies coupled with 
process of transformation (Hoffinan, 1985). light of the political 
landscape, Adisa (1993) has argued that some measure of collaboration for on 
a regional basis has thus become essential if 
states and people are to be assured. 
survival and well being of the 
The problem is that, while there are strong political, economic, and social rationale for 
establishing alliances, working models are hard to find. Two basic variations compete 
for attention. First are Regional organisations such as the OAU, the Organisation of 
American States (OAS), and Arab Second are sub-regional organisations 
such as the CONTADORA GROUP in the Gulf Co-operation Council 
the Persian Gulf and ECOW AS in West Experience has shown that the 
larger regional organisations are somewhat at a disadvantage in field security 
operations partly the ambitious nature their charters and partly because 
their and diversity create an environment that is hostile to collective decision-
making in such areas (Boyd and Brown, 1986:210-211). 
Management of security related problems is with sub-regional organisations 
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narrower agenda, smaller and geographic proximity or coherence 
which lend them a sharp operational focus. Even so, constraints of political relationship 
among group members, the fragile nature of political institutions, economic and social 
structures as as the nature of political orientation and structure 
enjoined in the common effort attempts to concert at this The instance of 
ECOMOG Liberia Sierra and moreover, Nigeria's dominant role 
provides a critical test case for analysis in this respect while highlighting the numerous 
VVJ,,,,U,., associated with the search for viable models of military 
collaboration in the emerging world order (Adisa, 1993: 207). 
However, one should ask why Nigeria should play role of prime-mover of this 
while some of more immediate neighbours, who as a result 
" ... Jll..,'; ... contiguity are more directly threatened did not contribute as much, and 
some, such as 'd'Ivoire, have largely to the of 
ECOMOGand ",,,y'''''-'U to work the Mediation Committee. Secondly, can oealce-
"'''''''V''''I''> actually act to restore stability or does it only conflict at a certain 
threshold conflict, either or lower, while concrete measures at conflict 
resolution are required to remove the source conflict? (Vogt Ekoko, 1993: 
210). 
It is often argued that when politicians are confronted delicate or strategic 
decision-making, more particularly with international or national issues (like the 
conflict), rational approaches to decision become (Kuye, 
1989: 45). (1973) states due to the pressures a nation face either locally 
or internationally, it might act to move or shape policy to that particular 
further states that opportunities in the international 
strategic -mlU"Klet place' move 
: 33). 
nation to act rest)onlse to problem' (Allison, 
According to Allison, in rational decision-theory a problem is reduced to a simple 
matter selecting among a set of given each of which has a given set 
consequences: agent selects the alternative whose consequences are preferred 
terms of agents utility function which each set of consequences in order of 
preference :29). professional analysts of foreign affairs (as wen as 
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ordinary laypersons) think about problems of foreign and military policy terms of 
largefy implicit conceptual models that have content of 
their thought. Furthermore most analysts explain behaviour of national 
go'vernmlen1ts in terms of one conceptual model, that is the Rational or 
Classical Modell (Allison, 1971: 3-5). 
Therefore for the subject under study analytic approach adopted is Rational 
Actor Modell, which views the actions of a state as a rational and calculated decision. 
Therefore Nigerian State win view Nigeria's policy in ECOMOG as a rational 
decision. However before we tum to the intricacies of the policy implications of 
flagship on ECOWAS, a brief attempt will be made to recap on the 
Nigeria-Liberia relations as is already indicated in 
in ECOWAS. 
The Liberian Crisis. 
overview the country's policy 
Liberia, like Ethiopia had a special status among African countries. Liberia prided 
herself on the fact that the country was never really colonised. Even though slaves 
liberated from the United States were resettled and in spite of the dominant, 
economic and political influence enjoyed by the American Rubber consortium in 
Liberia, the country was never subjected to the direct control the United States 
government. For this reason, Liberia was a founding member of the United Nations, 
and, co-ordinated the activities of the Monrovia Group (the coalition of conservative 
to moderate African states who came together to oppose the spread of communism). 
Liberia also played a leading in influencing the philosophical perspective of the 
OAU (Africa South ofthe Sahara, 1990:213). 
The bilateral relations between independent Nigeria and Liberia, has its foundations in 
the pre-charter negotiations leading to the formation of the OAU. The Nigerian 
government . Abubakar Tafawa-Balewa shared some of the conservative to 
moderate political philosophies of the Monrovia Group. Nigeria, rather than 
join one group, worked towards the reconciliation of positions of the Casablanca 
and Monrovia groups that made the formation of the OAU possible. On a sub-
regional platform, both countries were party to the formation of ECOWAS 1975 
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(Vogt, 1993: 198). 
However, Sergeant Samuel assumption of office in 1980, through a bloody 
military coup, created serious Liberia's relations with neighbours 
.... u ............ to allow him to participate in deliberations of the MRU. In fact, Nigeria 
reacted negatively to the coup in Liberia of 1980, not only because of the fact that 
a relatively junior member of the armed forces staged it but also mainly because the 
scale killings of the old political their families. mentioned earlier on, 
the Nigerian refused to allow Doe to assume Liberia's seat at the 
O..f\U Summit that caused a diplomatic furore as there 
were some questions raised on the right of the host country to take such a unilateral 
decision (New Nigerian, June 1980: 17). 
According to (1993), this diplomatic furore was r"" ... t""'r .... ",rI by the fact that the 
Doe coup appeared to have had tremendous support among Liberians and with more 
progressive governments who saw his action as a movement of the suppressed people 
against neo-colonial domination the Americo-Liberians (1993: 198). However, 
restoration of the soured relations was not· effected until the military itself assumed 
power again in Nigeria in 1984 and even with that, it took a concerted fence mending 
policy the The point in with 
occurred the emergence Ibrahim Babangida as Nigeria's president 
in August new Nigerian leader was to renew ties with the tradition, 
which characterised Nigeria's policy in the 1970s of projecting a leadership 
position in inter-Mrican affairs. Official relations the Nigerian leader and his 
Liberian counterpart developed quickly into a close personal friendship. During an 
official visit to Liberia December 1988, Gen Babangida offered economic assistance 
to this country and gave a cash grant estimated at between 0.6 million and 1 million 
dollars to University of Liberia which appreciation named one of its faculties the 
'Ibrahim Babangida Graduate School ofIntemational Relations. (Nwokedi, 1992: 11). 
Babangida more than any other administration worked to reinforce Samuel Doe 
as a respectable member of African leadership. Samuel Doe was initially perceived 
at home as a progressive whose finally removed the neo-colonial dominance 
the Americo-Liberians who had treated the indigenous African peoples as second class 
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citizens, denying them full participation in the country's political and social life (Vogt, 
1993). 
Vogt (1993) has that, the Liberian situation created a receptive audience for 
consideration of regional initiative to mediate and moderate the crisis for three main 
reasons. First, the allegation that the different factions engaged in the violent tussle for 
power in Liberia were sustained by certain states in the sub-region threatened the 
posture of political solidarity, which the 'ECOWAS family' was seeking to contrive as 
the agent of economic integration. Moreover, if the concept is to be taken 
seriously a show of concern was necessary. Secondly, there was a serious danger that 
·conflict was allowed to assume greater momentum it might assimilated into 
ECOW AS and portends disintegration. Supporters of different factions could interpret 
third, and more importantly, the prospect of ECOWAS mediation provided 
political mandate was sufficiently ambiguous, in different ways. Those in favour of the 
probably saw it as a diplomatic device to edge out Doe and facilitate the 
ascendance of Taylor, while those that supported Doe would be reasonable to suppose 
that it could provide an avenue for national reconciliation that would not harmful to 
their prestige (Vogt, 1993:208). 
It was within this context that the Babangida proposed and 
received support the establishment an ECOW AS Mediation 
Committee, a committee that would be charged with the responsibility of deliberating 
on the increasing wave .of inter and intra state which the was 
ex.,:.entencmg. The Nigerian proposal was influenced by the a ....... .., ........ "' .... 
within the ECOWAS and that of the OAU, for the immediate inter-summit 
discussion and malllaJgernerlt of conflicts in the sub-region. The 
before then, made no provision for the Secretary nor the Chairman for the 
particular year, to initiate action inn mediating conflicts between and among 
member states. The provisions for the convening of Extraordinary Sessions of the 
summit of Heads of States was an unwritten provision the charter of the 
and until that it had never been utilised. (Vogt, 1993: 203-204). 
idea of a standing committee was informed by the need to empower the 
organisation and its secretariat with greater powers of initiative in delving into problem 
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situations without the intricate procedure of convening a meeting of heads of states. 
proposal was instigated by the fast deteriorating security situation Liberia. 
While thousands of people were being killed by the various factions, international 
community did not even discuss Liberia. The gulf war was relevance. Thus it 
became obvious that 'only could save situation (Vogt, 1 
However, the ECOMOG intervention in Liberia though considered by the countries 
concerned as an African initiative to save an African situation did not fail to generate 
controversy and debate. have many debates as to whether or not there is a 
moral and a legal justification for the ECOWAS to intervene in the Liberian civil war. 
arguments of those who condemn such an intervention can be summarised in three 
points. First, the Liberian is an internal affair and any intervention is a 
contravention of the provisions of the Charter (Article 111-2) of OAU which 
forbids inte:rtelrenc~e the internal affairs member states. Second, ECOW AS is an 
economic grouping whose Treaty and present structure have not made a provision for 
such an intervention. Third, by intervening in the Liberian civil war the member states 
of the ECOWAS the impression of pursuing  'holier-than-thou policy 
many of these states have Liberian skeletons in their political cupboards (Nwokedi, 
1992:5). 
The ECOMOG venture became more complicated by Nigeria's flagship That 
piloting role implies heavy financial and political stakes. timing is also crucial. 
Events were taking shape within the context of a changing international landscape and 
at a critical juncture in the country's political history when was in the throes of 
a hazard ridden transition process to civil democracy. Again, the political UU'<CUi was 
sponsored when the moral credibility of the Babangida administration had reached very 
low ebb. Accordingly, the issue of motive was combined with the cost to produce an 
explosive political package of disquiet which is reinforced at the by intra-
community differences within the ECOW AS family arising from francophone 
scepticism about the purpose of the (Adisa, 1993: 138). 
From the beginnings, the decision to introduce ECOMOG into the theatre 
conflict was dogged by controversy. first sign of 'things to come' was that the two 
francophone members of the Mediation Committee who were party to the decision to 
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deploy ECOMOG, i.e. and Mali, balked at the prospect contributing troops. 
Mali had taken the decision at the onset. on the other hand, initially pledged a 
contribution and then retracted on the grounds that a """""'."'''''-UI 
Since Togo knew from the discussions that preceded 
that the decision was not a of exhaustion of all the 
be assumed that this was a pretext. (Adisa, 1993). 
must first put in 
pelicemalanlg mission 
parties, it can 
What then could have accounted for Togo's withdrawal? Some diplomatic sources 
attribute it to its aversion for Ghana a country which Togo had a long-standing border 
problem. it should be that both had amicably 
together on the Committee that took decision. Moreover, Nigeria and not Ghana 
was the pilot the project and it was inconceivable that deployment would 
somehow give Ghana an edge in its border row with (Adisa, 1993: 139). 
The history political relationship between and Nigeria would normally 
factor consideration in President Eyadema of Togo has a history of 
close personal relationship with Nigerian leaders- with Gen. Gowon the formation 
ECOWAS, and with Obasanjo and Babangida. There was also the 'father 
Christmas' mentality of diplomacy under Babangida to take into account. The 
regime had a legendary reputation for 'donations', which regional politics 
translated into of various sorts. Gen. Babangida had also it a 
duty to develop personal rapport with other leaders in the sub-region, a propensity that 
paid in support for ECOMOG among members of the Mediation 
Committee. This was case of President Momoh of Sierra who was 
Gen. Babangida's course mate at Nigerian Defence in Kaduna. It 
certainly influenced the regime Rawlings in Ghana that remained steadfast 
support of the, ECOMOG initiative. There was also the common factor that the four of 
the five Mediation Committee had military and could thus contrive 
military camaraderie as an instrument of common understanding. Confidential, 
May 1991). 
""""'A",,3r that left civilian Sir Dauda Jawara. Jawara belonged to the immediate 
school of post-independence governors. He was appalled by the carnage in Liberia and 
receptive to 'humanitarian' proposals for ending the anguish. The fact that led 
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the initiative was an added bonus. Nigeria-Gambia relations have always been cordiaL 
Nigeria has constantly sent judges on secondment to bolster Gambian judiciary 
while there is a history of military assistance. In any would be well 
aware that Nigerian diplomacy was very active in the ECOMOG bid and this meant 
that, usual style, military-leadership would provide the 'olive of economic 
if and when required to 'soothe itching hands'. Hence, President Eyadema 
resisted such blandishments, the only to be drawn is that a much 
greater loyalty was at stake and this could only be La Franco-Phonie inspired by 
pressure from Houphouet Boigny of Cote D'Ivoire. (Owoeye, 1993: 140). 
In of the controversy over the the first 
session of the ECOWAS Heads of states was convened in Bamako, November 
1990. The aim the session was to consider the report of the Mediation Committee 
and this meeting endorsed the Plan for Liberia, including the 
provision of arrangement for ECOMOG. However, it was clear that the deployment of 
ECOMOG had generated a great deal dissension among the Heads State of 
ECOWAS. and Ekoko (1993) have the issues of contention into two 
question of procedure; and 
.. The questions of principles. 
Issues of Procedure. 
Some member states, whose views were strongly explained and represented by 
"'-' ............. .., .. '" of Burkina Faso argued that the Mediation Committee went beyond its 
mandate and deploying ECOMOG without initial reference back to the 
.,lunrn,,"t of the entire ECOWAS. In light of such discrepancies some commentators 
interpreted the ECOMOG intervention as an attempt to impose a Nigerian solution- a 
pax-Nigeriana- on the Liberian crisis (Agboli, 1990: 28-29). 
Burkina Faso, and Mali, considered that the establishment of 
ECOMOG and its dispatch to Liberia were at variance with the mandate which the 
ECOWAS had given the ESMC. Burkina Faso in particular expressed a strong 
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r 
disapproval over the dispatch of an peacekeeping force to Liberia "without 
fully briefing other countries on the exact assignment of such a force" (National 
Concord, 1990: 29). 
It is significant to observe that all countries that raised objection to the ECOMOG 
venture were French speaking. Of the countries that initially sent contingents to 
the ECOMOG- Nigeria, Ghana, the Gambia, Leone and Guinea- only Guinea 
was French speaking. strong impression was therefore created of an Anglophone-
Francophone dichotomy within ECOWAS with regard to the search for a solution to 
the Liberian (Nwokedi, 
In spite of the fact that Cote d'Ivoire was a party to the decision to set up a Mediation 
Committee it however did not become a member itself Togo's withdrawal from 
ECOMOG and the subsequent den~nciation of Blaise Campaore of Burkina Faso, 
Boigny's protege, represented an open acknowledgement by the Ivorian leader that he 
had been dislocated by Nigeria's military leadership in the politics of regional 
diplomacy and must take desperate measures to regain the initiative. To locate the 
crucial point in conflict, it is necessary to recall in specific terms the language of 
Babangida's appeal for the inauguration ofa Mediation Committee; 
'Permit me at this juncture to remind us all of the basic principle which formed the 
foundation stone of our organisation. The noble ideals of the ECOW AS were anchored on 
solidarity, unity, mutual trust and neiighbourLine:ss... these attributes on us an 
obligation to adopt a conciliatory situations ... we can ill afford at this time to dissipate vital 
energy on inter-state squabbles ... " (Journal ofECOWAS voL 1990: 24). 
Thus Babangida seemed to be asking for a political truce at the community level and 
this request had three possible connotations. First, it called for a symbolic show of 
collective concern without concomitant practical obligations. The leaders of 
Faso Cote d'Ivoire were quite willing to Gen. Babangida's ... VIJ'''' .... 
Second,. appeared as a diplomatic including a tacit the 
ultimate not be taken to this vain it argued 
that the implicit was that it was that Doe could not hold out 
much his 'godfather' was prepared to help ease him out the mstrulmel!1t 
of Mediation Committee provided he could obtain certain guarantees. This 
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consideration weakness also embodied an unspoken threat. That if the total 
humiliation of Samuel Doe and his father' became the primary insistence, the 
conflict runs the risk being assimilated into ECOW AS with a potential for 
political convulsion (Adisa, 1993: 141). 
Houphuet Boigny and Compraore were to concede to Gen. Babangida's 
proposals because the idea had own attractions. Charles Taylor was having 
problems taking over the Executive Mansion in Monrovia, Classical insurgency has 
three main the defensive which an insurgent movement chips away 
at the superior military strength a standing hit run tactics, the 
stale-mate in which a certain amount of parity IS established and set 
conventional battles SU1)pllement and run operations the strategic offensive, 
at which stage the insurgent movement has attained conventional superiority and 
in 'for the kill' (Bateman, 1970), So when Charles Taylor's forces decided to at 
Monrovia the inference was that strategic offensive level and his 
the Executive Mansion inspired "' ..... v ... ,'" doubt about his leadership 
had reached 
inability to 
capabilities. Moreover the stalemate in the persisting confrontation within Monrovia 
"'V<'l''t~'n a high toll casualties and devastation and offended international sensibilities 
while providing an excuse external intervention on basis of military 
Gen, Babangida's idea was therefore received as a way of overcoming 
the (West Africa, March, 1991). 
any case the leaders of D'Ivoire and Burkina had ample political and 
historical justifications for conceding the mediation initiative even it fell short of the 
objective. The scheme would cleanse the regional conscience. The idea mediation 
was sufficiently noble in political terms while entailing or no practical risks. 
Furthermore, previous records of mediation efforts had been unproductive and there 
was enough historical basis for the assumption that the new effort would also be 
stillborn. This sense of appreciation is to explain the receptive mood that was 
given to the Nigerian proposal (Adisa, 1993: 141). 
It is necessary at this juncture to note that focal point of Gen. Babangjda's appeal 
was anchored on the need to ..... "' .• u~<u .... harmonious relationship among member states. 
spite such appeals and reassurances of Nigeria's nq--adventurous stance, Cote 
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d'Ivoire and her were still suspicious Nigeria's intentions. However the 
political support which the NPFL received from Libya, Burkina Faso and Cote d' 
Ivoire did not help the regional political squabbles. Apart from the danger of escalation 
which external intervention represents in a civil war situation, the Libyan and Ivorian 
intervention in the Liberian was bound to draw reaction a number 
of reasons. First, the overall of Libya's policy as evidenced by 
military occupation of Chad between 1980 and 1 1 created security 
problems for Nigeria's regional policy. Second, Nigerian leaders remember President 
Houphouet-Boigny's pro-Biafra policy in Nigerian civil war (1967-1970) which 
principal objective was the break-up the Nigeria federation. He considered 
too for comfort of its mainly"" ........ "'. neighbouring francophonie states. The 
Ivorian support in many ways its past pro-Biafra policy. Third, the nature of 
Charles Taylor's uprising has unsettling for most political leaders the 
region. Finally, Nigeria '"'v •• i3 .......... as a leader in inter-African politics and so 
intervention in Liberia could be seen hypothetically, as an expression of its desire to 
play a prominent role in the resolution of conflicts within the continent (Nwokedi, 
1 8). 
in spite of appeal, Houphuet-Boigny of Ivory Coast was 
OD1Dm;ea to ECOMOG venture for main reasons. was that he deeply 
rescent(~a the Samuel Doe Liberia and wanted to see it humiliated. 
was personal the Ivorian Head State has been supporting anti-Doe forces 
largely out of a deep grudge against the appalling Samuel Doe. For Samuel Doe in the 
early days· his regime, had murdered AB. Tolbert, son of the former President and 
son-in-law of Houphuet-Boigny. Samuel had promised Houphuet-Boigny that 
AB. Tolbert who had dragged from the sanctuary the French embassy 
Monrovia would be spared. Houphuet-Boigny never forgave this perfidy. used 
another of his son-in-law, Blaise Compraore Burkina Faso, as a for the 1989 
invasion of Liberia, allowing supplies to reinforce Taylor's men through 
d'Ivoire (Africa Confidential, May 1991: 3). 
It is further argued that Boigny's sense of personal outrage was compounded by the 
problem of ego control in the wake of the ECOMOG deployment. Boigny indulged in 
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if over-played sage 'Afrique (Africa's wise old man). As far 
back as the 1950's he had been a Minister in French Assembly and this translated 
into latent respect the French 'motherland' particularly the and the Ministry 
of Co-operation where his voice carried an 'authoritative ring'. Accordingly, 
Ivorian leader was piqued by the diplomatic antics of the Nigerian leadership. In 
particular, he could not tolerate the idea of 'military upstarts' dictating the of 
events in the sub-region without approval (Adisa, 1993:144-145). 
Third, was what Leopold Sedar Senghor had characterised as 'spirit of Fashoda', _ 
the colonial hangover of Francophone - Anglophone Inlimnloelrstllmomg. Precisely this 
cultural antipathy had motivated the decision to come in ECOW AS but the 
cleavage remained. Boigny was COlrlCe:rn«~a about Anglophone machinations. 
concern had two aspirations. To with, it implied concern about strength of 
Ivorian influence. Boigny's influence with France and his country's relative wealth vis-
a-vis neighbours assured Cote d'Ivoire a pre-eminent status in Francophone 
Africa. threat to this status came from Anglophone West Africa especially 
and right from its inception in 1975 Boigny saw ECOWAS as vehicle for the 
mobilisation of Nigeria's influence and tried to derail the idea. it was clear that 
ECOW AS would be a reality, Boigny sponsored a Francophone organisation- CEAO-
with a military as a counter weight. ECOMOG thus appeared as a 
signpost of Nigeria's moral ascendancy and Anglophone triumph (Africa Confidential, 
February 1991). 
The composition 
d'Ivoire's attitude in itself 
lent weight to this assumption and this context, 
the momentum for the self-fulfilling prophecy. Only 
Guinea, a Franchophone state with a legendary reputation for in La 
Francophonie in the era of Sekou and which had a defence agr'eelnelrlt with 
Sierra Leone, contributed forces to the ECOMOG military contingent. Otherwise the 
bulk of the came from Anglophone states-Nigeria, Ghana, Gambia and Sierra 
Leone. However, the discomfiture of the Ivorian leader was increased by sense of 
bravado that to underline resort to active military diplomacy. As one 
astute observer enthused: 
" the involvement of the anned forces in Liberia "'U~U'&"" the military balance 
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of power in West Africa and even further The Nigerian military have 
demonstrated clearly that it has confidence in its ability to influence events 
outside Nigeria's borders. Given Nigerian aspirations to regional power, this is of some 
slgrl111c:ancc>< (Africa Confidential, Febrnruy 1991) 
significance for Cote d'Ivoire was that it implied a militant revival of the posture 
of Pax-Nigeriana (the drive to impose a Nigerian peace on Africa) the mid 
seventies with critical implication for the character of the Ivorian influence (Adisa, 
1993: 145). 
The situation was all more compounded by the ........ uu, ..... nature of the politics 
Both Burkina Faso and Cootie d'Ivoire took strong exception to 
ECOMOG as LJO'''''''''' Compaore of Burkina Faso definitely notes; " ... as far we are 
concerned the mediation committee of ECOW AS is not competent to intervene in a 
member's internal conflict, but when there is a conflict between one member-state and 
another, as stipulated in the last ECOWAS summit communique" (African Concord, 
August 1990:3). However it has been argued that Blaise Compaore's assertion is not 
altogether defensible in the light of the 'Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance on 
ueren.ce' of May 1981. Although conceptually a distinction is made between external 
aggression and internal insurrection in the protocol, is also a - provision for 
specific situations warranting action; conflict 
which is engineered and supported actively outside and which is likely to threaten 
the peace and security of the community (Bassey, 1993: 159). 
Torn Imobighe (1985) rightly noted that; 
'Since it is often too easy for rulers to attribute their predicament to outside 
mal;nUIaUIJrus, this provision is likely to involve the ECOW AS in defence commitment of 
unknown dimension since it is too easy for a to cite external 
involvement as a reason for ECOW AS action even popular internal revolution. 
The implication of this provision is that ECOWAS might be so bogged down with 
queUing internal revolutions as to have little or no time to prepare for, and deal with 
external threats and 19). 
reason for embattled Doe's initial warm acceptance of 
ECOMOG was "".,., .. '''', in line with thisobjeciive. In thisre!W:d his later rejection of the 
~ '.' " . 
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ECOW AS initiative (concerning an interim government) and refusal to step down did 
not so much represent a 'change of mind' as it was a 'celebration of the success of 
Doe brand of politick: protracting the of presidency behind a cordon 
sanitre of an intervention force locked supremacy ... 5" ...... " 
Charles The about turn by Samuel as one commentator 'threw 
spanners in the works ECOMOG. It and concern rebel 
and their backers that ECOMOG after all, might be sympathetic to Samuel 
(Newswatch, August 1990: 17). 
Bassey (1993) has argued that, in a conflict situation like Liberia, where there is little 
consensus among the parties to the conflict on the very establishment of the force, and 
subsequently on the nature of its activities, it is arguable whether the force is to restore 
a minimum condition for peace it would have to enforce its mandate. As was alter the 
case, such a move would however, threaten to the force inextricably involved in the 
political imbroglio- a situation the force commander Gen. Arnold Quainoo was most 
anxious to avoid. As he asserted on arrive Monrovia, 'in performing its functions, 
the force will act with complete impartiality and avoid actions which could 
prejudice the rights, claims and positions of the parties concerned... our duty is 
mediatory. We will act in interest peace and unity and not otherwise'(Bassey, 
1993: 163-164). What this means in practice is that the ECOWAS force was given a 
peace-enforcing task while at the same time armed with 'peace-keeping' 
As was initially the case in the Congo and Chad, the in Liberia was thrown into 
the crippling dilemma of threading its way between the subsequent mandate for peace 
enforcement and one of the most fundamental guiding principles for peace-keeping- a 
firm commitment not to be ' party to or in any intervene in or be used to influence 
the outcome of any internal conflict, constitutional or otherwise' (Security Council 
Resolution of August 1960). Having reached a stalemate the battlefield, 
'Authority of Heads of State and Govc:;lrnment' ofECOWAS got involved in a 
resolution of the conflict through political rather than military option (the 
Yamoussoukro Round), a course fraught with frustration as ECOMOG seeks a 
consensus that would 'tie slippery (Bassey, 
1993:164). 
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From a comparative standpoint, it is a historically invariant that the 'preventive 
diplomacy' approach may contain inter-state confrontation given the central 
authoritative direction which imposes some degree of restraint on both parties, to 
avoid ugly the case has been different in a condition of a civil disorder. It is 
possible to envisage the impartial application of procedures on both when state 
actors are involved. However, in a domestic context, the mandate stipulates the 
need for restoring authority to central government, such impartiality clause seems to in 
appropriate (Bassey, 1993: 164). 
ECOMOG and Domestic Opinion 
The anti-Nigerian reflex ofHouphuet-Boigny was given succour by domestic disquiet 
within Nigeria itself about the wisdom and morality of the ECOMOG enterprise. A 
significant section of the Nigerian populace was apprehensive about the purposes of 
the for various reasons. 
To begin with, it marked a radical departure the country's traditional defence 
posture. Since 1975, successive Nigerian governments have constantly alleged that 
Africa is the cornerstone of the country's policy and in the favourable 
economic climate of the oil boom in this perception was given 
............ ...,.. by some measure of forceful diplomacy the continental 
apartheid and minority rul  in However, strain of bellicosity 
in the language and conduct of diplomacy was reserved for the so-caned 'Western 
imperialist nations who were working against African interest'. Thus 
towards its brothers, especially neighbours the sub-region, has 
always circumspect and at times, wilfully differential. Defence policy took cue 
a political tradition which had established even """"1",(,\"'",, maepc;:na.en,~e 
Prime Minister Tafawa-Balewa declared 'that visible ct1""'nmrh Nigeria will be a 
stabillisinl~ influence in this part world'. The consequence this is a cautious 
defensive orientation, which implies that rarely gambles military card in the 
international arena (Adisa, 1993: 146). 
rt../<"UU'''' this institution of ECOMOG and role 
be(~anle the object of public scrutiny. Opposition to ECOMOG 
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within was inspired by serious considerations. There was a suspicion that the 
objective of the Babangida administration was lees than altruistic (The Guardian, June 
1990 and African Guardian, October 1990). Prior to the second coming of the military 
in 1984, had a sour relationship with since Shehu Shagari 
administration to allow him to take seat at OAU in .LA"I"''''''" 
in 1980. when the Babangida took over 1985, Samuel Doe 
set out to personally cultivate Nigerian leader conscious of the country's 
political importance the region. Gen. Babangida responded warmly to Samuel Doe's 
overtures and .LA"/","',," helped to finance and staff a graduate school of international 
relations named after the Nigerian president in Monrovia and Samuel Doe enrolled in 
the school as a student. (Vogt, 1992: 222). 
There was therefore a suspicion that, its lofty declarations about military 
humanitarianism notwithstanding, the objective of the Gen. Babangirla administration 
facilitating ECOMOG was to save his personal friend Samuel Doe. The situation 
was given further fillip the aft·ermath of the Orkar coup in Nigeria in April 1990. 
Samuel Doe visited Nigeria ostensibly to show solidarity to his benefactor after the 
abortive coup but local newspapers reported that the solidarity gesture was a cover. 
Charles Taylor'S rebellion had assumed serious momentum Liberia and it was 
alleged that Samuel Doe had come to ask for military assistance and Gen. Babangida 
obliged (Adisa, 1993:146). Accordingly, in the wake ECOMOG, political and 
intellectual elites argued that the Nigerian Im1tlatlVe to intervene in Liberia was a 
function self-interest-the desire to protect Samuel Doe (Vogt,1993: 222). 
Furthermore, critical public focus on this score was reinforced by the delay in the 
Nigerian ot"",,,,,nn ..... ,,, ... t decision to evacuate Nigerians trapped by the civil war in 
Liberia. Media and diplomatic circles constantly the government to evacuate its 
citizens the socio-political situation was deteriorating and the Americans, British 
and· other Europeans started to evacuate their own nationals (Owoeye, 1993: 146). 
President Babangida resisted the pressure by insisting that it would look like a panic 
reaction; "Liberians" he noted « are our brothers and Nigerians over there lived 
together with them and see themselves as part of the society. I don't think it is for 
government to create distinctions between fellow Africans over a .... t'aWlvu exercise" 
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(African Concord, October 1990). However, this was a Pan-African gesture that failed 
to convince several listeners who interpreted it as meaning that the administration was 
willing to sacrifice Nigerians to assure prestige and seeming inability to control 
the (Vogt, 1992:223). 
Moreover, later on, when ECOMOG was deployed and began to stress 
humanitarian considerations and the need to protect their nationals, critics derided the 
situation as hypocritical and the mandate as overstrecthed. In this vein the eminent 
Nigerianjurist, Alcinola Aguda, told members of the Ghana Association that: 
"even if the states whose nationals entrapped in Liberia were justified in attacking and 
invading Liberia, such justification can hardly apply for the of the Five ECOW AS 
countries who in will be colonising and dec;olonising it in twelve months" (African 
Concord, July 1991). 
However, others were more concerned with " bread and butter" implications. The 
10<>, .... 0 ... Tribune of 15 1990 touched a sensitive nerve in this respect: 
'Aside from the logistic and other problems, which ECOMOG would face is the 
fundamental issue of the funding of the military operation. ECOW AS members, who are also 
members of the are notorious defaulters in the payment of their c:"h""ri,nti,,,". to the two 
bodies. Most of these countries do not believe in honouring to the 1 Cl'.;lUUID 
and continental organisations whose charters they had subscribed to'. (Nigerian Tribune, 
rU""CUln 1990). 
anchor this point Tribune reminded Nigerians of the lesson of history in the ill-
. fated OAU Peacekeeping operation in Chad in the 1980s: 
l'\jlgl~na under President Shehu sent it soldiers to Chad under the auspicces of the 
OAU on a peacekeeping mission with troops fTom the and Zaire. At 
the end. the OAU did not pay and Nigeria had to write off 80 million US dollars. On top of 
that, the Chad was a shamble. The economy has pretty out of shape since then 
and is now in no position to up unsettled ECOMOG bills. We do that 
Nigeria has interests in the West African and in sulrSaharan Africa and 
it does cost money to execute a role inn this wise. In all there is nothing 
for ECOMOG to save in Uberia ... ECOMOG should rescue the nationals of West Africa still 
in Liberia and out and let Mr. Doe it out to the end. Then talks can to 
rebuild Liberia' Var.!{1UI'1rtl. ruu~u~t 1990). 
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• 
The Labour movement supported this position. In a press of 20 August 1990, 
the Nigerian Labour Congress denounced Nigeria's role in ECOMOG on the basis that 
it is a waste of economic and military resources and further emphasised that, Nigeria's 
involvement in the Mediation will no doubt place enormous economic and political 
responsibilities on the country at a time when hands should be on deck t~ help turn the 
crisis-ridden economy healthy growth. With a in its cheek' the 
statement concluded that instead of ECOMOG, West African leaders should put 
pressure on President Doe to resign (Adisa, 1993: 147). 
Some critics based their argument on the feasibility of the project in terms of strategy; 
they argued that the project was open to question. of the problem they advanced 
has to do with the of the mission. The enterprise was billed as a 
peacekeeping mission but since the warring parties were not exhausted, the claim that 
ECOMOG was sent to enforce a cease-fire was unsubstantial. There was no cease-fire 
to enforce. ECOMOG it selfhad to create a cease-fire. The mission requirement meant 
that at the point of entry, ECOMOG could only intrude as an expeditionary force to 
constrain hostilities by restraining the NPFL from seeking absolute power by force 
arms. Thereafter ECOMOG would embark on the task of peace enforcement as a 
prelude to putting in place a complex peace-building operation involving supervised 
elections and perhaps, national reconstruction and administration a Cambodia. This 
was heightened President Doe was abducted a gunfight on ECOMOG 
by Prince Johnsons' troops subsequently and executed. 
ECOMOG lost some moral credibility and there were worries on the Nigerian 
domestic front that the military adventure could turn out to be Nigeria's Vietnam 
(Adisa, 1993: 148). 
Furthermore, the travails of the domestic economy and consequent deterioration of 
general living standards complicated the policy posture of the Babangida 
administration this respect. The country was in the throes of economic 
depression in the wake off:he gmlenlmt:~nts Structural Adjustment Programmed (SAP) 
designed in response to requirement of foreign creditors. The programme that was 
in its fifth year by 1990 included a package of economic deregulation, which led to 
constant devaluation of the Naira, a tendency that fuelled inflation and eroded workers 
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purchasing power. Welfare conditions worsened as real income depreciated inspiring 
widespread social discontent (Vogt, 1992:223-224). 
With deteriorating economic conditions, which was triggered by the plummeting of 
the real income, there was widespread discontent, which occasionally found outlets in 
out breaks of riots. Such conditions enervated public disquiet about the financial 
implication of ECOMOG. When William the Financial correspondent 
reported that a substantial proportion Nigeria's Gulf War windfall- n""r"'f ... ~n 
500 million US had been appropriated to sustain ECOMOG and was 
subsequently deported, the suspicion that pervaded public perception of ECOMOG 
was intensified (Adisa, 1993: 148). 
What further aggravated domestic tensions was the that the situation on 
ground appeared to be frozen and the endless rounds negotiations designed to 
persuade Taylor bore no apparent was some measure of public concern 
about the 'body count' of the operation and this was aggravated by the faulty 
information management strategy of the Nigerian authorities. controversy was 
fuelled by inconsistencies on the part of government. The African Concord 21 
January 1991 put the death toll at 750 as at December 1990. Major-General Joshua 
Dongonyaro, the then ECOMOG field commander, said that only 70 soldiers had been 
killed. Colonel Chijuka, Director of Army Public Relations, the figure at 
lower than 50. Quite expectedly, the public was very sceptical about official claims 
(African Concord, January 1991). 
In view of the mounting domestic and regional pressure over Nigeria's role in 
ECOMOG, Babangida appealed to military humanitarianism and Pan-African 
sentiments when he emphasised that: 
" ... We should also appreciate the fact that the leadership of the ECOWAS is aware that the 
entire world is watching and judging our collective capability in mounting effective policy 
response to the present critical economic, and to our SUD··regIon. 
We also know that there are those who are to see the Liberian crisis as a concrete 
evidence or indicator of Africa in and in purposeless and without any 
directional control at this crucial last decade of the 20th century. But above we all know 
that in in of minor we are first and foremost 
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retl(~ctitlg the love we have for our countries, our SUI}.re21On. the black 
world, and mankind" (in Nwachukwu, 1991: 108). 
Such sentiments by the Babangida administration were taken with scepticism, as some 
of domestic critics related Nigeria's involvement in ECOMOG to the transition to 
civilian rule. Critics of the Babangida administration had always charged that had a 
hidden agenda: to himself in power, an allegation which he strenuously 
denied. Ho}Vever the regime's tendency to shift the transition date from once it draws 
near gave fuel to such speculations. Initially, the target date was 1990, and then it was 
shifted to 1992 presumably October, then December. The date of January 1993 was 
eventually announced only to be shifted again in November 1992 to August 1993. 
Critics also drew attention to the constant changes the timetable for handover and 
raised the possibility that a Liberian debacle could provide a plausible pretext 
extension of the tenure and military rule. Alternatively, they 
should reflect upon the implication of bequeathing ECOMOG IPO~Il'U_ a probable 
"Vietnam" to an incoming civilian government (Adisa, 1993: 148-149). 
Responding to the charge of a probable 'Vietnam' Gen. Babangida sought to assuage 
the fears of such critic by indicating that: 
Liberia will not be a Vietnam. nus:sum there is clear, and attainable. 
Indeed, there is no wisdom in ,....lYln<u+n<J ECOMOG, a multilateral peace force, to the 
Vietnamese and Afghanistan's experience. Every conflict has its own context and character, 
and those who take time to study the genesis of the two conflicts they parade .as typical 
examp1es will soon realise that the scenario they are in the Liberian crisis is both 
false and (in Nwachukwu, 1991:107). 
In view the foregoing analysis it became apparent that the diplomatic initiative was 
all the more bedevilled by the bitter differences that surfaced among member states of 
ECOW AS following the deployment of ECOMOG. Although the root causes of the 
Liberian conflict are local, the operational factors which sustained it are tied to 
regional rivalries involving Cote D'Ivoire, Burkina Faso, Libya on one hand, and 
Nigeria, Ghana, and Sierra Leone on the other. These rivalries are in tum rooted in and 
sustained by a historical and complex interaction between extra-continental interests 
(Britain and France) and regional economic, political and ideological which 
bedevilled ECOWAS from inception. Such a configuration of factors lnn,pr .... ".nr',. .... 
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dangerous spiral of linkage between local and systemic influences on conflict in the 
sub.region, especially when it involves prevalence in civil disorder (Adisa, 1993: 165). 
In spite Gen. Babangida's re-assurances to both its domestic and regional critics, 
Nigeria's role in ECOMOG and the force itself came under sustained attack on issues 
based on legality and principle. 
The Principle and Legality of ECOMOG. 
The deployment of ECOMOG forces generated senous legal controversy. 
chairman of the Mediation Committee, Sir Dauda Jawara, tried to pre·empt this 
. possibility. At a briefing given to diplomats Banjul, revealed that then UN 
Secretary De Cuellar, had written to wishing the ECOW AS 
initiative success and was to be given a full update on the proposed move to 
endorse ECOMOG actions (West Africa, August 1990). He further noted that he 
sought legal advice on the matter but concluded that the sort of peacekeeping 
envisaged did not need Security Council approvaL Present also at the Banjul summit 
was the OAD Secretary-General, Salim A. Salim, who gave his blessings to the 
enterprise and later urged the permanent members the UN Security Council to 
support the subregional initiative (West Africa, August 1990). 
if the objective was to attenuate criticisms, the stnlte~r;y did not work. 
most important legal and political questions at the centre the of the 
deployment ofECOMOG include the 
• Why should a multilateral organisation that was established for econonuc 
integration assume the responsibility for the collective security and management of 
conflicts in the sub-region? 
• To what extent should a multilateral be utilised in contlict situations that are 
purely internal to member states and do not involve a second state actor or a 
foreign power as party to the conflict? 
• That the decision to deploy ECOMOG was contrary to Article Section 2 of the 
OAD Charter and the corresponding articles the UN which expressly forbid 
interference in domestic affairs of member states and that it also violated the 
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1978 ECOWAS Protocol on Non-Aggression espeCl:aHv 2 which demands 
that: Each member state shan refrain from committing, encouraging or condoning 
acts of subversion, hostility or the territorial integrity or political 
independence of other member (ECOWAS Treaty, 1992). 
• What is the legal basis on which ECOWAS decided to impose a multilateral force 
on Liberia? To what extent is the concept of humanitarian intervention legally 
tenable? 
• dominance by Nigeria of the composition and financing the force been 
an equally contentious .. The issue of the dominance of the ECOMOG 
initiative by Nigeria and the perception that Nigeria sought, through the ECOMOG 
platform, to extend her dominance of the 
bone 
African sub-region also became a 
• Finally, ECOMOG was perceived as a force conceived to provide support for 
Pre:Sictent Doe and to Once Doe was killed the 
argument then turned to the belief that ECOMOG was aeslgnc~ to impose a 
government on Liberia. In fact, Charles Taylor argues that the was largely a 
Nigerian attempt to impose agenda on Liberia. (Vogt and Ekoko, 1992:206). 
However, such legal criticisms have been found to have substantial flaws. In the first 
case, the desire to delink the purpose of economic co-operation from re~,lOnat security 
is defective. Political stability is a nec:essary precondition for any for of enduring 
economic co-operation. attempt to delink economic co-operation from regional 
security is a moot point (Adisa, 1993: 142). further reinforce the intertwined nature 
of the two, then ECOW AS General Abass Bundu in an interview held 
before the 14th Ordinary Session of 
point; 
of in Abuja, succinctly stressed 
"You can not talk meanill1gfilily about economic Co-()pel'atiCIn and int.'"""ti by it self 
without relating to the underpinning of political stability within the sub-region. The two 
are inseparable and therefore have to be discussed inter alia. It is clear to me that regional 
solidarity and commitment to integration will be enhanced where political 
stability becomes a conunon identity and is also ""'1"""hn"'t'1 as a shared reslx>ru;ibility" 
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(West August July 1991:1085). 
Also the presumption that the deployment of violates the non-intetference 
clauses in OAD and UN Charter is subject to dispute for main reasons. First 
is on the grounds of military humanitarianism. The OAD Secretary General Salim A 
Salim and Dauda Jawara, the then ECOWAS chairman, have placed crucial '"'''11./<1""1,, 
on this point. The OAD chief dismissed the criticism as rhetorical and academic' , 
Before ECOWAS undertook its initiative many, including the African media, were 
mdittelren(~e demonstrated by Africa. The most desirable thing would 
to have an agreement of all to the conflict and the convergence of views of 
all member states of ECOWAS. But to argue that there is no legal basis is surprising. 
Should the countries West just leave Liberians to each other? Will that 
more legitimate? Will that be more understandable? (West Africa, May-June 1990). 
Salim further added that; will rather make a mistake trying to solve the problem 
than to in such a situation" (West Africa. 1991: 1085). The 
Secretary General did not think so and could not added that if the 
intervention was construed as a legal error it remained proper. Salim's position derives 
strong support from changes in the character of UN peace-keeping orientation which 
has jettisoned classical conception which meant conflict 
containment to embrace multicomponent missions such as human rights overwatch, 
midwifing political transitions and complex building operations including the 
process of national reconstruction and administration as envisaged in Cambodia (Vogt, 
1992: 216). ECOW AS chairman Sir Dauda Jawara was even more categorical 
when he noted that: U the wanton killings going on in Liberia has made that country a 
slaughter-house and the situation could no longer be treated as an internal matter" 
(West Africa, May-June 1990). 
The premise of 'internal affairs' is as problematic for the opponents ofECOMOG as it 
is for proponents. How one may ask, can an insurgent movement such as Charles 
Taylor's NPFL, with cadets trained in Libya, a staging post in Faso and 
conduit pipe for supplies and transit facilities provided by d'Ivoire refuge in 
claims of internal affairs? (Adisa, 143). Moreover, how can the crisis be treated 
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as an internal affair when it had spillover effects into neighbouring countries and their 
embassies a subject of attack? The current civil war in Sierra Leone is a direct 
of the Liberian crisis. Added to is the fact that by allowing Charles 
Taylor to assemble his in Burkina Faso and using Cote d'Ivoire as a launching 
pad, with the full knowledge of the governments of these countries, had 
already been internationalised before the deployment of ECOMOG. ECOW AS 
1981 Defence Protocol COIlta1l!1S clear provisions for the use of Allied Armed forces in 
internal conflict when there is an indication of external support. This Protocol provides 
the empowering instrument for the deployment of ECOMOG; with Cote d'!voire and 
Burkina stilI remaining strong launching pads for the NPFL. Furthermore, the 
growing importance of multinational companies in the exploitation of Liberia's natural 
resources further extern ali sed the crisis situation (V ogt and Ekoko, 1 208). 
The other legal aspect relates to the modality of intervention. Article of the 
Protocol on Mutual As;slstan(::e On Defence provides that "in case of threat or 
aggression" directed against a member states the Authority shall, on receipt of a 
written request submitted to the current chairman, with copies to other members, 
decide on the expediency of military action in relation to the provision of Article 6. The 
issue then is whether this provision was complied with and in what form? In an 
interview with James Butty, Dr Harry Moniba, the former Vice President of Samuel 
Doe observed that: 
"Incidentally, let me add that the of ECOMOG was dne to letter written the Doe 
administration to the Chairman of ECOW AS him to send a peace force. 
Know because I have of those (West Africa, February-March, 
1992). 
Adisa (1993) has argued in this vain that, in the of submissio~ the only 
plausible objection is about whether Doe at that time had authority to be regarded as 
the legal President of Liberia. The answer to this question is positive, otherwise why 
would Taylor and his men have insisted at the subsequent mediation meeting that 
Samuel Doe should down as condition for accepting a cease-fire. Moreover, an 
insurgent movement has to topple an incumbent before it can lay claims to power. 
Hence, Charles Taylor's inability to dislodge Samuel Doe from the Executive Mansion 
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could be regarded as a testimony to the constitutional 
(Adisa, 1993: 144). 
of Samuel Doe's position. 
In any the refusal to accept the legality of Samuel Doe's position simply 
supports the view that there was no government in Liberia, no machinery 
that can with the outside world; only anarchy. Accordingly, individual states 
had a duty to intervene to ensure the safety of the international 
community (specifically ECOWAS) had the duty to intervene to stop the irresponsible 
killing of with the doctrine of military humanitarianism which as 
explained earlier on, has been sanctioned by the UN (Adisa, 1993: 144). 
dominance of ECOMOG by Nigeria and cost of the operations to 
especially in view of the severe economic situation the country was was criticised 
largely by who could not understand the relevance of the situation to 
u .. o.v",,,,, IIlter'ests. Other sub-regional actors' who were critical of 
dominant involvement, especially Burkina Faso and Cote d'Ivoire were, memsleJV~es 
deeply involved in Liberia and they perceived ECOMOG, especially at the initial stage, 
as an attempt by the Anglophones to extend their dominance and undermine their 
national agenda. However, by incorporating the critical states into the negotiating 
especially by the leadership of the peace initiative to Cote d'Ivoire, 
appeared for a to have mended the bridge created between the 
Anglophones and Francophones. Secondly, the several mediatory sessions and the 
....... "'''.M display of bad faith by Charles Taylor created serious disaffection between 
Taylor and his supporters who were by constant signature of peace 
gre1em(mts only to denounce and backtrack as soon as he got home (V 081 
.LJ .... ~J"'U, 1993:208). 
As a result Taylor's 'soured' relations with his the July 1992 
ECOWAS ",., ... ,uun held in Dakar did not have difficulty in agreeing to impose a 30 
days ultimatum on Charles Taylor to adhere to the terms of the Geneva Accord which 
stipulated that each warring faction be encamped and disarmed as a prelude to the 
elections. However, the consensus that was built in ECOWAS on 
management of the Liberian crisis appeared to have broken down again as some of the 
francophone countries, including President Soglo of Benin Republic who was the 1992 
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ECOWAS chairman were critical the decision to implement the sanctions that were 
imposed on the controlled areas following the failure of that force to to 
disarmament a.I]d encampment. (Vogt and Ekoko, 1993: 209). 
The refusal of NPFL to disarm and to confine its Trn,nnc to designated areas in 
keeping with the provisions of the Lome cease-fire agreement, was to leads in June 
1991, to yet another mini-summit of ECOWAS at Yamoussoukro (Cote d'Ivoire), 
during which a committee of five nations- Cote d'Ivoire, the Gambia, Guinea Bissau, 
:serleg,aJ and were named in order to attempt to break the stalemate the 
Liberian peace-process. The emergence of this committee was endorsed at the 
ECOWAS annual summit which took immediately after, at Abuja (Nigeria) in 
early July 1991. The committee of five was, in fact, the ECOWAS Observer Group 
Liberian election-a sub-committee of the ESMC-which the larger body had 
provided for during its first meeting in Banjul in August 1990. (Nwokedi, 16). 
The of this new committee seemed to be in its chairmanship assured 
by the d'Ivoire whose leader has a Taylor and 
also, its inclusion of Senegal thus bringing into the diplomatic Francophone 
states whom Taylor appeared to have much confidence. Yet, whereas Senegal was 
to send a contingent of 1,600 troops to the ECOMOG, the Ivorian leader made moves 
that suggested that a United Nations peacekeeping force should replace the ECOMOG 
force in Liberia. But because good judgement prevailed, the committee was to 
invite, its second meeting, Burkina Nigeria, and Ghana as observers at its 
Yamoussoukro meetings. At the third meeting of this committee in October 1991, 
another agreement was reached on timetable for the disarming of troop of the warring 
factions and for the holding of national elections. Yamoussoukro agreement was 
to prove once again, a failure owing to differences its interpretation between 
ECOMOG and 
which set up its own 
Cognate the 
Babangida and Gen. 
Interim Government on one the 
other hand (Nwokedi, 1992: 17). 
seen that, ECOMOG 1.I .... " ... Ut ... u the 
~""'..,u .. administrations with it or;:>,.:IT""CT challenge on foreign 
policy agenda. Previously, criticism of ""vtE'rnl'l initiatives were few unsustained 
and often times, normally mooted by vociferous critics of the ".""c.',vn"" who would 
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condemn the syndrome' of external relations as profligacy in the midst of 
want The tenor of domestic criticism of ECOMOG followed a similar pattern but the 
sources were not acknowledged critics but the average man in the streets. The 
criticism was with echoes of internal problems and compounded by a 
measure of francophone hostility at regional level. This dangerous mtlerSlectllon 
prompted a crisis of confidence at the governmental level and it soon became clear to 
GenBabangida that he could only alleviate the situation which involved, (1) 
incorporating the Francophone critics the process at the sub-regional 
level and (2) coming out to a spirited defence of the poHcyin a dramatic bid to 
win public support within Nigeria. (Adisa, I 149). 
To incorporate the Francophones, Babangida had to "v'-" ....... of 
Houphuet-Boigny and the only way to do this was to indulge his grandstanding as 
Africa's 'wise old man'. In this regard, Nigeria needed to take a backseat in conference 
diplomacy while openly conceding the leadership of the peacemaking process to Cote 
d'Ivoire. The process was subsequently adjusted to accommodate this 
objective (Adisa,1993: 149) 
It has been further argued that, Houphuet Boigny accepted this position because of the 
inner logic of his accession to leadership in the peace process. Nigerian diplomacy 
stressed that as captain of the venture he could ensure the impartiality of the mission 
and ascertains that the essence was not dislodging Charles Taylor. Similarly, Charles 
Taylor could now assume that Houphuet Boigny would not preside over a process 
designed to liquidate his influence. Moreover, the incorporation of the francophone 
critics into the peace process strengthened ECOMOG. (Adisa, 1993:150). 
In essence, therefore, the substance of the controversy that attended the "",...,"' .... +. 
ECOMOG is really political differences in the and not 
community dissensus within the ECOWAS was a function of political 
differences, the interests of various leaderships and their personal differences 
(Adisa,1993: 144). 
ECOWAS' Liberia experience was significant because it was the time that West 
African leaders had questioned hitherto inviolable principles of sovereignty and 
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non-interference in internal affairs. Scholars of conflict resolution go as far as to argue 
that the episode shaped future US intervention in Somalia, and this paved the way a 
new era of co-operation regional institutions and the UN in conflict 
resolution. In that ECOW AS, recognised the in Liberian spill over for the sub-
the community paper tiger that many insist it is- in advertently or otherwise 
made a strong case for interdependence and supra-nationality, to replace outmoded 
and unworkable concepts of independence and nationhood (Africa Report, 1994: 41). 
ECOMOGlNigeria and The Sierra Leone Imhroglio. 
ECOMOG's involvement in Sierra """,""JU,", can be traced to the first set of Nigerian 
troops that were dispatched to Freetown In 1993 at the request of the then 
government. force though not initially rlr~un'l from of ECOMOG 
forces in Liberia was later to be incorporated into the ECO~M~O~G~~~~~~f1~orce. 
However, it was only after the overthrow of the elected government of President 
Ahmed Tejan-Kabbah, that the LA,",H"''';'<.J 
--------------~-~------~~~---~~~--~-
...,.l"l,F-i....... and richest power, 
Nigeria has taken a proprietorial interest in its neighbourhood. Political observers have 
argued that, it was inevitable. No one else was so inclined. After the disasters in 
Rw~da and Somalia, no Western government was prepared to send troops to the 
region (The Economist 1998: 14). 
There is no doubt whatsoever that the Sierra """''''''JUV crisis is first and foremost a 
political an intra-elite struggle control power. Contests political 
control are considered as normal features of modem states especially in so far as they 
take place within the confines of the constitutional framework. constitutional means 
were pursued then there would be minimal dislocations in terms of political transitions. 
The Sierra Leone crisis is not in category. By the time the crisis started in 1991, it, 
pitted the government of President Joseph Momoh against the forces of Corporal 
Foday Sankoh's RUF, with support from the NPFL in Liberia, who had also resorted 
to an extra constitutional means order to remove the former from power or ''' ......... Iu 
acquire power themselves (Nkowedi, 2). 
Gen. Abacha's ability to shape f'nrE~ian policy domestic purposes was facilitated 
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by the historic Anglophone and Francophone he!~e:rnloUllc divide and in the sub-region. 
The role of COte d'lvoire in the peace process in Liberia was seen as an extension of French 
ambitions in West Africa of the alleged between the son of the 
Mitterand and the then of NPFL in Liberia Charles Taylor. _ ... _ ... , by way of 
Nigeria, helped US not to lose its only direct of m Africa. The US 
returned this favour in the case where Britain needed US help, by 
Nigeria, to destroy the RUF and the disloyal army in order to remove the possibility of 
Taylor's influence on behalf of France (New African, 1998: 14). 
However, in spite of the between Nigeria, Britain, and the US 
over their respective policies on Sierra Leone, the political leadership of the 
Leone peace process into the lap of Cote d'Ivoire again. This happened by a 
coincidence of interests between the then of State of Sierra Leone, Brigadier 
Julius Maada Bio and the leader of the Corporal Foday Sankoh. Both leaders had 
come to suspect and mistrust the intentions of the US, Britain and Nigeria. Brigadier 
Bio was dishevelled by what saw as arrogant interference in domestic affair of 
Sierra Leone. Britain and the US insisted on 'election before peace' and added the 
moral authority Commonwealth the UN. The OAU sought to remain neutral 
(New Afiican,1998: 14). 
Corporal Foday Sankoh, a veteran of the Congo saw how Lumumba and 
the Congo were destroyed by the British and even at the expense of the 
of the UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold. Corporal Sankoh was 
therefore mistrustful of ECOWAS the thumb of the Nigerian military 
establishment. It was this coincidence of interests that drew Cote d'Ivoire to the centre 
stage of the Leone imbroglio. had offered to host the talks but Freetown 
had yielded the option of the choice of venue to (New Afiican,1998: 14). 
Thus Cote d'Ivoire directed the U"'''~V''''''~''''''' process with support from the UN, OAU, 
Commonwealth and the International Alert. Ghana, Burkina Faso and especially 
Guinea and left out. Britain was irritated by what it saw as interference in 
its of influence. When the OAU became accepted by Brigadier Bio and 
Corporal Sankoh as a more neutral broker, it is alleged that the OAU Secretary 
was asked to standoff by Britain and the as in their opinion, the UN could 
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not play second fiddle to the OAU. This was reinforced by President Kabbah who 
accused both OAU and International Alert of too close to the RUF and 
elements within the Sierra Le(mecin army. Despite the clash of interests and interplay of 
a peace was duly signed and named the Abidjan Accord on 29 
November 1996 (New Afiican,l 14). 
However, the leading to the of the Abidjan Accord was a turbulent one 
In international community. The leadership struggle in UN was in full swing; the 
US against the of France was challenging Boutros Boutros-GhaH's 
leadership. Coincidentally, key personalities in the Sierra peace process were 
candidates to succeed Boutros-Ghali. Salim Ahmed the OAU 
General, Amara the l"n .. '>1 ......... Minister of Ivory Coast and Ould Abdallah, the chief 
executive of Afiica Alert, (New Afiican, May 1998), were aU interested in the post of 
the UN Secretary-General and their names had been put forward along with that of 
Kofi Each candidate knew the strength of will of th  and Britain and the 
importance of winning their votes. These coincidences of interest also came to shape 
and the and of the peace process in Leone. The filling 
was two tactics of Salim Salim who was also on "" ..... ,.'"'''' a third term as 
the OAU Secretary Salim got President Kabbah to nominate him and also the 
support of Gen. Abacha. that juncture, the coincidence of had coalesced 
with the US and Britain using Nigeria and Guinea to sideline Cote d'Ivoire. At the 
same time a Guinean senior UN officer, Lansana Kouyate, had taken over as 
Executive of ECOW AS based in Abuja, the Nigerian Capital (New 
Afiican,1998: 14). 
whole issue of election before or peace before election became a political dice in 
hands of different contestants, The question who will finance the 
also became contentious, with pledges coming from different 
despite pledges international community to only 
B:lr11~Qin paid up, The ultimate desires Western the ones such a 
hurry to see civilian rule root in Sierra Leone-was to marginalise the RUF, it 
would seem. Their belief was that once a civilian government is in place, western 
military hardware would pour into to back the government in a last ditch 
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attempt to annihilate the RUF. But there was no guarantee that would happen. 
Crushing the internal revolution will only the rebellion underground, to ",mD .. r,,,,, 
later. So peace appeared to be the best approach, notes William Zartman, writing 
about negotiations in internal conflict, observed that 
" ... In principle, negotiation is the best policy for both in an 
conflict...Reduction of OT1I"v!U'''',." is sometimes even as the government 
way of deterring from devotion to the cause; negotiations thus becomes 
correspondingly difficult, if not impossible. Rebellion a way of life in a culture of 
violence. Negotiations become ditll:icullt in that Sltlllau(m for at least four other reasons as well. 
First there is no room for compromise on the part of the rebels. Recognition is both the top 
and bottom line. Whether as a reglOlt!U secession movement or as a national contestant for 
central power rebellion seeks recognition and once this has been achieved only 
................. " ....... details remains to be Second there is room for which are 
the components of bargains. The rebellion issue and commitment are integral and indivisible 
and the have little to up but the rebellion. So the most important deal is made 
and the agreement to negotiate, leaving only details to trade off when neg;oti~ltIOJtlS (in 
West March 1996). 
It seemed that both RUF the NPRC appeared to have reached the stage where 
they were both prepared to cut and end the carnage that has engulfed the 
country for the last eight years. Zartman further posits that negotiation offered 'an 
alternative, somewhere between unattainable triumph unlikely annihilation' (:Nest 
Afiica, March 1996). However, in spite of the seeming convergence of interest 
between the NPRC and the RUF, they could not agree on issue of The 
agreed that the elections were the best thing for the country but that they were 
being conducted at the time. demanded that the war 
should end before elections take place. It that the RUF would take part in the 
elections not as a political party but through the participation of individual members 
(West January 1996). 
In spite of objection to of election before peace, NPRC went ahead 
with it plans to return the country to civilian rule but on the condition that there is an 
atmosphere of peace. The rebels on the other hand stressed that they would not co-
operate with any of the political parties that would fonn a new government, if the RUF 
does not playa major role in the transition from a war-tom society to one of relative 
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peace. This was a recuning theme during the talks, which were chaired by the foreign 
Minister of Cote d'Ivoire, Amara Essy. The RUF insisted that they would not 
recognise ~he presidential and parliamentary elections. politicians, who were not 
represented in Abidjan, said that they could end the conflict. The soldiers on the other 
hand believed that they were in a better position to broker peace now that they are 
talking to the rebels. (West Africa, March 1996). 
This then begs the question: should the return to civilian rule have been delayed so that 
military can hand over power in a conflict-free environment? However, the first 
tentative moves to return Sierra Leone to normality- that is, to establish a civilian 
government and to about peace - were made inside and outside the country in 
the first of March 1996. Elections for a President and a new parliament were 
held in areas of the country that were not embroiled in the civil conflict while at the 
same time the rebel RUF and members of the government side began talks in Cote 
d'Ivoire. With the elections completed and the counting over, it the dawn of 
the Second Republic under the leadership of President Tejan-Kabbah, leader of 
the SLPP (West Africa, March 1996). 
first moves towards normality were believed to have achieved with the 
of the new leader. The new )Vernnlent" determination to restore to 
led them to engage in talks with the RUF which had been 
started by the previous regime in Abidjan. However, it soon became a stark reality that 
the establishment of a legitimate government could only be deemed complete with a 
negotiated settlement to end the war. The tasks ahead of the new government were 
enormous and were more than just clamouring for a return to civilian rule. Some of the 
immediate questions that needed attention were; how will government ensure that 
public institutions are stronger than politicians; that people are able to boot out bad 
leaders office through constitutional means; that politicians are held accountable 
their policies while in VA.""",,,,. and that the people feel that ""T"'''''''''T<! are represented 
in government and other public institutions? (West Africa, March 1996). In the midst 
of finding answers to some of these challenging issues, the government President 
Tejan-Kabbah was short lived as the army resurfaced and overthrew the one-year-old 
civilian government. This action by the military brought them into direct confrontation 
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with the Nigerian-led West Afiican intervention ECOMOG. 
It is a general contention now that, despite the appalling human rights record of the 
military establishment in Nigeria and the doubts that Britain and the US express about 
Nigeria's willingness to return to constitutional rule, Britain and Nigeria backed by the 
have found a common ground in third policies over Liberia and Sierra Leone. It 
has been a remarkable coincidence of which domestic politics in 
Nigeria and the fact that Abacha is generally considered to be an international 
outcast (New Afiica, April 1998). But Nigeria is not anyone's poodle. Nigeria has 
staked its national interest in the success of its operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone 
in order to break the international isolation, which continued to hamper the political 
objectives of Gen. Abacha. In Abacha's eagerness to seek international support or 
understanding for his democratisation programme, he has inversely isolated Nigeria 
from most of West Afiica. He could not carry his with him in his pursuit of 
the military option in 
April 1998). motives of 
Leone in order to "restore democracy" (New Afiican, 
Abacha have therefore been brought into question 
and it remains to be seen if he had scored the real victory he yearned for. But here, the 
adage that no one has any use for you you have allowed yourself to be used is 
apt. It will be recalled that the decision to intervene in Jun 1997, as soon as the military 
ousted President Kabbah on May 1997, nearly divided the military establishment in 
Nigeria. Those who advocated a military solution argued that it would the US and 
Britain to change their stance on the domestic politics of Nigeria. However, they were 
wrong. Yet still the victory in Sierra Leone may produce the same convulsive anger 
that eats at the vitals of every Nigerian (New Afiican, April 1998). 
With the overthrow of Teejan-Kabbah government by the AFRCIRUF under the 
chairmanship of Major Koroma, the Nigerian-led ECOMOG force was invoked to 
restore the deposed civilian government. However, this restoration did not come 
without controversy as was manifested in Liberian Whatever happened to 
non-interference? Meddling in other countries' let alone invading them used to 
be a taboo, even in the best of causes. When Tanzania invaded to throw out 
the dictatorial Idi Amin in 1979, it was fiercely condemned. But when the Nigerian 
troops moved against junta officers in Sierra Leone who had overthrown an t:lt:CLt!:U 
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government, their intervention was accepted by the world as Sierra Leone were 
Nigerian and not an independent state nearly 900 miles away (The Economist, 
1997). 
the coup of May some 900 Nigerian troops were already in 
by treaty: a battalion attached to ECOMOG, the west African peacekeeping force, and 
a military training team. But no agreement had made provision for intervention to 
reverse a coup. Nonetheless, on 2 June 1997, Nigerian vessels shelled army 
headquarters and Nigerian troops seized the international airport and then 
brought in reinforcements. In return, Sierra Leonean soldiers attacked a hotel where 
foreigners were sheltering under Nigerian protection. was negotiated and 
attempts renewed to persuade the coup makers to surrender. The pause time for 
foreigners to escape and Ghanaian and Guinean troops to arrive, helping the Nigeria 
Force to look more multinational. Most of the usual guardians of international 
behaviour and rules remained· The US would not comment on 
intervention, not the least because they had rescued American Britain 
At the Security Council there was outrage about the coup but no public 
comment on Nigeria's role. African leaders, meeting at an OAU summit 
. ,Zimbabwe, a mandate, albeit retrospectively, by calling on 
\ \ ", 
ECQWP;:S;,the organisation that is responsible ECOMOG, to restore constitutional 
order in Sierra Leone. And the secretary General Kofi Annan, also seemed to 
give backing to the use offorce when he told the OAU: 
1JellOOC1:acy has been uslltrped. Let us do whatever is in our power to restore its owners, the 
Verbal condemnation ... is not sufficient" (The EconoDnst, Iune1997: 50). 
generosity with oil and the provision of credit raCiUn:IjeS for 
it is still not accorded and dignity of office it it 
m the Even after successful reinstatement of the civilian 
government of Sierra Leone, IS little international acclaim. It is this 
.. "" ..... " .. JI', of benign neglect and the feeling being that could choke 
Abacha regime should the expected pay-off not yield results domestically (New 
African, April 1998). 
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The intervention in Sierra Leone, would leave a lot of ex-presidents, 
whose pleas help as they were overthrown went unheeded, must be wondering 
whether they had been born too soon. Suddenly, intervention in Africa is all right, so 
long as it is by Africans; it is then politically acceptable in Africa and elsewhere. In 
it is called "African solutions to African problems". There is now a growing 
confidence among some African leaders that the continent can provide such solutions. 
However, the question is raised, did anybody realised that this might lead to 
being given a free hand West Africa? (The Economist, 1997). 
However, it now strongly argued that, Nigeria's domestic interests ofIate have come 
to shape the politics of West Africa as represented by ECOWAS. As the US sought to 
use the UN in its own national interest, Nigeria has almost succeeded 
ECOW AS as a tool for its national interest despite the chagrin of Ghana, Cote 
d'Ivoire, Burkina Faso and Vulnerable countries like 
Gambia were alarmed by what appears to be a carte blanche the military 
to do what it wants in region just as it does with impunity at home. It is this fear of 
Nigeria's sense of impunity that has worried Liberia despite a job well done there. It 
was the fear of the unintended consequences of the dominant role of Nigeria in the 
formation of ECOMOG that brokered the compromise role of Ghana to provide the 
field commander. But after the capture from ECOMOG of President Samuel Doe and 
his subsequent took over the role of field commander and thus the 
military political leadership was in of d'Ivoire and it 
later shifted to Benin and Ghana between 1990 and 1995. After the of power in 
Nigeria by Gen. Abacha 1993 and by the middle of 1994 his consolidation process 
noticed the international importance supreme control of both the political 
and military leadership of ECOMOG in order to bring coherence in the mission of the 
ECOW AS Authority in Liberia. The and put their ambivalence over the 
military establishment Nigeria aside and provided the backbone of moral and 
material support to this consolidated thrust (New African, April 1998). 
Extra-regional Involvement. 
The "'-'''''JU''' imbroglio casts more light on the web of security companies and 
u .. uu ...... o houses associated with COI1lIllCtS such as the on going 
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When the attention of the British Parliament and press was to the involvement 
of Sandline International, a London-based private military company, in the 
reinstatement to power of Leone's Kabbah, it brought the issue 
into sharper focus. This created a great deal of interest and controversy within British 
political circles. The principal focus of the British parliament and the media was in the 
possible discomfiture of Robin Cook, the Foreign Secretary, who had loudly and 
repeatedly committed the Tony Blair administration to the pursuit an ethical 
policy. the story it appeared that Sandline International might have violated 
the UN's arms embargo on Sierra Leone by supplying weapons to forces loyal to 
President Kabbah, with the knowledge of officials and Ministers in 
government. was the question of how the government would attempt to 
reconcile its ethical pm;1tIcm with played in the affair by Nigeria, 
which was suspended the Commonwealth because of its anuses of human 
and doubts about its commitment to the restoration of civilian rule. (African Security 
Review, 1998: 73). 
However, earlier in the government of Captain Strasser, seeking to ensure a 
continued flow of revenue, hired a private military company employing the Gurkhas to 
help secure the country's principal diamond and titanium oxide mines the 
raiders. This force was however withdrawn looses, and replaced by 
Executive Outcomes, a company with South African origins, introduced to Sierra 
Leone by mining interests that had used its services in Angola. Executive Outcomes 
inflicted heavy losses on the and also began to co-operate with local rural militias 
and self-defence units to curb the excesses of soldiers and rebels At some time, 
outcomes also provided additional training in counter-insurgency to 
militiamen (African Security Review, 1998: 74) 
Soon the overthrow of President Kabbah then sheltering in Conakry, 
neighbouring Guinea, made contacts with Sandline International, a company also 
associated with Executive Outcomes and Diamondworks. According to the account of 
events later released by Sandline's lawyers, President Kabbah initiated the initial 
contact at the suggestion of Penflod, the British High Commissioner to 
sheltering in Conakry. President Kabbah had arranged for funding for the 
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Sandline operation through Rakesh Saxena, a banker wanted for embezzlement in 
Thailand and then on bail in Vancouver on of travelling on a false passport. 
Saxena was evidently anxious either to protect or extend his diamond operations in 
Sierra and was promised that, return for his financial assistance, a restored 
government would grant him certain concessions. By the middle of July, Tim : .. n1P"'" 
the head of Sandline, had flown to West Afiica to see President Kabbah and 
ECOMOG. It was after this meeting that Spicer arranged for the delivery of 35 tons 
of arms and ammunition from Bulgaria, initially to ECOMOG, for onward shipment to 
the civil defence militia's. Sandiine is also believed to have been involved in co-
ordinating the planning of the campaign to unseat Major Koroma, provision of 
logistical support, control· of ECOMOG air operations, including the ,"""rvl"',"," of two 
helicopters, and intelligence gathering. (Afiican Security Review, 1998: 77). 
On the November 1998, a appeared in the Gl be and Mail, Toronto, 
detailing the relationship between Executive Outcomes, Lifeguard, Sandline 
International and a number of mining companies, including Diamond works. It alleged 
that members of these companies were engaged in planning a counter-coup in Sierra 
Leone to reinstatement President Tejan-Kabbah. lack of response was shattered 
after the reinstatement of President Tejan-Kabbah. At least three more articles 
appeared in the international in March about the role of Sandline in President 
Tejan-Kabbah's restoration. But it was not until May that questions in the British 
parliament revealed that a customs investigation was being mounted into the provision 
of arms to ECOMOG, in possible violation the UN embargo (Afiican Security. 
Review, 1998). 
The concern III whole affair was centred on the role played by Nigeria's 
military establishment, which was an international pariah, and by then under 
international sanctions. The concern was about the possible support for mainly 
Nigerian force and how that would square with the and the EU's sanction on co-
operation with the late Gen. Abacha's military rel'ume. In strict terms, the 
sanctions do not prohibit the export of military equipment and services to a force of 
which Nigeria was a part. But governments argued that they would have no way of 
preventing equipment sent to Freetown, example, from being ferried back to 
185 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
(Africa Confidential, May 1998). 
The major contention was centred on Nigeria's pivotal role in the whole operation. 
The assault against Major Koroma, was without doubt, Nigerian organised, Nigerian 
led, and financed by Nigeria. Kayode Ogunbunmi, in the Guardian 
February 15, put it succinctly: "Koroma's ouster is a victory for democracy, no doubt. 
But it more so a victory for Nigeria. It should send out a to potential regional 
trouble makers that Nigeria will not brook further destabilisation in the region- it a 
boost to the morale of Nigeria" (The Guardian, February 1998). 
The main political actors in the execution of the reinstatement of President Kabbah are 
Nigerians. Chief among them was Gen. Abacha, head state, also chairman 
ofECOWAS and Chief Tom Ikimi, the Nigerian Foreign and the chairman of 
the ECOWAS committee of Five on the Sierra Leonean situation. Brigadier Abdul One 
Mohammed, also a Nigerian the ECOMOG chief of staff and so is Colonel Maxwell 
Khobe, the commander of the operation in Sierra Leone (West Africa, February 1998). 
Compounding the dubious role played Sandline International, was the question of 
mandate. It was argued that the Nigerians had no proper mandate-they did not even 
inform other members of the ECOMOG force that they were going to attack- but 
have at least paved the way for the return of the ""I"~·f-.. rl government It appeared that 
no one else was going to get rid of the junta, and a peace agreement am~ng Sierra 
Leone's warring parties, signed in Conakry, Guinea, seemed to be falling apart (The 
Economist, February, 1998). 
However, the chairmen of the OAU and ECOW AS respectively welcomed the 
intervention and it their tacit support. Th operation on the face it was an 
affair. For Nigerian officers to go into Sierra Leone, they needed 
ECOW AS's official backing, once they moved they needed an ECOW AS secretary 
who would support them. At the initial the ECOW AS secretariat decided to 
work in the background. But when Lansana Kouyate resumed his duties relieving 
Dr. Edouard Benjamin, who was sick at the time, momentum returned to the efforts of 
the secretariat However, even during the illness of Dr Benjamin, with the non-
001·PI1.I1.:nlP nature of the other members, was able to get her accepted 
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from one summit to the whether in Abuja, Conakry or Lome (West Africa, 
February 1998). 
The initial reaction to the claim that the British government had condoned or even 
connived over the involvement of the 'mercenaries' in a counter-coup and the illegal 
sale of weapons to President Kabbah, was one The Foreign Mipister 
responsible handling African Affairs denied that his government would 
associate with 'hired and dismissed allegations as irresponsible rubbish. 
Foreign Secretary subsequently supported him, though it was soon apparent that <.:pnll0r 
officials and diplomats enjoyed prior knowledge of Sandline's involvement. 
Indeed, Sandline's defence position was more c>v,,\c>rt than the disingenuous one 
mounted by the British government over its aHlegc;~a involvement in the sale of arms to 
President Kabbah. lawyers detailed with some British officials, in some of 
which actual plans had been shared by the company, claiming with some justification 
that it had every right to believe that its operations enjoyed the support and approval of 
London and Washington (African Security Review, 1998). 
While much of lively debate in British press concentrated on the Ministers' 
possible lack of control over officials, or of Foreign Secretary to pay 
sufficient attention to detail, the broader ironies implicit in Robin Cook's defence also 
drew comment. On 8 May 1998, the Times(London) carried the following: 
"Had president Kabbah not turned to the private sector, he would still be in exile. He had 
universal verbal but and after last coup, only force western 
governments used was to evacuate their nationals; Nigerian troops had tried to overthrow the 
> 
plotters and failed ... since the wrath of the 'international community' had not the slightest 
on the a rational observer might have the British to be 
quietly pleased that unorthodox methods had worked. It certainly at 
the result. Instead, Sandline has been placed under criminal investigation and Robin Cook, 
the foreign seclretary has flatly condemned the operation .... " 
1998: 78-79). 
The· debate in the British circles became centred on 'Resolution 'of UN 
among other prohibited the supply of arms to Sierra Leone, was drafted largely 
by Franklin Berman, adviser to the mUllstlry Sir Berman's interpretation 
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was that the embargo applied equally to all parties in the conflict, and that on these 
grounds, Sandline may have been breaching the law. But by the end of May, the UN 
'>",,,, .. rC! appeared to have changed their minds as had Sandline, that the 
Resolution had as its purpose the reinstatement of the m 
Leone, then which was working towards that end with the 
encouragement of UN, must enjoy an implied partial exemption from the ban 
(African Security Review, 1998). 
it is important to note that Britain despite its position on the Nigerian military, 
has consistently backed the hire and use of mercenaries in Sierra and justified it 
by extraordinary circumstances. British-related such as the Gurkhas, 
Outcomes and have all Sierra.Leone. And for the 
time, the World Bank allowed President Kabbah to us some of its money to pay 
Executive Outcomes in 1996. What is perhaps more interesting is the fact that, neither 
the nor the Commonwealth has criticised this practice of the hire and use of 
mercenaries in Sierra Leone. The stipulation in the Abidjan Accord for the withdrawal 
of all foreign troops within a specific time frame was seen as targeted at Nigeria. 
However, Britain's policy justification in Sierra Leone was anchored on the firm belief 
by both the politicians and civil servants that, 'you can not appease terrorists and 
dictators'. A military solution was therefore the preferred option in Sierra Leone (New 
African, Apri 1998). 
In spite of all the "',..~\+ .. n",,::,,''''' that followed the restoration of President Kabbah, 
Operation Sandstorm, as it was code-named, was considered to be a resounding 
victory. One anonymous West Africa diplomat in London was thrilled by the outcome 
of the ECOMOG mission in Leone. put his enthusiasm thus: 
" I doff my hat to the Nigerians, who have shown the world that we in West Mrica can solve 
OUI own problems without too much bloodshed. This is a tremendous success when you 
consider how the disastrous US-led UN intervention in Somalia in 1993 ended with the so-
called peace killing hundreds of civilians (West 1998:224). 
He further continued that: 
" ... this proves what we have always been saying that Mricans are capable of solving their 
problems without ".,."r.rl:iT.a to outside assistance, which may not be compatible with the 
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way ... we are used to" (West "'",h,n,,,, .. ,, 1998: 224). 
However, there were those who believed that ECOMOG should have waited until 
April 22 when the junta said it would step down before trying to dislodge the 
military regime. This was strongly promoted by the Liberian government whose 
Information Minister, said disapprovingly: ''we think it is pathetic, especially as the 
deadline is approaching for the return to power ousted President Kabbah 
under the Conakry Accord. Only peaceful discussion involving all parties under the 
Conakry Accord is in the right direction" (West Africa, February 1998). Such 
sentiments as expressed by the Information Minister did endear 
government to authorities in Freetown and the force in general. This 
further heightened the accusation of involvement in the 
imbroglio, hence claim 'bad by some ECOW AS member states. 
Sub -Regional Complicity. 
One area of controversy in the Sierra imbroglio has been the involvement of 
countries Liberia and Burkina in propping up the Since the start of the 
war in Leone, accusations have been flying thick and about the dubious role 
of Liberia and Burkina Th Liberians on the other hand, have accused President 
Kabbab's Kamajor's (the traditional hunter militia group which had been on 
the the government) and dissident groups fighting alongside them of 
planning to disrupt the new in their country. Charles Taylor has threatened 
reprisals if any attempt is made to destabilise his country from Sierra Leone 
Confidential, 1999). 
However, many West African leaders find Taylor unconvincing and alarming. They are 
worried by his failure to and development to Liberia than by his 
regional ambition. The latest diplomatic assault started on 13 January, 1999 when the 
government announced it had categorical of Charles Taylor's material and 
logistical support the and warned him to stop. Nigerian and EU diplomats 
repeated that they had clear proof that Charles Taylor had supplied and helped to co-
ordinate RUF operations in Sierra (Africa Confidential, January 1999). 
a result of this accusation of bad-faith between the two countries, Liberian 
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government shut its border with Leone. This came amidst persistent 
allegations that Charles Taylor was providing arms to the RUF and its ally the Armed 
Ruling Council(AFRC), to President Kabbah's government. 
Monrovia has constantly denied that it is supporting the rebels. However, leaders of 
ECOW AS states increasingly becoming bogged down by political problems-decided to 
act swiftly to reduce the An extra-ordinary meting of the committee on 
Sierra Leone was quickly convened in Abidjan. Representatives of Togo and Burkina 
Faso and the ECOWAS secretary joined Foreign Ministers of Cot Ghana, 
Liberia and Nigeria. were from Sierra Leone, the UN, 
ECOMOG and US. (West Africa, January 1999). 
The Liberian Foreign Minister, Omni Capt an was 'ambushed' by his Sierra Leonean 
counter part and the ECOMOG force Commander Gen. Shelpidi. Monie 
Captan denied the accusation and called for an international In 
Monrovia, one government official told West Africa magazine that given the UN arms 
embargo on Liberia did not even have enough weapons to guarantee its own security, 
alone hand any over to the rebels in Sierra Leone. He further claimed that Western 
gunrunners were in weapons through airstrips in rebel-controlled territory in 
Leone and leaving with diamonds, which the RUF was using to pat for its arms 
purchases. At the end of the conference the Committee issued a Communique which 
concern at the against the Republic of 
and strongly condemned the activities of the which are 
providing support to rebels in in violation of the decisions the 
ECOWAS Authority of Heads of States and government and the UN security council' 
(Africa Confidential, January 1999). 
government, the US claims to have 
mn~rCI;:Dte~O satellite and mobile telephone COIlVersaltiOIlS DI~rween Charles Taylor's 
However in the denial by the 
and RUF commanders. 
some 2000 
chief of Brigadier Maxwell Khobe 
said NPFL fighters were sent to Freetown along the 
AFRCIRUF. Taylor in reaction sent envoys to sub-region to explain 
government's position. Liberian Vice-President Enoch on 
14 1999 to inform President Rawlings that Nigerian and .... w .. Ui.l were 
190 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
alilles. The Ghanaian leader bluntly told him that Charles Taylor was stabbing West 
Africa the back, that the evidence indicates the close involvement in the 
assault on Freetown not just another West African Compare of 
Faso) plus a North African (Libya's Muammar Gadaffi) were all guilty of 
complicity. In reaction to Liberia's involvement in Sierra Leone, Rawlings 
ordered all Liberian refugees out of Ghana, telling Vice Dogolea that if 
Charles Taylor could afford a war Sierra Leone, he could afford to look after 
his own migrants Confidentiid, January 1999). 
In spite of the apparent involvement of countries like and Burkina Faso in 
propping up the AFRCIRUF coalition, the reinstatement of President Kabbah should 
send a clear signal to all in sub-region ECOMOG's no nonsense stance. With 
mission accomplished, ECOMOG stands today as probably the world's best peace 
keeping model. Credit must to Nigeria, the leading ""':l1rt ... ,,,, .. in the coalition to oust 
the junta from 
This chapter has explored policy in integration effort West Starting 
with a focus on the protocol on free movement of persons and goods and the ECOW AS mutual 
relation to ofECOMOG, it has illuminated some 
controversies that Nigeria's policy posture has triggered. consequences 
orders of 1983 and 1985; the prolonged land border closure of 1984; and 
b-r~glonlal p€~ace'keeIJmg force ECOMOG, the 
the expulsion 
pivotal role 
....... , .. ~P it 
has explained how the use of 'gun-boat diplomacy' has been instrumental in an attempt at the 
establishment of regional stability. 
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CHAPTER FIVE. 
CONCLUSIONS: Issues, Trends, Options and Recommendations. 
With the dawn of the new millennium and the ever-growing reality of the 'global 
village', Afiica stands at a crossroads transformation. globalisation is as much a 
threat as an opportunity, could regional integration (like ECOW AS) not serve as a 
solid platform from which could enter into the global market, not as 
weak and helpless units, but as relatively influential actors? options open to 
are either to economies' in order to compete in the global market or to 
remain as small units and be 'totally marginalised'. In the West Afiican sub-region, 
"'n ...... the path to integration have been pursued the mid 1970s; and its apparent 
slow progress, have precipitated questions and research interest such as this one, about 
the role of sub·regional powers like in promoting such Nigeria's role 
championing the establishment of and its continued support for the 
or~~arulsatlon is laudable; though have certain policy shifts, which had 
10m ... ,,,,,,, consequences on community. The main question th.",..",t:nr", is how can the 
h_T"d"o-U'" under ECOW AS with the leadership Nigeria, initiate 
constructive and m-.. '''t-o,n ..... policies to take leap into the In other words 
the rp..:,F>~T"I~.h Q1UestlOlrl, which has shaped the discourse of this 
To what extent has Nigeria's policy contributed in shaping the integration efforts in 
West Africa? 
The study of regional policy policy posture in ECOW AS between 1979-
1997 has helped to bring certain crucial policy of the issue to the This study 
has utilised the Rational Actor: Model I as the basis of analysis of Nigeria's foreign and 
regional policy The study was divided into three phases- the Shehu 
Shagari and Gen. Buhari eras 1979-1984; the Gen. Babangida and Shonekan 
eras - 1984-1993; and the Gen. Abacha era 1993-1998. analysis followed 
Nigeria's policy course since the of ECOWAS, to the outbreak of the 
Liberian civil war and Nigeria's' subsequent championing of the formation of 
ECOMOG; the latest and most controversial policy that could be identified with 
Nigeria in the 1990's. In the analysis, special focus was given to Nigeria's expulsion 
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illegal aliens in 1983 and 1985~ the land border closure of 1984 Nigeria's latest 
invention ECOMOG. These policy measures by Nigeria were eximllned in relation to 
the ECOW AS protocols on Movement of persons, goods and and the 
1978 Protocol on Non-Aggression and the 1981 Protocol on Mutual Assistance in 
Defence. The conclusions were drawn from the study and recommendations were 
given in rell:I.tICm to the specific issues examined and role in ECOWAS. 
The study conclude that, the expulsion of aliens in a mass quit-order may appear to be 
the easy solution to West Africa's perennial migration problem of illegal labour and a 
tempting means of gaining domestic political mileage out of economic crisis. But the 
eXt)enlenc:.:es of the including Nigeria's expulsions in 1983 and 1985 shown 
that such have failed both to halt the tide of citizens seeking a life in 
their neighbour's backyards and to discourage refugees from famine and drought from· 
heading to the greener 'south' in search of pasture. It can therefore be concluded that, 
no African nation can afford to turn its back on the citizens of its neighbours, for the 
tables can be turned (Africa Report, July-August, 1985: 13). 
Moreover, just as no West African government can deny that its own economy has 
benefited at anyone time or another from the free movement of labour, neither can it 
shirk a share of the responsibility for illegal aliens within its borders. Wage and benefit 
enticements from host governments and enterprises seeking labour to fuel economic 
growth were frequently the which drew them in the instance, and their 
illegal status was enshrined by employers willingness to hire them. Even if West 
notoriously porous borders were policed and the myriad bush paths 
were somehow brought under closer scrutiny, there would be border guards 
willing to take a little 'dash' or bribe to close their eyes to transgressions of the law 
(Africa Report, July-August, 1985: 13). 
It was therefore in recognition the economic realities of the sub-region that the 
ECOWAS protocol on free movement of persons and goods was drafted. The current 
90-day limit on residency without papers is only a temporary measure toward the 
ultimate goal of a West African common market in which the nationals of one country 
will be able to move work without hindrance in another (Africa Report, 1985: 13). 
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Generally, the movement of labour within the West African sub-region could 
create as many problems as it solved if certain other complementary measures 
social cushioning measures are not introduced as well, such as the right of 
establishment for the self-employed, social and housing for migrants, and 
possibly provisions vocational training. West Africa, as in the and 
the of labour among various national markets cannot rely exclusively on the 
blind forces of supply and demand, this could lead to results that would be prejudicial 
to the sub-regional economy to migrants themselves ... particularly so 
were a lack of knowledge about prevailing conditions in countries of destination 
(Lawson and Reed, 45-46) 
The study also concluded that most cross border movements West under the 
phase took place outside the of the ECOW AS protocol. The draft 
of the supplementary protocol proposed to place all such movements under blanket 
legality. The major instrument for the attainment of goal was the attempt to 
constitute the country of origin of the immigrants as well as the community into the 
pivot of the free movement policy of ECOWAS. In essence, the ECOWAS route to 
supranationality was to be charted not by a direct transfer of power from the Member 
State to the central institutions of the organisation. Rather, this was to take the form of 
alienation powers from the migrant receiving state to that of the' sending with 
the latter exercising de facto, the authority that should be rightly located at the 
community level. This arrangement would have in principle, made some sense all 
member states were equally placed as sending and recipient states or if the issues were 
simply legal, administrative and technical as the bureaucrats tended to perceive them, 
However, some states were not exporters of labour while others (like Nigeria), were 
predominantly recipient of such labour. Furthermore, the kind of reception accorded 
tended to reflect the state of the economy (Abutudu, 1 . 113). 
the 1983 and 1985 expulsions, the exclusion of the unskilled and semi-
skilled workers that the dominant migrant group in West Africa the 
category admissible community citizeIlS under the residence phase, the Nigerian 
state sought to political tenSlOln_ especially emamltlnlg low mcornle 
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groups which seemingly resented the of citizens from the community. 
Furthermore, through the calculated policy of exclusiveness, only categories of 
professionals may be able to advantage of the provisions of the protocol in 
Nigeria. Incidentally, these also constitute the high level manpower group, which in the 
depressed economic conditions of virtually all counties in Africa, have tended to 
turn their sight finnly to the industrialised countpes of the West where their skins 
command value. Thus, in moving away from a strategy of delaying the 
implementation of the second phase to a strategy of modifying the Nigeria 
would appear to have unwittingly, perhaps, promoted a in which the 
Protocol's group would eX(~lU(lea by the market Tn .. , ... .,," 
outside the framework of these market forces unleashed by objective economic 
conditions, the discretionary regime which governs admission into residence status was 
another powerful instrument, at the disposal of any member state, of restricting those 
categorised as admissible under a member 
proposals put forward by Nigeria were fundamentally 
domestic law. Thus, the 
on a consideration of 
prevailing domestic economic crisis. I-4n\1l1.,,·""''' they also attempted to long term 
"t." .. ."",." of the dominant of the Nigerian state by retracing the country's step 
from insularity while ensuring that those conditions which illegal aliens were alleged to 
have created or exploited to aggravate the country's problems were held in check 
(Abutudu, 1992: 116). 
Although Nigeria's expulsion orders have struck a blow at the spirit of as 
well as the long historical associations and the ethnic affinities that exist among West 
African countries, they have at the same time given the member states of the 
Community unique opportunity to reassess the full implications of theProtocol on 
free movement of persons with a view to strengthening it by initiating some 
complementary measures. And one important lesson to be learned from the Nigerian 
experience is that there is the need for a conscious and systematic public education of 
the wider implications of ECOW AS its aims and objectives, the benefits to be derived 
from it as wen the costs involved in the i~plrll1~m~tipp of its provisions. Second the 
social, economic and human problems that ~~~ ftQm lh~' phenomenon of labour 
~ '. ! l" . ~ 
migration constitute a challenge to member states of the cOl1ijl1unity. Third, and as a 
." 
corollary of this, lab?Rf m~)Vement in the absence of any pr~~'frtive measures can lead 
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to various social evils such as crime among the migrant workers, unsatisfactory 
conditions of employment, and damage to the economy and development of 
own country as well as the receiving country. And finally, labour movement 
has implications for labour and social policies in such areas as harmonisation 
national labour legislation of states, conditions of work, and role 
employment exchanges in the machinery for facilitating the geographical mobility of 
workers (Asante, 1986: 160). 
The study concluded that, one other serious barrier to the free movement of labour 
that ECOW AS governments will have to deal with and for which no provision is made 
in the ECOWAS protocol under discussion is the issue of social security. Migrants will 
lose security they have already acquired or are in the process of 
acquiring in the country where they have been residing, and will n t be able to obtain 
.31UJ111<U protection 
security for migrant 
adopted country. In other words, lack of provision for social 
or insufficient arrangements, which mean that the rights 
. acquired in different member countries lost, will tend to reduce intra-union labour 
mobility. movements may also be generated if the purchasing power of social 
security contributions from country to c untry (Asante, 1986). 
massive expulsion of ECOW AS immigrants, under President Shehu Shagari and 
Gen. Buhari, gave lie to support for movement of nationals among 
member states. To be certain there may be no more sensitive political than 
granting political and job opportunities to non-nationals, as President Houphuet-
Boigny of Cote d'Ivoire learned in the 1960s when riots greeted his effort to provide 
Ivorian citizenship to nationals of the Council of the Entente (Thompson, 1972: 143-
163). 
With regards to the closure the land borders by Nigeria against some of her land 
locked neighbours, study concluded that, such an action often resulted a 
downturn toll in a nation's economy. The Nigerian economy, which had to 
experience, some 'feverish cold' since the 1970s due to the oil glut was no 
capable of sustaining a immigrant community regardless of For 
integration therefore to move regional power brokers like Nigeria should 
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avoid taking any precipitate action that will playe~ upon by dissenting voices in the 
sub-region. The essence of integration is to help the hardships of sister 
countries whose development would otherwise continue to stall or deteriorate. 
It is evident that regardless of the effect of the two expulsions, Nigeria was still acting 
within the scope of the ECOWAS and this was clearly defended by the then 
ECOWAS Executive Secretary, Momodu Munu. Moreover, most of the """'1"'"''''''''' 
aliens were staying in violation of the country's immigration laws; while at 
the same time capitalising on the hospitality of the host nation. Therefore, with TPO'l'ITn 
to these two actions Nigeria can not be accused of derailing the integration process, 
uc\.,a.u;)C it immediately acted to dampen the political effect of the measures on the 
community. It could however, be said that it some how played to the hands of 
unwilling states in the whole project of integration. 
On the of ECOMOG and Nigeria's pivotal role the following conclusions were 
drawn. It is important to note that the Liberian and Sierra Leone crisis and 
involvement in resolving these crises have focused attention on the nature of crises 
spreading through continent in the last decade of this century. In the 1990' s, most 
lLU''',,"A conflicts are intra-stall rather than inter-stall, although they do have a much 
broader impact by fuelling regional parallel economic in light arms and assets, 
generating displaced populations, and creating exile communities. Most 
African conflicts like those of Liberia and Sierra Leone are becoming highly 
internationalised: both in their and of various parties (like 
ECOMOG), to prevent, manage or resolve them. They however, reflect the fragility 
and artificiality of the state system bequeathed to Africa by the departing colonial 
powers (Riley, 1998). 
The study concluded that, with the approval of the two defence protocols in 1919 and 
1981, the states of West Africa were considered to accomplished what the states 
of the entire have not: acceptance of mutual security agreement The regional 
than continental to - somewhat more 
aU.UllHa approval of Heads of State. Nigeria's ECOWAS shows 
leadership ...... r.u'I'1 the key to co-operation in West nature, extent and 
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objectives. on mutual defence does not prior full-scale 
greement on amalgamation. The mutual security initiative within ECOW AS came, 
from a core Francophone countries. These states co-operated far more extensively 
and readily than did former British-administered countries. Ironically, the 
predictable behaviour came from Nigeria, whose initiative had been central to 
creation ECOWAS. The removal of Gowon shortly after the of the 
Lagos Treaty was a serious internal problems. Nigeria experienced five ",,,u,,,1'>"" 
of of 1 and 1 this turbulence and of political 
predictability is by the most important member state seriously compromised ) 
in the community (Okolo and Wright, 1990: 1 76). 
There is no doubt that the Liberian process is an ECOW AS n"''''''.'~1" Certainly, it 
came into as a result diplomatic initiative and has 
continued to playa dominant in the military of ECOMOG. It 
is certain that a precipitate decision by Nigeria to withdraw from this nn" ... <>'" 
would lead to its collapse. Yet, Nigeria's dominant role has not tantamounted to the 
imposition of a Nigerian solution as consultations continued members of 
ECOWAS, more especially in the negotiation process between the wamng 
factions. Certainly, Nigeria's initial political and military support for the late President 
Doe gave the impression that the ECOMOG intervention, which it initiated and led, 
was designed to buttress the crumbling authority of the Liberian leader. But the 
analysis, it has shown that once Nigeria voted along with the other members of 
the to adopt a peace plan which it was explicitly stated that President Doe 
had to step aside order that peace might return to Liberia, this was the clearest 
evidence a shift policy towards the government of President Doe 
(Nkowedi, 1992: 17). 
Another salient point to note from the Liberian and Sierra Leone and Nigeria's 
bold at it the establishment ECOMOG, is the revelation 
the divergent and policies the West states. The reason why the 
NPFL, INPFL and ULIMO and Rl.JF in Leone remained 
was simply that some West L>.T1I ...... ", ... states sus:talllea amlcmu)ns: they ".,....""',, 
as conduits for transmission to groups by interest. 
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management of the crisis the logistical and the financial difficulties 
inherent in an ECOW AS collective security arrangement. Many West African states 
were neither nor able to participate in nor were they able to 
contribute to the Fund for the ECOMOG operation in Liberia. It 
may well be that the economic crisis in most of the ECOW AS member states explains 
the lackadaisical attitude, but note worthy is the fact that, there can be no meaningful 
economic progress in the sub-region in the event of generalised instability, as was 
case in Liberia and Leone. It may well be that, according to Gen. of 
Nigeria, divergences and "apparent misunderstandings" are 'lypical and inherent the 
nature of international relations even among friendly countries (Gen. Nwachukwu, 
1992: 931). But this was exactly why Liberian and the Sierra Leone in 
particular remain unresolved for almost seven years after ECOMOG's intervention. 
The ECOMOG experiences in Liberia and Sierra show that, while national 
policy participation peace support operations continue to stress them 
for a comprehensive and solution as a precondition for involvement, there are 
strong arguments for a far more modest assessment of the attainable goals of 
intervention. Where a national legal order has lost its efficacy (like in Liberia), to the 
extent that it no longer protects the citizenry from the grossest of human abuses 
a higher body of law must be invoked - at least until a new legitimacy has been 
established at national level. The problem, however, is that the efficacy of 
international law is widely doubted, and the will to act is often lacking (African 
Security Review, 1998: 18). 
member states of ECGW AS will have to draw salient lessons from their crisis 
management and Leone. Their integrative process cannot be pursued 
in the midst of political turmoil and generalised instability. The two crises have 
perturbed economic realisations within immediate neighbourhood, created an 
unprecedented refugee problem and peace process has consumed resources, which 
ought to have been employed differently. What is more, the crisis reveals that both the 
ECGWAS protocol on Non-aggression and the Treaty on Mutual Assistance on 
Defence need to be reviewed in order to provide them with appropriate structures and 
other logistical requisites. Gn the whole, the nature of the conflicts that the 
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best guarantee against destabilisation and insecurity, is the institutionalisation in the 
West states of a credible democratic political system which without 
let or I'l1n,rlr<>,l"Il"'" 
of its political process 
1992: 19). 
the nature of the state will automatically alter the nature 
1"h"'1"<>1",,,r,,, the pattern of its political (Nkwokedi, 
The Liberia and Sierra Leone cnses and Nigeria's involvement have shown that 
Africa's artificial political borders, combined with decades of colonial manipulation and 
economic exploitation, guarantee that the continent's political jigsaw will provide 
serious and expensive challenges for peacekeepers. Thus, funding for peace keeping is 
a critical issue for any government. The potential costs such operations and the 
massive logistics commitment for long distance operations are factors in any 
decision-making Developing such as can not rush into any 
venture without consideration of the fmancial implications. 
Nigeria's involvement in Liberia and Sierra Leone, have cost the country millions of 
dollars that could have been diverted for development projects in Nigeria itself or the 
West African sub-region (Africa 1995: S). 
It could be asked, from an African perspective whether the peace is to be kept only 
at the cost 
could also 
African states placing their natural resources paw? it 
asked whether those countries lacking the necessary and conveniently 
exploitable unassigned assets are by implication excluded from such assistance from 
the private sector. It may be argued that, only relative security is established, can 
these resources be exploited and the proceeds for the general good. It does 
seem evident however that, mining companies and other entrepreneurs, if they can 
command realisable military assistance, win be in a better position to negotiate 
concessions than other businesses without such connections. Is the time far-off when 
private companies will do battle, literally, for access to the natural wealth of Africa, as 
did the chartered companies of yesteryears? Should this happen, it win be because the 
movers and the the UN have to regard Africa as a continent entitled 
to the consideration the community of nation (African Security Review, 1995: SO-
SI). 
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While and enforcement could help stem violence and save lives, it 
only dealt with the rather than disease. military solution (like 
ECOMOG'S in Sierra Leone) could not be imposed on a political and ethnic contlict. 
As one analyst has put it, 'you can not put out local with distant hoses". (West 
December 1998 - January 1999). The Liberian and Sierra Leonean conflicts 
have shown that the sacred tenets of the OAD, namely, non-interference in the internal 
affairs of can no longer be literally. can not mean 
'indifference'. The activities of ECOW AS in Liberia and Sierra 
Leone, is today canvassed as a success story and perhaps as a pointer to where Africa 
should be going. The effort has been generally applauded, but doubts have been raised 
as to validity as a modeL ECOMOG succeeded, largely because it was funded and 
staffed for the most part by one of its leading protagonists, Nigeria. More cruCially, the 
question has been, whether an elected government accountable to the people could 
crate blanche to effort for almost ten now, as 
military has done. And if the tables were turned and Nigeria 
found itself circumstanced as Liberia had been at the time, and Sierra Leone at the time 
of writing, was it conceivable that ECOW AS countries could summon the will and 
resources to set up an intervention force to restore stability in Nigeria? (West Africa 
December 1998- January 1999). 
The integration process, just like national economic development, is affected 
by external factors, and ECOW AS policy-makers to be very conscious of this 
ECOWAS with Nigeria in lead should take due account of external 
forces that work to discourage regional integration in Africa. On the assumption that 
global is enhanced by trade and that existing world trade pattern is based 
on comparative advantage, preferential arrangements for promoting intra-regional 
trade are generally viewed by the international community to trade diversionary and 
therefore should not be (West Africa, 1993: 1257). 
Finally, the study of Nigeria's policy in ECOW AS between 1979-1997 has shown that, 
in the absence of a clear and consistent policy from Nigeria, ECOW AS will find 
significant progress extremely difficult. the following recommendations are 
provided as viable options based on the findings of the study. 
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Recommendations: 
With to above stated conclusions, ECOW AS can learn from th~ experience 
the European Co-ordinating Office (European Co-ordination and 
of Employment Supply and Demand) and establish an like an ECOWAS 
Citizens to act as an interregional labour clearing house capable of meeting 
the of industry, agriculture, and public services. It should be 
capable of serving interests and aspirations of the working classes by preventing 
any migration that would result in unemployment in the country immigrants 
and a shortage oflabour in the country from which they migrate (Asante, 1986: 161). 
[In this respect, it is therefore recommended that, intergovernmental agreements 
and legislation should lend themselves to organising systematic forms of more 
permanent co-operation among national employment services order to make 
adequate provisions for maintaining a balance between labour supply and demand, 
based on a standard classification of the skills and jobs}. 
An agency similar to the Administrative Commission for Social Security of 
Migrant Workers should be formed to specifY the ways assessing compensation 
between social security institutions of different member countries of and 
administer and regulations governing this exercise. This agency could inter-
alia ensure that there is equal treatment of workers irrespective of nationality; and 
establish close co-operation the social security institutions of ECOW AS 
countries. The application of th  principle of the totalisation of insurance periods will 
also ensure that pension of migrant workers are not lost (Asante, 1986: 162). 
[In order to avoid undesirable repercussions on both the strength the direction 
of labour movements it is recommended that, ECOWAS establishes social security 
.' 
rights based upon many precedents in international welfare law such as 
International Labour Convention No. 48 and the other similar bi-Iateraal 
agreements on reciprocity in this field- set during the past five decades, and upon 
the example of their application the respective cases}. 
There are also such other social policy measures as establishment of vocational 
tr"",n,1"I"'" institutions for communi,ty workers or the setting up a 
social Fund like European Social Fund designed to complement movement 
labour protocol 1969: However, measures may well seem at 
the moment to lie capability and resources of the Yet 
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they are necessary as a step toward the community a 'human face'. 
Continuing conflicts in the region demand that approach to cmuwOl 
and if desired integration process is to be realised. 
Piecemeal approaches have not worked in the past. What is needed is an approach that 
LV""Ul)\;'l) on the whole sub-region as a conflict system. This regional approach may 
involve the adjustment of some national borders, the deepening of democratic 
processes, including the devolution of power development of viable 
local governments (Afiica Analysis, 1999: 15). 
[The study recommends that in light of Nigeria's involvement in ECOMOG and 
the controversy it sparked off, there is the ever-growing need for a regional 
approach to conflict resolution. Above all, the reduction of poverty, through the 
redistribution of national or regional resources is an essential way forward 
movement of labour, capital and in certain a common citizenship, together 
with the unification of the smaller, poorer states in the sub-region may be a 
collective way forward Societies must be demilitarised and the politics of 
inclusiveness must be introduced ECOWAS needs to have strength to map out all 
conflicts in the region and deal them in a regional approach}. 
Regional integration can not succee~a in the face of political instability, as is manifested 
in the and civil which have much 
resources for development goals. Regional instability therefore retards econorrnc 
growth and serves as a disincentive to investment (Bundu, 40-41). [What 
needed, therefore, is /01' Nigeria to co-ordinate some kind of common security 
arrangement that would safeguard and guarantee the long-term peace and security 
of the region and meet the needs of all member states. The two protocols dealing 
with security addresses conflict between member states as well as aggression by 
external forces, and could form the basis for the consolidation of ECOMOG. With 
the limited resources at their disposal, member states could extend on-going public 
expenditure reforms to cover national defence spending, in the context of such a 
regional security system]. 
Security and stability must embrace the development of democratic institutions at the 
national leveL Moreover, the required level of regional solidarity and community spirit 
can be expected to develop by itself, over time, through accumulation of shared 
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experiences, growing awareness of the advantages of belonging to the community, or a 
clearer perception of common interests. process could be actively reinforced 
through Nigeria's promotion of the virtues of regional integration, while propagating 
knowledge and understanding of how regional co-operation can be used in support of 
national development goals (Bundu, 1997: 40-41). [Another salient recommendation 
to notefrom Nigeria's involvement in ECOMOG, when the needfor intervention 
arises, the basis and the limits should be clearly specified, and the legitimacy of the 
effort should never be left in doubt}. 
The question funding should be properly addressed, considering the fact that very 
few member states were up-to-date with their subscriptions. There should be a 
role for ECOWAS; creating a civil constituency for (Africa Analysis, 1999: 
494). ECOMOG should be a permanent order to allow the deployment of 
the at short notice if the need done however there ought to 
be a provision all ECOW AS member should pull their weight. It is not 
on Nigeria that it should carry a share of the burden all the time 
(West February 1998). [The study also recommends that, as a way of getting 
out of the financial quagmire involved in peacekeeping, Nigeria should champion 
the establishment of a peace keeping Fund or Bank. This fund or Bank could 
should be set up with help of donor agencies from the developed world, from which 
funding could be tapped for peacekeeping. The peace keeping Bank or Fund would 
be advised by military experts as to the feasibility of any operation and would 
require reasonable guarantees of success before undertaking the venture). 
[It also recommended that a permanent peacekeeping force built around the 
framework of ECOMOG and recognition of the various inadequacies in the 
ECOWAS Treaties and Protocols regarding conflict Resolution. There should be a 
movement away from the inaction or slow action when conflict erupted}. 
Preventive diplomacy is the best response to growing regional low intensity conflict, 
especially in West Africa where the political, social and geographical complexities 
make peacekeeping unattractive. At the same time, preventive diplomacy requires 
adequate early warning and the speedy response to a crisis. Moreover individual states 
should be encouraged to initiate preventive diplomacy, in consultation with regional 
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nel:ght,ouirs and the ECOWAS secretariat, order to begin peace negotiations before 
conflicts (African Security Review, 12). [Another recommendation is 
for Nigeria and ECOWAS to concentrate their p"jJ'rm,,,,.~ on diplomacy. 
Therefore national governments and international information should provide 
warning networks to avert humanitarian disasters caused either by natural 
disasters or political conflicts). 
[The study further recommends that, Nigeria and ECOWAS should have a proper 
appreciation of external factors that impinge upon their economies, especially the 
negative effects of external pressures, and should take to contain such 
pressures. This can achieved when Nigeria undertake a thorough analysis of 
given development issues and determine the appropriate options for promoting 
West African interests. It only when the region has a firm grasp its short and 
long-term interests that it can gauge the true value of any prop sals or prompting 
from sources external to the region). 
With the inauguration 
ECOWAS be 
a new civilian government in Nigeria, it is hoped that 
a boost from the perceived stability that the return to civil 
will to Nigeria. the European Union took almost four decades to achieve a 
common market, ECOW AS should take inspiration from this put in place 
means and for realisation of ultimate goal - a common ,.....", .. Ir •• t 
as Germany in the EU, Nigeria should bolster dedication to the Community, which 
it has helped to create and sustain. Moreover, the Nigerian experience ECOW AS as 
unravelled by study should serve a focal point for African regional 
powers to emulate. 
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Map Showing the .LJVVU,jUjJ,V Community Of States 
(ECOW AS) member countries. 
Shaded countries are original ECOMOG contributing States. 
Note that it is only Senegal and Guinea-Conakry out of all the Francophone speaking 
states that contributed troops to the original ECOMOG force. 
pulled out about 14 months. 
Appendix ii 
A sketch regional the and Leone 
imbroglios. 
Note the link between Ivory Coast, and Liberia both as and 
conduits for RUF's logistical and manpower supplies. 
Note the concentration of rebel activities in the Eastern and Southern parts of Sierra 
Leone - alluvial diamond lUJJlHU5 areas, which have been to sustenance of 
the RUF war lllQ,vUJCUv, 
A sketch showing the of Mining and Security involved 
Leone thus further complicating an already complex scene ECOMOG. 
that Diamond Works, Outcomes Sandline International have an 
been sucked Leone. 
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